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ABSTRACT

ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE:

CONCEPTS AND STRATEGIES,

A THEORETICAL INVESTIGATION AND AN EMPIRICAL CASE STUDY
by
EQBAL AL-RAHMANI
University of New Hampshire, December, 1988

The main goals of this dissertation are three-folds: (i) to define
the concept of economic independence through theoretical investigation
of five schools of thought: 1) The United Nations Economic Commission
On Latin America

(ECLA); 2) The Dependencia School;

3) The

Soviet

School; 4) The Work on Self-Reliance; 5) and the Work on Small Open
Economies;

(ii)

to

evaluate

the

main

proposed

strategies

in

the

literature for achieving a higher level of economic independence for
Third World Countries.
Industrialization,
the New

These strategies include:

Basic Industrialization,

International

Economic

Order;

Import-Substitution

Regional Cooperation and

(iii)

to

examine

the

Cuban

experience since the revolution in its attempt to reduce its heritage
of dependency, a legacy of more than four centries of colonial and
neocolonial domination.
This dissertation views economic independence as a function of the
internal level of productive and technical capacity and the degree of
national integration.

Economic independence is not viewed as an

equivalent of autarky, nor as an absolute condition, but rather as a

viii

process toward a higher level of national integration and of a more
equal interdependence.
Utilizing

Such

definition

of

economic

independence,

this

dissertation shows that the Cuban economy, mainly through the commited
efforts at industrialization and provision of basic needs,

has

undoubtly became more independent since the revolution and especially
since the

1970s.

This achievement refutes the claim of Cuba's

continued dependency especially in the forms of "Soviet dependency" and
"sugar dependency".

Such a claim mistakenly equates "dependency" with

"dependence" and focuses only on external quantitative factors.

ix

CHAPTER I

CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS OF ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE
Introduction
Political independence from colonial powers has been perceived, by
Third World leaders and liberation movements,
condition for any attempt

to combat

the

as

the necessary

economic backwardness

and

social injustice; economic independence, on the other hand, has been
perceived as a sufficient condition for it.
independence has been linked to the economic
the country.

In many cases

economic

and social development of

Despite the dispute in the literature about the nature of

the causal relationship between development and economic independence,
most writers would agree that a country's

economic independence is an

increasing function of its level of social and economic development.
greater

dispute

in the

literature,

however,

important questions and issues such as:

revolves

around

A

other

what is meant by economic

independence? is it a goal that is confined to certain social systems?
or

is

it pursued

by

all

regardless

of

the

social

and

political

orientation, i.e of the mode of production? what are the prerequisite
conditions

and strategies

for achieving

it?

and who

are

beneficiaries of achieving it?

This chapter will attempt

these

examination

questions,

through

the

of

different

the main
to address

schools

of

thought.
Before exploring the first question,

however, it is important to

tackle another fundamental question: Why economic independence? This

1

question is important because many theoretical contributions in the
literature and the orientation of many of the international development
organizations increasingly point towards economic interdependence among
all countries.

Therefore, why "bother" with economic independence when

most of the international development conferences point towards more
integration?

First,

it

is

important

independence

should not be viewed as

to
the

clarify

that

opposite

economic

of economic

interdependence. Emphasizing the issue of economic independence is by
no means a call for

a reduction of international economic relations

whether in the form of trade or cooperation among nations.

It is not a

call for autarky, which is not a viable option even for the large and
richly endowed countries.

Most writers on the subject, as we will see

later, would equate economic independence with a more equitable level
of economic interdependence between the developing countries and the
developed ones.
For most Third World countries, the long and bitter experiences of
colonization remain as an important factor for their concern
economic independence.
been the
(i)

with

The goal of economic independence, however, has

center of much recent attention for the following reasons:

the worsening

financial

situation of many of

the

Third World

countries (including both poor and rich ones), manifested in the huge
external debt and exacerbated

by the international economic recession

of the 1970s; with the consequent increased interference of the IMF
through the implementation of its austerity measures;

(ii)

the

increased volume of direct foreign investment and the much advanced
role and control of the multinational corporations (MNCs) in many of
the Third World countries;

(iii) the theoretical development of

2

different perspectives about dependency and independence, which have
enhanced the understanding of the underlying causes of the experienced
dependency situations.
Green (1973:51) has identified seven classes of reasons of why
economic

independence is accepted as a priority political

economic

goal:
(1) Psychic satisfaction.

Individuals and nations feel more human,

fulfilled and confident
greater

control

over

affecting their

if they
decisions,

have,

forces,

assumption

and

they have,

institutions

lives;

(2) Power to control one's economic destiny.
the

or believe

that

only

citizens,

This power is based on
interest

groups

and

governments of a particular country are ever concerned with their
collective

economic

welfare;^-

(3) Altering the divisions of economic gains and opportunities from
foreign

to national beneficiaries.

This

is

an

important

motivation which, when separated from the pattern of distributing
the transformed gains,
political

is shared by

different

social and

groups;

(4) Resolving of

interest conflicts between external

and

internal

economic forces;
(5) Achieving structural change in the pattern of production, resource
allocation and institutions;
(6)

Altering the domestic socio-economic patterns and power divisions;

(7)

Altering

the

dominant mode

of production,

transformation to socialism.
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which

means

the

Some of these motivations might be
systems.

In some cases

more

specific to certain social

than one

motivation can operate.

Finally, the interest in the issue of economic independence is an
outcome

of

the

previous

emphasis

on economic

considered an undesirable state of affairs.
argues,

dependence

which

is

This position, as Brewster

is usually presented along two. lines:

i)

The

positive

proposition which views economic dependence as an inherently unstable
state that would hinder attempts to predict economic performance and
hence to plan for economic growth, ii) the normative proposition which
views economic dependence as
internally

and

externally)

a state of

which

as

inherent

such

is

inequality

condemned

(both

(Brewster,

1973:90).
It is difficult to find any country, regardless of its level of
development and its social and political orientation,

that does not

considers economic independence as one of its major goals.
this shared goal, however,
definition of

economic

there is no one shared and accepted

independence.

groups would differ in defining it.
agreement on

identifying the

Despite

Many

theorists

and

interest

As a result there is no general

prerequisites

and

the

strategies

for

achieving it.
This chapter examines how different schools of thought

in the

literature have dealt with the issue of economic independence.
examination will

include the following schools of thought:

United Nations Economic Commission Of Latin America

(ECLA);

This

1) The
2) the

dependencia school; 3) the soviet school; 4) the advocates of selfreliance; and 5) the work on small open economies.
My focus on these schools of thought should by no means indicate
the absence of other theoretical contributions.
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Other writers who are

not associated with these schools have written on the subject; while
some reference to their work will be made, the major emphasis will be
on those five schools of thought in order to focus and define the
theoretical framework of this thesis.

I. ECLA
ECLA's theoretical propositions reflect a Third World perspective
that has challenged the traditional international trade theory and the
modernization

theory

that have

dominated

literature. From the beginning ECLA,
leadership of Raul Prebisch in 1948,

the

economic

development

which was established under the
has attacked the conventional

international trade theory which saw all countries involved in trade
relations as benefiting mutually according to their comparative
advantage.^

To the contrary, ECLA argued that international trade has

operated, since the late 19th century, against the interests of Latin
American countries and for the interests of the advanced capitalist
countries.

As a result underdevelopment remains a characteristic of

the former group.

Although ECLA's argument was specifically about the

deteriorating economic position of Latin American countries

in the

world market, it was equally applicable to other Third World countries.
ECLA's emphasis was not directly on the
independence as such, but

issue of economic

on the unequal exchange, between the center

and the periphery, which was exacerbated by the deteriorating terms of
trade.

This situation was caused by an outward oriented strategy based

on exporting

raw materials

and

food

stuffs

to

the

countries and importing their manufactured products.
based mainly on the structural disparities of demand.

5

industrialized

The argument was
ECLA has argued

that the income elasticity of demand for raw materials, imported by the
center, is less than one and for the manufactured products, imported by
the periphery, is greater than one.
Engels'

This assertion was supported by

law, agricultural protectionist policies of the advanced

countries and the development of synthetic substitutes.

Therefore,

ECLA believed that the long run impact of this disparity is a reduction
in Latin American countries' earnings and a deteriorating position in
the world market.
ECLA's theorists viewed the deteriorating terms of trade not only
as an obstacle to development (because it curtailed foreign exchange
earnings and hence capital accumulation) but also as a means for the
transfer of surplus
periphery

"fruits of increased productivity"

to the center

(Baer,

1969).

To support this

from the
assertion,

Prebisch links the structural differences in the supply side between
the center and the periphery to the terms of trade. He argues that
while the increase of the productivity in the center leads to a higher
wages without

changes

in the prices

of both

domestic

and

export

industries goods, the increased productivity in the periphery's export
sector will not lead to an increase in the wages due to the unlimited
supply of labor and the weakness of its unions.^

However, due to the

downward trend in the terms of trade part of the marginal profit of the
increased productivity in the periphery

will be transferred to the

center.
While the centers kept the whole benefit of the
technical development of their industries, the
peripheral countries transferred to them a share
of the fruits of their own technical progress
(Prebisch, quoted in Baer, 1969:208).
ECLA's argument and proposed policies, however, were reformist in
their nature.

Meier cites the limits to their propositions:

6

Unlike Marxists who concentrate on the unfavorable
efforts of imperialism, these critics
did not
concentrate their critique on any "deliberate
exploitation" by the advanced capitalist nations.
Instead, their contention
was simply that
thefree
play of the international market forces
creates
disequalizing effects that operate to
the
disadvantaged of the less developed nations
(Meier, 1984:190).
As a consequence ECLA saw economic dependence mainly as an economic
relation between

the

center

referred to as external

and

the

dependence

international division of labor.

periphery,
that

or what

could be

is perpetuated by

"The consequence

the

is that due to

exterior pressure the country cannot decide autonomously what it should
do or cease doing" (Prebisch, 1980; quoted in Chilcote, 1984:26).
Dependency in this analysis came to mean the lack of autonomy
(Roxbourgh,

1979).

And

the

alternative

clearly

points

towards

an

autonomous capitalist development as opposed to the "imitative" and
dependent form that dominates the periphery.

The main proposed strategies and nolicv recommendations of ECLA:
To overcome the structural disparities and increase the autonomy
of

the

peripheral

economy,

production and trade.

ECLA

proposed

a

structural

change

of

As a result of his strong emphasis on the long-

run deteriorating terms of trade and the structural difference of the
wage-productivity relationship,

Prebisch proposed policies

that

emphasized both industrialization accompanied by tariff protection and
a redistribution of income aimed at improving the living standards of
the masses. In referring to industrialization, Prebisch has emphasized,
especially in his early writing, the strategy of import substituting
industrialization (ISI).

7

Import substitution (defined as an increase in the
proportion
of goods that are supplied from
domestic sources and not necessarily
as a
reduction of the ratio of imports to total income)
is the only way to correct the effects on
peripheral growth of disparities of foreign trade
elasticity (Prebisch, 1959:253).
However, later on Prebisch included export of the manufactures as a way
to overcome some of ISI limitations.
Export of manufactures by the countries of the
periphery, together with import substitution, will
enable their industrialization to be made
increasingly efficient and in the same time
promote their technological development (Prebisch,
1985:20).
Besides criticizing conventional international trade theory,
Prebisch has also questioned the neoclassical

theory of

distribution

and

in

which

workers,

entrepreneurs

income

capital

are

remunerated according to their marginal contribution in the production
process.

In the periphery, Prebisch argues,

productivity

is not

transferred

into

an

Instead the generated surplus is transferred,
via the

downward trend of export prices

privileged groups.

the increase in
increase

in

labor's

its

wages.

in part, to the center
and

internally

to the

Prebisch proposed deliberate measures of income

redistribution to be taken by the state as the means to both retain the
surplus internally and to enlarge the domestic market.
Besides the proposed redistributive measures

of income,

ECLA's

analysis pointed to regional integration as another means to enlarge
the domestic market and increase the effective demand.

In addition,

regional integration was viewed as a means of ISI on a regional scale.
As a practical consequence, ECLA had an important role in the formation
of Latin American integration efforts: Latin America Free Trade
Association

(LAFTA)

and

the

Central

8

American

Common

market.

Gurrieri notes in his assessment of Prebisch* s work that in his
later writings, Prebisch put more emphasis on
economic
reforms,

the issue of the use of

surplus as opposed to his previous emphasis
Intensive capital

formation and

on structural

international

cooperation.

This new emphasis came about as a result of the continued internal
inequality despite the increased economic growth in some Latin American
economies (Gurrieri, 1983).
Finally, ECLA has always actively advocated certain measures to
improve the current structure of the international division of labor.
These measures form a part of the general demands addressed by many
Third World countries, and which are known as the demands for a New
International Economic Order (NIEO).
Prebisch asserts that the development of the
periphery requires supressing the center-periphery
system and establishing a new international
economic order in which the reordering of the
functions of its components and the corresponding
modifications
in
the
domestic
productive
structures would make it possible to achieve a
more equitable distribution of power and income
among nations (Gurrieri, 1983:392).
ECLA's emphasis on industrialization with protectionist measures
and

income

distribution

political implications.

was

accompanied

with

explicit

social

and

ECLA's program called for a broad alliance of

nearly all social classes against the landed oligarchy.

Roxbourgh has

summarized ECLA's social and political scenario as follows:
The peasantry, once freed from the oppressive and
inefficient latifundio system would produce more
foodstuffs and their income would increase.
This
would increase their demand of domesticallyproduced manufactured goods, thereby stimulating
national industry. Deliberate state intervention
in the economy would foster the creation of new
industrial enterprises, and the industrial
bourgeoisie and/or the urban middle class would
take over state power from landed oligarchy.
The
industrial working class would benefit from

9

increased employment, and the policy of maximizing
consumer demand by redistributing income would
ensure that they would benefit in real terms from
economic growth (Roxbourgh, 1979:30).
Criticism of ECLA came from all directions.
mentioned

article,

directions:

Fernando

Cardoso

1) the "orthodox" line,

identifies

In his often
three

of

these

led by Haberler who denied the

possibility of inferring a constant trend toward decline in the terms
of trade and criticized ECLA's argument for lacking explicit analysis
of the role of economic cycles; 2) the "heterodox" liberal line, which
focussed on the circularity

of underdevelopment to the restriction of

the markets; on the political front, the liberal right accused ECLA of
being the "Trojan horse of Marxism"; and 3) the Marxist line, which
criticized ECLA's reformist measures

(Cardoso,

1979).

Other leftist

writers also criticized ECLA for its failure to denounce sufficiently
the exploitation mechanisms within the capitalist system (Palma, 1979) .
Despite

all

the

criticism,

however,

ECLA's

contributions have formed an important challenge to
dominant conventional theory of international trade.

theoretical

the previously
In addition they

have enhanced the understanding of some of the obstacles facing the
process of capital accumulation in the Third World.

Further,

ECLA's

analysis constituted an important factor in the development of other
theoretical perspectives, especially that of the dependencia school.

II. The Dependencla School**
By the 1960s ECLA's proposed policies and strategies which had
been adopted by some Latin American countries did
promises.

not fulfill their

Besides the increased inequality of income distribution,

unemployment,

and balance of payments difficulties,
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there was a

"growing loss of national control over economic, political, social
cultural

life"

(Palma,

1978:908).

The

dependencia

argument

and
arose

around this period was concerned with analyzing the causes of these
continuing problems

and others.

The

dependencia

theorists

(or

dependistas) were influenced both by the Marxist theory of imperialism
and by ECLA.^

The dependencia analysis differed, however, from the two

trends of thought in its focus: it differed from the classical Marxist
theory of imperialism by focussing on the disadvantages

to

the

peripheral economies rather than on the gains and changes occurring in
the center.

It differed from ECLA by emphasizing not only the economic

impact of the relationship between the "core" and the "satellites" but
also

the

internal

social

and

political

manifestations

of this

relationship.
Most critics would agree that the dependencia analysis cannot be
treated as one theory; rather it should be treated as a set of theories
O

or a paradigm.

It can be said, however,

that the dependistas are

unified in their focus on the economic, social and political aspects of
the

dependent

pattern

of

development

or

underdevelopment

that

characterize the peripheral economies as a result of their relationship
with the center.
The dependistas' main focus has been on the causes and features of
dependency and not on economic independence or overcoming dependency.
"(T)he dependency perspective tells us much more about what is wrong
and why than about what is correct and how to get there"
1983:22).

(Gereffi,

However, one could infer what is not dependency through an

examination of what was meant by dependency.

This task, however,

is

not a straightforward one mainly because of the different implications
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of the term and, at times, the vague, and circular presentation which
O'Brien expresses as:
The actual mechanisms of dependency are seldom
spelt out in detail (...).
One looks in vain
through the theories of dependency for the
essential characteristics of dependency.
Instead
one is given a circular argument: dependent
countries are those which lack capacity for
autonomous growth and they lack this because their
structure are dependent ones" (O'Brien, 1975:24).
In an attempt to understand what was meant by dependency, perhaps
it is best to start with the most quoted definition in the literature,
that of Dos Santos:
By dependence we mean a situation in which the
economy of certain countries is conditioned by the
development and expansion of another economy to
which the former is subjected.
The relation of
interdependence between two or more economies, and
between these and the world trade, assumes the
form of dependence when some countries (the
dominant ones) can expand and can be selfsustaining, while other countries (the dependent
ones) can do this only as a reflection of that
expansion (Dos Santos, 1970:231).
Sunkel and Furtado share a similar view, though they
Santos

in their

policy

conclusions.

q

Sunkel

differ from Dos

sees

dependency

and

marginalization as inevitable outcomes of the dependent pattern of
development in the periphery in which an increasing share of ownership
and

control

of natural

resources

is

given to

foreign

firms.

In

addition the increasing role played by these firms in the industrial,
financial,

marketing

and

distribution

activities

has

fundamentally

changed the social structure and the political system (Sunkel, 1972).
Similarly,

Furtado

sees

the

alliance

of certain

groups

(e.g.

the

landowners and commercial capitalists) with foreign interests as
facilitating

the

latter's

expansion and weakening the

national

entrepreneurial class which will necessarily exclude the "possibility
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of self-sustained national development, along the lines of

classical

capitalist development" (Furtado, quoted in Sunkel, 1972:527).
For these theorists,

and others,

dependency means the lack or

weakness of an autonomous national pattern of development, which causes
and aggravates many of the social and economic distortions of the
peripheral societies.

The obstacles facing an independent development

are seen in: the industrial and technological expansion of the foreign
firms and their monopolistic control of the world market; the skewed
internal pattern of income distribution; the traditional structure of
the

agrarian

foreign

system and;

expansion.

These

the tendency of the
obstacles

will

state

tend

to

to

facilitate

preserve

the

traditional export sector and hinder the development of the industrial
sector.

To some extent this view shares some similarity with ECLA's.

The alternative is seen in the advancement of national development
which Sunkel defines as "a force of national affirmation, an aspiration
to self-determination and sovereignty" (Sunkel, 1969:32).
ECLA,

these writers find the potential

As seen by

leadership of such national

development in the national (entrepreneurial) bourgeoisie.
A more radical line within dependencia is led by Frank. According
to this line the historical relationship with the center, has not only
conditioned the internal economic,

social and political structure of

the dependent peripheral economies, but also has determined it.
same relationship has led to the development of the

'core'

This

and the

underdevelopment or "development of underdevelopment" of the periphery
by the continual transferring of surplus from the latter to the former.
Frank believes that underdevelopment was not an original state but was
a result of the mercantilist and capitalist expansion of the center.
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Underdevelopment
is not due to the survival of
the archaic institutions and the existence of
capital shortage in regions that have remained
isolated from the stream of world history. On the
contrary, underdevelopment was and still is
generated by the very same historical process
which also generated economic development: the
development of capitalism itself (Frank, 1972:9).
Hence the only periods, Frank argues, where the satellites were able to
develop were when ties to the metropolis were weakened by wars or
depressions.
For this line within dependencia,
outcome

of

the historical process

of

dependency is viewed as an
incorporating

economies into the capitalist world system.

the

peripheral

Unlike the previous line,

Frank considers the national bourgeoisie (together with imperialism) as
the enemy of national development.
this class will strengthen

He believes that the policies of

economic dependence by coinciding with the

interest of capitalist class of the center.
Hence,

the only way out of this dependency condition lies in

breaking the ties with the center and pursuing a socialist development:
(T)he historical process of underdevelopment
cannot be reversed and turned into economic and
social development for the majority of Latin
American people until they destroy the capitalist
class structure through revolution and replace it
with socialist development (Frank, 1972:19).
A third line within dependencia, advanced mainly by Cardoso and
Faletto, has focussed on the analysis of the "new dependency".

Unlike

the previous line, it acknowledges the possibility of the development
of the periphery despite its incorporation in the capitalist world.
Unlike

the enclave

underdevelopment,
peripheral

economies

that

perpetuated both

dependency

a new type of economy has developed,

countries,

which

is

characterized by

notion of development and dependency.
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the

and

in some of
contradictory

This latter situation, which

Cardoso labels as "associated-dependent development”, has been caused
mainly by

the

dynamic

interaction between

new

forms

of

national

political powers and new international economic forces:
Changes
in
the
international
capitalist
organization have produced a new international
division of labor. The moving force behind these
changes is
the multinational corporation.
Assuming as it does the immersion of industrial
capital into peripheral economies, the new
international division of labor puts a dynamic
element into operation
in the internal market.
Thus, to some extent, the interests of the foreign
corporations have become compatible with internal
prosperity of the dependent countries.
In this
sense they help promote development (Cardoso,
1973:149).
The view of this line of argument within dependencia shares some
element of the classical Marxist theory of imperialism which predicted
that capitalist expansion into the underdeveloped countries would bring
about and facilitate the capitalist development of these countries.
However, this line, though accepting the possibility
development,

sees

of this kind of

it only in a dependent form with no independent

internal dynamics.
Development under this set of conditions implies,
quite obviously, a definite articulation with the
international market.
Development
in
this
situation also depends on technical,
financial,
organizational, and market connection that only
multinational corporations can assure (Cardoso,
1973:149).
Thus, this line would disagree with the pessimistic view of the
previous line of dependencia which foresaw nothing but underdevelopment
and stagnation for peripheral economies within the capitalist system.
On the other hand, it disagrees with the first line's optimism of the
possibility of an autonomous capitalist development that would bring
about better

conditions

for the majority of the
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people.

To

the

contrary,

this line argues that the pattern of associated*dependent

development

will

be

based

on

a

regressive

profile

of

income

distribution, with emphasis on luxury consumer durables as opposed to
basic

necessities

and

will

contribute

to

social

marginality

(Cardoso, 1973:149). Cardoso and Faletto distinguish between the
features

of

periphery.

the

capitalist

development

in

the

center

and

in

the

However, they do not subscribe or propose a "theory of

dependent capitalism"

or

a

"theory of

dependency".

Rather,

they

concentrate on "situations of dependency" that exist in concrete cases
(Cardoso and Faletto, 1979).
In summary,

therefore we can see two general definitions of non

dependency or independent development.

For some writers within

dependencia the alternative to dependency is national development which
will bring about a higher degree of autonomy and equal
relationship in the world market.

For others, however,

interaction
the only way

out of dependency is a revolutionary change towards socialism.

The main proposed strategies and policy recommendations of dependencia:
As

a result

of

their

analytical

concern with

the

causes

of

dependency and its features, dependencia's writers have not proposed
clear strategies to overcome dependency and achieve a higher degree of
economic

independence.

In his

assessment

of dependencia's

conclusions, O'Brien argues that:
For policy conclusions are (...) (perhaps
deliberately) left very vague. It is never clear
whether the multinational corporation is to be
nationalized or to be controlled by an Andean
Pact-style foreign investment code, nor which
specific policies are to be followed with regard
to technical transfer and technical development,
unemployment and income distribution,
etc.
(O'Brien, 1975:24).
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policy

It seems fair to argue, however,

that the absence of explicit

policy recommendations is a logical consequence for those writers who
see underdevelopment

and dependency as the only possible outcome of

the center-periphery relationship.

On the other hand,

those who see

the possibility of either an autonomous national development or
dependent one, have suggested some policy recommendations.
Sunkel has argued in favor of industrialization.

However,

he

opposed IS1 which, as he sees it, not only did not "free the economy
from

its

heavy

reliance

on

primary

exports,

foreign

capital

and

technology, (...) but has in fact aggravated the situation and nature
of "dependencia" (Sunkel, 1972:518).
development tasks

Sunkel identifies three essential

for the social groups

that are trying to regain

control over the economy and break out of the structure of a dependent
economy. Assuming their control of the power, these tasks are:
transforming the agrarian structure
inequality and marginalization);

1£t ,

(which is the main root

of

2n<*, using the primary export sector

to support the expansion of heavy and consumer industries; and finally,
organizing the industrial sector away from satisfying the conspicuous
consumption of the minority into
majority (Sunkel,1972:530).

satisfying the basic needs of the

He further recognizes the importance of

the role of regional integration in enhancing national development,
though he acknowledges the possible limitations or even adverse
effects.

"Integration, in fact, can be either a basic instrument of

national realization in Latin America; or it can be the instrument of
accelerated dependence"

(Sunkel,

1969:33).

In order

to avoid

the

latter possibility, Sunkel emphasizes the importance of multinational
planning

particularly

activities.

of existing

and

additional

basic

industrial

Furtado, who shares a similar perspective, has emphasized
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economic planning and programming as the means to regulate ISI and to
broaden the industrial structure.
different perspective,
goods

sector

as

the

Cardoso,

though subscribing to a

sees the lack of a fully developed capital crippling

factor

to

the

capital

accumulation

process in the dependent economy (Cardoso, 1973).
Perhaps no paradigm or school of thought, in the literature, has
been more controversial than the dependencia.

Their analysis has been

heavily criticized by many leftist as well as bourgeois writers.
have been

criticized for:

over

emphasizing

external

over

They

internal

factors that shape underdevelopment and dependency (Palma, 1978); over
emphasizing national and international conflict over

internal class

conflict

political and

(Angotti,

1982);

attributing the social,

economic features of capitalism to dependency (Lall, 1976), which led
to conceptualizing dependency as a mode of production with its own laws
of motion (Cueva, 1976); failing to incorporate analysis of "socialist
dependency" (Ray, 1973); and methodologically for being both static and
ahistorical (Palma, 1978).

The criticisms have been aptly

summarized

elsewhere, and hence 1 will not attempt to present them here.^®

While

some critics have specified the writers or the line within dependencia,
some have
writers,

generalized their criticism,
to

include

generalization has been

the

whole

based on

paradigm

in many cases,

of

the work

of

dependencia.

in my opinion,

unfair.

some
Such
For

example, many dependistas (e.g., Cardoso and Falleto) are aware of the
importance of internal causes of dependency.

Similarly, they

clearly

reject conceptualizing dependency as a mode of production.
Before ending this section it is important to mention that some of
the

"vagueness" and multiple implications that are attributed to the
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concept of dependency have arisen because of the misapplication of the
concept by some other writers, especially in North America, who have
attempted to analyze

dependency

in quantitative

terms.

Duvall

has

differentiated this group as:
The
tradition
of
rigorous
empiricism
is
distinguished by a commitment to precise
measurement criteria and on that basis alone is
distinguishable from the dependencia tradition.
Unfortunately the distinction does not end here
because empirical scientists have generally been
guilty of ignoring the degree of precision of
meaning which is provided by dependencia theorists
for the concept of dependence. Instead, they have
started with more common-sensical meanings of the
term, and have given the impression that
measurement rules developed in accord with those
meanings
are all that matter. Precision
is
provided
by,
and meaning is captured
in,
operational criteria. The result is a distortion
of the primary meaning of the term as it appears
in dependencia theory (Duvall, 1978:59).
As a result anotherconceptualization of dependencyappears
literature causingsome confusion.

This

in the

other concept which

is

differentiated by some writers^ as "dependence" refers to external
economic relations, for example reliance on the importation of certain
products from other countries. In this sense all countries can be said
to be dependent.

This concept is totally different from the dependency

situations or structural dependency that the dependistas see prevailing
in the peripheral economies.
The structural dependency of the periphery on the
metropolis resulting from the asymmetrical process
of penetration cannot be compared with the simple
dependency of the metropolis on the peripheries
for further deliveries of energy resources and raw
materials. What in the first case is reflected in
a special socio-economic structure; i.e. in
periphery capitalism is in the second reduced to a
question of the price of use value (Senghaas,
1975:290).
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Perhaps

this

dichotomy

of

the

concept

is

best

expressed

by

Brewster in his often quoted statement: "(T)here may be a difference
between a country which depends on external factors and a country which
is dependent on them" (Brewster, 1975:290),
These two conceptions of the term "dependence" have caused errors
in the classification of which countries are dependent, and which are
not.12

III. The Soviet School
The issue of national independence in its two forms - political
and economic - has been the center of the Soviet analysis of the Third
World nations.

As Clarkson notes in his book on the Soviet theory of

development,
(the) best conceptual bridge for an outsider
wanting to enter the Soviet view of the developing
countries' position in the world - historically,
politically, and economically - is their under
standing of national independence (Clarkson,
1978:135).
The current Soviet perspective springs from the Marxist-Leninst
theory.It goes further,

however,

by

incorporating analysis

of the

changing internal conditions of the politically independent Third World
countries

(referred to as the "newly free countries")

international

relations.

In

addition,

the

clear

focus

and of their
within

the

literature on the issue of economic independence and sovereignty is
related to the official position taken by the Soviet Communist party,
which has been reaffirmed by the 27th CPSU Congress.
However different the newly free countries may be
from one another and whatever road they follow,
their people are united by a desire to develop
independently, on their own, and to run their
affairs without foreign interference (New edition
of the CPSU program, quoted in Rymalov, 1986:61).
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The

Soviet

analysis

of the Third World

always

takes

into

consideration the international context and especially the role played
by imperialism.

Soviet writers view the political independence of the

Third World nations as only the beginning of a complex process of
struggle for national independence.

This complexity is related to the

unchanged essence of imperialism. Almost all Soviet writers would agree
that imperialism is
doing everything possible to retain the former
colonies within the framework of the capitalist
system, to slow down their advance toward stronger
independence, and social progress (Editors'
introduction, International Affairs, 1978:65).
They fully analyze the new forms of imperialism or neocolonialism,
which is defined as a system of indirect control and exploitation based
on financial and economic monopoly (rather than the former military and
political monopoly).
its older

form,

The major difference between neocolonialism and

however,

is the new

tendency

to cultivate

facilitate some forms of capitalism in the politically
countries (Simonya, 1985).

Vernikov and

ism's

of

current

mechanisms

economic

Shibayev
control

countries as in the form of capital export,
markets by

major monopolies,

expansionism

of MNCs

machinations

(Vernikov and

and

independent

identify imperial
over

the

developing

seizure and division of
with

Shibayev,

interest
1987:45).

rates
To

and

these

mechanisms, Volkov adds the growing foreign debt of the developing
countries (Volkov, 1985:68).
Most Soviet writers would view the world capitalist system and the
international division of labor as the main obstacle to an independent
capitalist development, especially with the increasing role played by
the MNCs.

There are some writers, however, who accept the theoretical
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possibility of an independent capitalist development.

In his book,

titled The Newly Free Countries in the Seventies. Brutents argues:
It should be born in mind that there is a
possibility for transition from dependent to
national capitalist development. One cannot wholly
agree with the idea, often encountered in relevant
literature and tinged with fatality,
that
dependency is bound to increase in every instance.
There is not a single influential social stratum
or political group that can be regarded as forever
associated with prospect of dependent capitalist
development. On the contrary, we believe that,
once they become stronger and more consolidated,
they are more likely to start searching for a
new way of development (Brutents, 1979:73).
In analyzing the different forms of capitalist development in the
Third World, Simonya cites India and Nigeria as examples with a form of
national capitalist development (Simonya,

1982).

These writers,

however, see the potentials of an independent capitalist development as
highly restricted in the developing countries.

And they all come to

the conclusion that if it were not for the existence of the socialist
system one

could

not

speak

of

any genuinely

independent

national

related

economic

development (Simonya, 1985:205).
Despite

the

explicit

analysis

of

issues

to

independence, it is difficult to find just one definition because of
the complexity of the issue and its national and
economic, social and political aspects.

international

However, by presenting the

different emphasized aspects in the literature, one can understand what
meaning(s) economic independence holds in the Soviet view.

Many Soviet

writers

with

equate the dependency of Third World

unequal position in the world economy.

countries

their

They recognize these countries'

need to engage in the world market as a means to promote their own
development.

Hence economic independence is defined as an equitable

and mutual position in the world economy.
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Economic independence in no sense means economic
autarchy and isolation. On the contrary, it
implies the establishment of an equitable,
mutually advantageous and fair international
division of labor to promote the balanced economic
development
of
the
former
colonies
and
semicolonies (E. Tarabrin, 1978:19).
Though Soviet writers emphasize equal interdependence they oppose
the Western or bourgeois notion of interdependence which is equated
with

"collective neocolonialism."

They

see

this form of interdepen

dence as an attempt to organize a single production mechanism, based on
the capitalist mode of production, in which all countries are connected
components (Gorokhov, 1980).

As Simonya puts it:

Indeed there is interdependence between countries
(...). However, there are equal and unequal types
of interdependence (...). It is against their
unequal status in the international division of
labor, not against their interdependence as such,
that the developing countries' struggle (Simonya,
1984:109) .
From the
economic

political

standpoint,

independence with

the

Third

conduct independent foreign policies.
manifested in the strength
On

the

national

most

Soviet

World

writers

countries'

associate
ability

to

Such independence is basically

of the non-alignment movement.

level,

Soviet

writers

have

emphasized

nationalization, not in the narrow legal notion, but as a broad and
deep process of transforming foreign and foreign-oriented
elements into national elements.
economic independence.
synonymous with

the

Nationalization here is equated with

"Nationalization in the

gaining

of

local

the

full

broad sense

political,

economic

is
and

cultural independence of the developing countries" (Simonya, 198:109).
Some writers

have

defined

economic

independence

in

terms

of

greater domestic control over the production and capital accumulation
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process; more specifically as "self-sufficiency in the production of
the means of production" (mentioned

in Clarkson, 1979:139).

The main proposed strategies and policy recommendations:
Most of the proposed strategies and policies clearly stem from the
emphasis given in defining economic independence.

As a result of the

shared emphasis on the need to achieve a more equitable interdependence
in the world economy, Soviet writers have emphasized the importance of
the NIEO,

cooperation with the socialist and other Third World

countries.

Simonya sees the NIEO as a logical outcome of the Third

World nations' struggle for economic independence (Simonya, 1984).

And

Nukhovich sees it as a major prerequisite for any successful struggle
against

international monopolies

(Nukhovich,

1980).

The

cooperation

with the socialist countries is proposed as a means to strengthen the
demands for NIEO.

Further,

the cooperation with

the socialist

community is seen to enhance the national effort for independence.
(T)he Soviet Union and other members of the
socialist community do not pursue self-seeking
goals in their relations with developing countries
and do not place them in subordinate position
(...). The credit granted to young states and the
aid extended to them are normally repaid by the
deliveries of the goods produced at the enterprise
built with that aid or by traditional export goods
(Vernikov and Shibayev, 1987:51).
Another strategy

that would

strengthen Third World

position in the world economy is their own cooperation.

countries'
Politically

this cooperation is reflected in their engagement in the non-alignment
movement.
relations,

Another important form of this cooperation is their economic
especially

in

the

form

of

regional

cooperation.

The

emphasis on this latter strategy arises from recognizing the limitation
of most developing countries* size and resources.
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On the national level, those writers who emphasize the importance
of nationalization would clearly point it out as prerequisite policy
for economic independence.

As mentioned earlier, nationalization is

not confined to the legal ownership but to a structural transformation
of the economy.

In the economic sphere, it means not only the national

ownership of productive assets but also the ability to control the
process of production and marketing (Simonya,

1984).

Soviet writers

emphasize the importance of the public sector and the role of the state
for both socialist and capitalist oriented economies.

In his recent

book devoted to the analysis of the destiny of capitalism

in the

Orient, Simonya argues that the only "way out" for those countries that
are trying to attain economic independence while remaining within the
capitalist formation is to leap over the phase of private capitalism
(as experienced by the advanced capitalist countries) and move directly
into the specific phase of state monopoly (Simonya, 1985:120).
One of the major national strategies put forward by the Soviet
writers is industrialization. The stress on industrialization is
influenced to a great extent by the Soviet Union's own experience, for
this reason most Soviet writers on the Third World would agree that
"economic independence is inconceivable without a certain degree of
industrialization" (Levkovsky, 1973:47).

Levkovsky argues that there

are two economic factors vital for achieving economic independence: i)
modernizing and expanding the local industry which will pave the way,
technically and economically, for large scale reproduction,
consequence;

ii)

increasing the national

and as a

labor productivity

to the

world average which will enable the Third World to become part of the
world economy on equal and mutually advantageous
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terms

(Levkovsky,

1973:53).

In

their

early

references

to

industrialization

writers have stressed heavy industrialization.

Soviet

However, taking account

of the limitations of size and resources of most developing countries,
Soviet writers

have

shifted

their

emphasis

to

small

scale

basic

industrialization.
Finally,

it comes as no surprise that economic planning

is a

policy that is continuously emphasized, whether in arguing in favor of
nationalization,

state

involvement,

cooperation or any other activity.
suggested:

industrialization,

regional

Different methods of planning are

long-term economic forecasting;

planning for capital

investment in the state sector or inter-sectoral and project levels;
current financial planning; specific state regulatory measures for the
private sector.

The choice of the method or combinations would depend

on the level of the country's economic development and its political
structure and property relations (Stanis, 1976:65).
In emphasizing the international context and the role played by
imperialism, Soviet writers gave less attention to the internal class
structure in the developing countries.
identified with

their position

in the

The internal classes
"anti-imperialist"

are

struggle.

While it is clear in the case of the socialist oriented countries that
the

vanguard

Marxist-Lenist

party

will

pursue

an

independent

development on behalf of the majority (workers, peasants), in the case
of other countries references point to an "anti-imperialist" front or
groups.

These latter groups would include all classes except the large

land owners and compradors.

In the theoretical debate of the "non

capitalist path," Soviet writers point to the progressive role played
by the petty bourgeoisie who were believed to lead an anti-imperialist
independent development benefiting the majority of the population.

26

13

It is this strength of national element and not
only the unclear social barriers and the level of
consciousness of the masses which allow one to
explain that a division - one that would be very
clear in terms of social classes - of forces
standing on the opposite side of the barricade has
often not yet occurred in the developing
countries, and that the controversy within the
bourgeoisie in those countries about position to
be
taken with
imperialism is continuing.
Motivated by nationalist considerations (...), a
section of the bourgeoisie is ready (as in India)
to support serious progressive measures even if
they go as far as to encroach on the interests of
big business (Brutents, 1979:45).

IV. The Work on Self-Reliance
The work on self-reliance in the West represents the most explicit
discussion of policies to reduce dependence.

The politics of self-

reliance are seen as "an important part of contemporary history - an
effort to undo five centuries of dependency on the West"

(Galtung,

1981:173).
Self-reliance as a concept entered the debate on the Third World
development during the 1970s.

13

Self-reliance theorists represent a

range of different perspectives mostly with Marxist and liberal
influence.

The diversity of the ideological influences is perhaps best

expressed by Galtung, one of the strongest proponents of self-reliance:
The ideology of my vision encompasses some
insights about inner man found in Buddhist
thinking in the East and existentialist thinking
in
the West;
anarchist thinking
on
the
significance of local autonomy; liberal thinking
on freedom and outer man in general; (...) Marxist
thinking on social structure; and antiimperialist
theory and practice from recent years (Galtung,
1981:177).
Such diversity of background is

responsible for the lack of a

well-defined conceptual socio-economic framework within which the
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advocated policies would be pursued.

Some theorists

insist on the

alteration of the existing class relationships and increased political
participation as a means to achieve domestic self-reliance (Biersteker,
1980); others see the possibility of such defined self-reliance in both
socialist

and

capitalist economies

(Amin,

1977).

Sometimes

reliance seems to include the best of the two systems:

self-

"self-reliance

ideology might be similar to capitalism in its emphasis on creativity
and initiative,
participation"

but highly dissimilar in

(Galtung,

1981:177).

its

emphasis

And sometimes

on mass

self-reliance

is

presented as a "third way" in the present epoch after the previous
existence of only capitalism and socialism (Ogundowole, 1985:135).
The work on self-reliance differs from that of the other schools
of thought in two aspects.

First, while other schools present their

policies and strategies to be advanced within either a capitalist or a
socialist

development

path,

self-reliance

is

presented

as

an

alternative development path aiming primarily at the satisfaction of
the minimum needs of the entire population and reducing dependency.
Second,

while

previous

schools

generally

give

more

weight

to

the

external factors, self-reliance theorists insist on the necessity of
combining
collective,

the

three

levels

of

self-reliance:

local,

national

and

since self-reliance at one level only does not mean the

absence of exploitation within the other levels.
There is general agreement among the theorists of self-reliance
that there are three levels or phases of the process of self-reliance:
local, national and collective.

The first level includes small units

like families, communes and ethnic groups; the second level represents
the country as a whole; and the third includes regional cooperation,
continental and sub -continental (Preiswerk, 1980). The local and
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national

levels are basically attempts

to "depend on one's

resources" meaning using local creativity,

raw materials,

own

land and

capital and directing them to produce for local consumption and the
satisfaction of basic needs.

Self-reliance as presented by

advocates does not mean self-sufficiency or autarky.
World countries'

need

for external

finance

its

Recognizing Third

(aid and

loans),

self-

reliance theorists do not reject the use of external resources as long
as they are not at the cost of "one's self-respect" and "one's autonomy
of choice and action" (Rahman,
thattrade and other

1980:83).

Self-reliance theorists argue

economic relations should not be cut butrather

redirected and recomposed by giving preference

to cooperation with

those in the same position and from the closer to the more distant
(Galtung, 1980).
One can deduce a definition of economic independence, which is an
essential objective of the development strategy of self-reliance, from
examining how self-reliance itself is defined.

Galtung offers us a

lucid definition:
Self-reliance
is
the
antithesis
of
dependence (...).
For ’dependence' has
two
negations in English, both of them implicit in the
idea
of
self-reliance:
independence
and
interdependence.
Independence is autonomy, that
invaluable combination of self-confidence, a high
level of self-sufficiency, and the fearlessness
out of which
invulnerability
is
forged.
Interdependence is equity, which means a style of
cooperation that does not engender new patterns of
dependence (Galtung, 1981:173).

The main proposed strategies and policy recommendations:
Within
propose

the local

and national

levels,

self-reliancetheorists

a set of social, political and economic policies. All self-
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reliance writers emphasize the

Importance of mass participation

reflected in a high level of popular control over the local economy and
in decision making, "(Mass)
of self-reliance,

participation becomes the alpha and omega

as necessary and, often,

(Galtung, 1980:28).

as sufficient condition"

These writers also emphasize the satisfaction of

basic needs. A report

from the Fugwash symposium on

self-reliance

indicated that the participants viewed the central objective as the
attainment of minimum needs for the entire population as speedily as
possible (Pugwash Symposium Report, 1977:260).

The symposium specified

three key areas for public policy (Pugwash Symposium Report, 1977:260261):

(1)

changing

the

pattern

of

land

and

resource

use

through

redistribution of land and agricultural reforms in favor of the rural
population, the construction and development of human settlements, and
physical

planning

of

the

location

of

agricultural

and

activities in relation to resource supply and environment;
consumption

patterns

Alternation of the
through

the

to

income

pattern

redirection

and

redistribution
level

of public

of

and

consumption

finance,

industrial
(2) linking

employment.
is

suggested

organizational

and

managerial resources to the: (a) creation of employment opportunities
in services

directly related

to minimum needs

education;

(b) development and conversion of

industrial

capacity

towards

the

production

such as health

some
of

of

the

goods

technological
generation

of

styles

through

technologies

the

proper

(appropriate

existing

required

meeting basic needs such as food, clothing and shelter;

and

for

(3) changing

evaluation,

selection

technology).

Third

and

World

countries are advised to develop individually and through collective
cooperation,

the technological

styles
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that

are suited to

their

environment, their human and natural resources, and most importantly
their minimum needs-oriented development strategy.
Within the collective level of self-reliance both strategies of
regional cooperation and the NIEO

are emphasized.

level, cooperation or integration efforts

are

At the

seen

regional

to enhance

the

industrial and technological capacities.
Industrial
integration
and complementarity
schemes, particularly those concerning neighboring
countries, can save resources and accelerate
development, provided that integration takes place
within a framework the objective of which is the
satisfaction of basic needs for entire population
rather than the benefit of small local minorities
and foreign corporations" (Oteiza and Sercovich,
1976:668).
Finally,

self-reliance theorists

Third World countries

advocate

the participation of

in bringing about the NIEO

through

their

collective effort in order to enhance their independence.
It was the recognition of the true nature and the
suffocating impacts of colonial relationships on
their overall activities that led the new states
to call for a new international economic order NIEO. Hence the word 'self-reliance' is central to
conceptual framework in which the demand for a
NIEO has been put forward and expressed
(Ogundowole, 1985:141).
Despite the explicit and elaborated policies

and strategies in

self-reliance analysis, there is no such explicit reference to the form
of

the

internal class

structure.

The policy

of self-reliance is

believed, by its advocates, to be carried out by and for the benefit of
the masses.
With the masses in control of the productive
machinary, especially in the countryside, such
ideas as using land for cash crops in order to
"earn foreign currency" (for the elites to buy
consumer good, means of destruction - arms - and
some means of production) would less easily emerge
(Galtung, 1980:27).

31

However, it is not clear what is the exact class structure of these
masses nor of the state, and within which social structure can these
masses pursue their control.

While few writers point to socialism as

the social framework within which such collective effort can be pursued
(Rahman, 1980), most writers refrain from specifying the socio-economic
structure and adopt a "utopian1* vision or that of a "class-neutral
point of view".
The driving force behind the self-reliancist
transformation is (...) assumed to be inherent in
the individual and the collective, or more
accurately, in their togetherness, in harmonious
social relationship.
The horizontal orientation
of the self-reliancist principle provides little
room for considering antagonistic contradictions
as an important driving force for social change,
societal progress. The principle of selfreliancism may therefore be regarded as a classneutral point of view (Ogundowole, 1985:145).

V. The work on small open economies
Writing around the same period as dependencia,

though

less

recognized, William Demas has questioned the relevance of the accepted
doctrine on economic development to the small countries.

Similarly, he

sees the Soviet Union's model of development, especially its emphasis
on accelerating heavy industrialization, as feasible only in a large
continental

country

with

large

population.

Taking

countries as an example, Demas finds their economies
certain

disadvantages

development.

"These

in

terms

of

disadvantages

their
are

the

the

Caribbean

suffering from

autonomous

economic

legacy of external

dependence combined with small size of population and narrow range of
natural resources at the individual country level" (Demas, 1978:237).
Demas argues that because of the small economies' size and limited
resources,

their leading sector is the export one;
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and the rate of

growth of experts is more tied to the rate of growth of the gross
domestic product (GDP) than in the larger economies.

Therefore, foreign

exchange always constrains the small countries.^
In his book published in 1965, Demas in his analysis of the small
economies, elaborates the notion of "self-sustained growth," which was
introduced by Rostow.

The previously accepted notion of self-sustained

growth implied the ability of a country to rely on its own domestic
savings

to

underlying

finance

its domestic investment.

assumptions of this notion:

(1)

Demas criticizes

the

the level and rate of

change of the per capita income of a country are uniquely related to
its state of development and;

(2) the country has a closed economy

which is also likely to be very large (Demas,
links

the

notion

of

1965:6).

"self-sustained growth"

Demas then

to the structural

transformation of the economy.
It is my view that the fundamental criterion of
underdevelopment is the extent
to which an
economy has undergone structural transformation
and has acquired the continuing capacity to adapt
and to apply innovations. Furthermore, within the
category of transformed economies, it is possible
to have different degrees of self-sustenance in
the growth process (Demas, 1965:6).
Demas defines this transformation process to include the following
seven elements (Demas, 1965:8):
(1) The capacity to transform, which is determined by
social processes.

political and

This implies the development of the economy's

capacity to apply innovations continually and to adapt to changing
situations.
(2) The unification of the fragmented localized markets
national market,

so all

potential

utilized.
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economies

of scale

into a
can be

(3) The

continuing shift and reallocation of production and

labor

between sectors of the national economy in accordance with changes
in relative productivity and demand.
(4) The development of an increasing degree of interdependence among
domestic industries and activities.
itself

The interdependence manifests

in the development of a whole network of forward and

backward linkages within the internal structure of production.
(5) Changes in the importance and composition of foreign trade.
(6) The reduction of dualism in the economy.
reduction

This step Involves the

(though not necessarily an equalization)

in the

disparities between returns to factors of production.
(7)

The

development of appropriate

institutions

such as

a

capital

market and other financial, educational and training institutions.
Taking all these elements into consideration, Demas distinguishes
between structural transformation and what has been experienced by some
countries as the growth of either short or long duration in the export
sector.

This type of growth has been experienced by countries that

enjoyed a

relative

surplus

for exporting certain minerals

materials which led to a high GNP and per capita

income

or

raw

without,

however, changing the production structure of their economies.
Demas further argues that in order to be more independent from
changing external conditions,

the

smaller economies have

structurally more flexible and adaptable,

to be

a condition they can obtain

by achieving a higher degree of structural transformation.

However,

given their small size and their large dependence on both trade and
capital flows, these economies will not be fully self-sustaining even
though they might achieve structural transformation (Demas, 1965:20).

34

He concludes
growth process
economy"

that
is

"the fullest degree of
possible

only

’self-sustenance' in the

in a very

large

continental -type

(Demas,1965:33).

More recent theoretical and empirical studies have elaborated the
analysis of small open economies with special focus on the socialist
ones.*-®

Though these studies have focussed mainly on the development

process of the small open economies' transition to socialism, many of
the analytical aspects and policy recommendations are similar to those
presented by Demas. Because of their small size and limited resources,
these countries are "forced to play by the rules of the global game in
trade, finance, and investment" (Fagen, et al., 1986:11) which affects
their degree of control over the

internal process

of accumulation.

Based on the work of Kalecki

and Dobb,

Fitzgerald (1985 (a), (b))has

presented a theoretical model

for small open economies in their planned

process of capital accumulation and income distribution.

In this model

the primitive socialist capital accumulation is not generated from the
labor or

peasants'

surplus

economies, but rather

from

as

experienced by

the differential

larger

rent

socialist

earned

in

the

international market. Like Demas, Fitzgerald sees the export sector as
the leading sector or as the "heavy industry" of the economy, and the
foreign exchange as the major constraint.

For this reason the small

peripheral economy cannot be completely planned;

in addition this

economy is "far more vulnerable than its larger cousins, in terms both
of the exposure to fluctuations in the world market and macro-economic
effects of single investment projects." (Fitzgerald, 1985 (a):105).
Thus,
capitalist)

in the case of small
the issue becomes,

open economies (both socialist
in

dependence" rather than reduce it.

a sense,

attempts

to

and

"diversify

Even though the economy cannot be
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completely "self-sustained"

or "planned"

it can be structurally

transformed to reduce the level of its dependence.
Similarly, Thomas, in his book on Dependence and Transformation
(1974), addresses the problem of underdevelopment and dependence of the
small economies.
dependency

to

He argues that the most important forms of economic
the

economic

technology, 2) the critical
domestic employment,

structure

are: 1)

reliance

on

foreign

role of foreign decision-making plays in

output,

and income

generation,

and

3)

the

persistent income drains via the transfer of surplus from the economy
to the

owner

of capital,

technology

metropolitan countries (Thomas, 1974:51).

and managerials
Thomas,

skills

in

however, does not

view the smallness as a constraint imposed by nature on the social
development but that which will affect the form in which production is
organized.

And that the major constraint on an economy's development

is not the size of its market but rather the size of its social surplus
and its allocation.

He believes that a socialist form of organization

is the only form (for the small countries) within which the economy can
develop

the

capacity

to

Hence in Thomas's view,

overcome

underdevelopment

and

dependency.

independence is a function of the internal

organization and development.

Unlike many neoclassical and socialist

writers, Thomas believes in the possibility and ability of such small
countries to pursue eoprehensive planning,

industrialization and

transformation.
We believe that transformation becomes possible in
the
context
of
a
strongly
entrenched
worker/peasant alliance seeking to establish a
socialist society - despite the widly held (and
qouoted) views that even then they cannot have a
modern and highly
differentiated economic
structure (Thomas,1974:301).
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The main proposed strategies and policy recommendations:
One of the main strategies proposed for the small economies to
overcome the limitations of their size is their regional integration
and cooperation.

Demas

argues

that

important avenue to achieve a more
growth (Demas, 1965:35).

economic

regionalism

offers

an

fully self-sustained pattern of

Taking the Caribbean countries as an example,

he argues that:
the prospects for autonomous development of the
Caribbean Archipelago and the more geographically
limited Caribbean community would obviously be
enhanced by schemes of integration and economic
cooperation bringing a wider market and a wider
range of human and natural resources (Demas,
1976:239).
In addition, he links regional integration to another strategy,
that of ISI,
the value of regional economic integration in
terms of development patterns it makes possible a
strategy of development based on
importsubstitution rather than export creation and
therefore
a
less
’dependent'
pattern
of
development (Demas, 1965:36).
The latter strategy is seen also as a means to maximize foreign
exchange earnings. Furthermore, Demas has suggested another pattern of
industrialization that would provide some of the basic needs

(e.g.,

food, textiles and shelter) and a limited range of intermediate goods
such as cement, wood and other building materials.

The output of this

type of basic industrialization could be utilized in the construction
sector which "could assume a more propulsive role in such economies"
(Demas, 1965:49).

In addition to the two types of industrialization

that are directed to home consumption, Demas sees the development of an
industrial structure that is geared to export as another way to enhance
the

economy's

capacity

to

transform
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(mainly by

virtue

of

export

diversification). Recognizing the negative effect of the unfavorable
terms

of trade

on the amount

international market,
countries'

of the

Demas points

participation in

the

generated surplus

to the

demand

importance

for

a NIEO

in

of the
(Demas,

the

small
1976).

Finally, Demas has emphasized the importance of economic planning as a
means

to accelerate

the small economy's process

of

transformation.

However, because of the small size and the openness, both the private
sector and the international investors play an important role in the
planning process.
It is interesting to note that while Fitzgerald's model specially
addresses the experience of the small socialist economies, the model's
policy

recommendations coincide with all

(which indicates

the dominance,

those

suggested by

in some cases,

Demas

of the material

conditions of an economy over its social and political orientation).
Rather than a reduction of dependency as such the diversification of
dependency is the aim; by the same token, the maintenance of a wide
range of exports and negotiation of long-term supplier's contracts of
barter agreements are aimed at mitigation of the negative effect of the
external terms of trade on accumulation.
run,

Nonetheless,

the transition strategy must involve

"industrialization"

to overcome

the

in the longer

a greater

degree

structural heterogeneity

of

(...);

this will have to take the form of integration with other economies in
the region (Fitzgerald, 1985(a):108).
In addition to regional integration, ISI, basic industrialization,
NIEO and planning, Fitzgerald has emphasized another strategy, that of
the provision of basic needs.

This strategy is emphasized for two

major reasons:
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at the center of economic strategy must be the
increasing supply of basic needs; this is an end
in itself (and a necessary condition for continued
popular support in peace time) and a requirement
if the effective contribution of the work force to
production is to be realized (Fitzgerald,
1985(a):99).
In Thomas's analysis, the main proposed policies are constructed
within the general strategy of structural transformation towards
socialism.
for the

He has criticized

both neoclassical and radical analyses

limited recognition of the possibility of industrialization in

the small economies.
features of

Thomas views the major structural problematic

the small underdeveloped countries as: (1) the lack of an

organic linkage between the pattern and growth of domestic resource use
and those of domestic demand; and (2) the divergence between domestic
demand and the needs of the broad mass
1974:59).

Both

could

be

overcome

of the population
by

pursuing

a

(Thomas,

structural

transformation of the agricultural and industrial sectors, based on
indigenous technology, geared to the production of basic materials and
the satisfaction of basic needs as defined by the society.

In addition

Thomas does not share other theorists' enthusiasm for the strategy of
regional

integration.
(At) present there is little likelihood of
meaningful political/economic integration among a
significant enough number of states to permit a
serious
combined
effort
at
structural
transformation. It follows that other strategies,
apart from waiting for the achievement of economic
integration, will have to be devised (Thomas,
1974:192).

His major emphasis is on the strategy of industrialization that is
geared to the production of basic materials
glass,

(e.g.

textile,

cement,

industrial chemicals) which would create the organic linkage

between the domestic demand and output.
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Furthermore, Thomas emphasizes

the necessity of

a

comprehensive

planning

of

both production and

consumption and the transformation of the agriculture structure.
Finally, while Demas did not pursue his analysis within a specific
social structure, both Fitzgerald and Thomas present their analysis of
the small open economies within a socialist framework.
model

assumes

a mixed

economy

in

transition

Fitzgerald's

to socialism with

a

relatively small size of the proletariat, peasant majority and remnants
of the capitalist

and petty mercantile

controling the "commanding hights” tends,

sectors.

The

State

in

during the transition to

strengthen the former two at the expense of the latter.

Thomas, on the

other hand, starts his analysis with the assumption that the dominance
of a worker/peasant alliance has been established.

These classes form

the social structure of the state, and are the beneficiaries of the
social and economic transformation of the economy.

Conclusions and further remarks:
The five theoretical perspectives reveal,
implicitly,

either explicitly or

two definitions of economic independence:

(1)

Delinking

from the world capitalist system and the pursuit of an anti-capitalist
path, i.e., of a socialist development; or (2) the development of the
productive

structure

of the economy,

with

increasing

the

level of

integration (linkages) among its productive sectors and between them
and the domestic resources and needs.

This process requires increasing

the national control over the internal process of capital accumulation
and hence over the social product.
increase the

benefit

In addition,

the

attempt to

of interdependence; i.e. , structural transforma

tion of the economy towards

a higher degree of

national integration

and equal interdependence in the world economy.

These two positions
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are shared by many other writers who are not necessarily associated
with

any

of

the

presented

theoretical

concerning which definition is more

perspectives.
"correct"

The

continues

literature and in both academic and political conferences.

debate
in the

A recent

conference in Jordan on Independent Development in the Arab Countries
reflects

clearly

participants

this

division

of

opinion.^

While

some

of

the

(e.g., Ismael Sabri) equated economic independence with

socialism, others (e.g., Sa'ad A1 Deen Ibrahim) argued that economic
independence stems from the development of the productive structure
which can

be achieved by socialist, capitalist, or cooperative means.

The two distinct positions are also reflected in the collection of
studies on Economic Independence in Africa edited by Ghai (1973).

Some

writers in these studies (e.g., Saul) argue that economic independence
should imply a disengagment from the capitalist system and the adoption
of a socialist strategy.

Others (e.g., Ghai and Green), however, take

it to imply a national control over the economic structure.
Economic independence can be formulated as a
situation
in which national institutions
(including private business and interest groups)
have the right, capacity and power to take and
implement decisions affecting the national economy
and its component units without a de jure or de
facto veto
power being
held by
foreign
individuals, enterprises, interest groups or
governments (Green, 1973:46).
These two definitions of economic independence are directly
related to the discussion on the possibility and ability,
theoretically and empirically, of the Third World countries

both

to achieve

an independent capitalist development.
In this dissertation I will take the second definition as the
starting point for different reasons:
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(1)

While the two definitions represent two different orientations of
thought, I believe that the first one is a special case of the
second definition.

Economic independence, as defined in terms of

greater domestic control over the internal process of accumulation
and not

in terms of more welfare

and

social

equality,

is

theoretically compatible with capitalist development.
(2)

Analysis

of

independence
opinion,
strategies

the

conditions

according

to the

and

strategies

first

definition

be viewed within the more

general

of constructing the material

society with all its

specific

social,

basis

for

economic

should,

in my

conditions
of

political,

and

a

socialist

and

economic

aspects.
(3)

Many of the strategies and policies advocated for economic
independence that have been applied in different social structures
are generally based on the second definition.
This

second

definition

is not

clearly

spelled out

in the

literature, with the exception of the work of some writers within the
fifth school of though (the work on small open economies) specifically
in the work of Thomas Clive and William Demas.
In working with the second definition,

it should be emphasized

that economic independence is perceived as a gradual process towards a
relatively higher degree of national integration and not as an absolute
condition.

In this sense we cannot speak of countries or economies

that are independent and those which are not, but rather of degrees of
dependence or independence.

Thus, a historical perspective becomes a

necessary framework in evaluating economic independence since an
observation at one time will not reveal the dynamic changes in the
productive structure, whether towards a reduction or aggravation of
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dependence.

In evaluating the case of India, Kelkar has emphasized the

importance

of

a

'time-frame'

and argued

for

the

necessity

of

distinguishing between short duration or 'tactical* dependence and long
duration or 'strategic' dependence.
(It) is perfectly possible that for a short
duration an economy can be 'dependent' on other
economy for increasing rapidly the state of
accumulation or capital formation.
However, such
process itself can lead to the limitation of
'asymmetry'
due to its
increasedeconomic and
technological power via accretion of capital
stock, technology etc. (Kelkar, 1980:247).
Hence, utilizing some external sources of finance (e.g., loans and
aid)

in the development of the productive structure of the economy

might be considered a ’tactic'
utilizing

or short duration dependence.

Yet,

a similar amount of external finance (or even less) totally

for consumptionist products and services might lead to a long duration
dependence.
Taking the second definition with its two emphasized aspects
national integration and equal

interdependence

question ’independent of what?'

should be clear:

reflects

-

- the answer to the
national integration

the endogenous aspect of the process,

a higher degree of

articulation among the different sectors of the economy and among these
sectors and domestic resources and needs.

In

addition, it is ahigher

capacity to manipulate the operative elements of the economic system in
order

to

structurally

transform

it according

to

the

national

objectives; i.e., to rephrase Brewster: a system which is ’independent'
from its own weaknesses (Brewster, 1973:91).

Equal interdependence, on

the other hand, implies that economic independence is not autarky, and
is not independence from 'others', but rather interaction on an equal
basis with

them.
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Another question that could be raised here is: is it possible to
measure

the

familiar

degree of economic

with

studies

independence,

that have

and how?

attempted

I am not

to measure

economic

independence as such, however, some studies have attempted to measure
the opposite situation,
their
that

economic dependence.

Evans and Gereffi,

in

assessment of Brazil's and Mexico's dependency situation, argue
direct foreign investment

gives the external owners of capital

the right to decide how and what

to produce, and how to utilize the

generated surplus (Evans and Gereffi, 1982:116).

Hence, they consider

foreign ownership as a "good 'first cut' indicator of external control
of the internal productive apparatus"

(Evans and Gereffi,

This indicator is accepted by many writers.18

1982:117).

"(A) country can hardly

be characterized as economically independent when a substantial
proportion of its assets and jobs are

in foreign hands"

(Ghai,

1973:xii).
Brewster

argues, however, that such an orthodox

measure as the

proportion of foreign to local ownership (as well as import and export
coefficients,

ratios of foreign to domestic

downgraded (Brewster,

1973:92).

has

to be

While national ownership is an

important factor for economic independence,
ownership

investment)

the absence

in one country does not necessarily

imply

the

of foreign
economy's

higher level of national integration and the capacity to manipulate the
domestic operative elements, nor its equal participation in the world
economy and hence its independence.

Defining economic dependence as

the wide and growing disparity between the structure of the domestic
demand and the structure of domestic resource use, Brewster suggests
using a matrix of inter-relationships between the operative economic
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functions of the system.

He has constructed a partial matrix of the

association between the changes

in a

(employment,

import

wage

rate,

prices, and investment)

export,

small selection of variables
ratio,

output,

in Trinidad and Tobago.

consumption,

The values of the

coefficients of correlation were insignificant which he considers:

"a

major distinguishing feature between a dependent economy like Trinidad
and Tobago and an economy depending on external trade like Britain"
(Brewster, 1973:92).
Sylvan has argued against measuring the degree of economic
dependence

by

computing

the

percentage

of

investment accounted for by foreign sources.

total

accumulation

and

Instead, he is concerned

with "the contingency of domestic processes on foreign sources"
(Sylvan, 1979:20).

In an attempt to measure this concept, he takes the

per capita liquid surplus as a measure

of the adequacy of domestic

capital accumulation, and the level of money incomes as a proxy for the
degree of the
domestic

"heaviness"

technology.

19

of investment and hence

These

two

factors,

Sylvan

the adequacy of
argues,

account

mainly for the contingency of domestic processes on foreign sources.
The measure suggested by Sylvan is, in my opinion, based on a rigid
causal mechanism that cannot be generalized to different economic and
social

structures. 20

I do,

however,

agree with

his

emphasis

on

technology as defined not in terms of machines only but as all means of
production.
The major problem in reducing economic dependence
is to find a way of increasing accumulation while
at the same time channeling that capital into
domestic
rather
than
foreign
technology
(Sylvan, 1979:160).
Gaporaso has correctly argued that while economic dependence as a
pure economic relation is easily measured, dependency is a much more
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complex concept and thus Is more resistant to measurement suggestions
(Caporaso,

1978).

quantitative

As mentioned earlier,

studies,

by

incorporating

many of the

only

some

conducted

external

(e.g., volume of trade and foreign debt), have reached

factors

the misleading

conclusion that many of the advanced industrial countries (e.g., Canada
and Japan) are more 'dependent' than many developing countries. 21

This

is not to argue against quantitative studies, but rather to signify the
importance of examining different economic, political and social
factors.

One might examine a set of indicators such as: changes in

the level or ratio of national to foreign ownership;
domestic

ability

technology;

and

changes

capacity

in the

to

produce

composition

scientific and managerial expertise;
conduct

independent

domestic and

the

changes in the

needed

(domestic vs.

and changes

capital
foreign)

and
of

in the ability to

foreign policies.

The

following

definition by Helleiner points to some additional important indicators
of economic independence:
No state without an economy basically oriented to
production for national needs, without a high
capacity for generating nationally at least the
bulk of the investable surplus and educatedskilled manpower necessary for rapid and sustained
growth has the economic base for fully meaningful
independence (Helleiner, 1979b:223).
Because of the difficulty of incorporating many of the social and
political indicators (in terms of data and the use of proxy), I believe
in the necessity of undertaking a qualitative examination of specific
cases within a historical perspective.
Finally, the examination of the different schools of thought has
revealed

a

set

of

different

proposed

recommendations (summarized in Table (1)).
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strategies

and

policy

The major proposed economic

strategies are:

Industrialization either as ISI or basic

regional cooperation, and the demand for the NIEO.
these

strategies will be

the subject

industry,

The evaluation of

of the next

chapter.

Both

nationalization and economic planning, which have been emphasized by
many schools,

are necessary policies with which a higher degree of

economic independence can be achieved.

While nationalization lays the

foundation of the structure of a more independent economy (by allowing
a higher control over the productive assets), planning enhances the
implementation of the development process and reduces the ill effect of
conflicting interests that might develop within this process.

Another

policy recommendation that has been emphasized by all schools is income
distribution.
differently.

The emphasis

on

this policy,

however,

is justified

ECLA sees income redistribution as a means to increase

the aggregate demand and hence

the domestic market.

Some writers

within dependencia see income redistribution as a means to reduce the
transfer of surplus
domestic wages.

to the center via the the depressed level of

The other schools see the redistribution of income

towards the provision of basic needs as means for increasing both the
mass support and the level of productivity.

Therefore, whether the

attempt at increasing the level of economic independence is conducted
within a socialist or a capitalist oriented development,
need to link the process to

a certain level of income distribution.

Though this policy will not be
the second chapter,

there is a

theoretically analyzed separately in

I will take it into consideration in discussing

other strategies and in evaluating the Cuban experience.
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Table (1)

Summary of Definitions and Proposed Strategies of
Economic Independence by Different Schools of Thought

School of
Thought

Definition of
Economic Independence

Proposed Strategies

(1)

ECLA
(50s-60s)

National integration and
Equal Interdependence

ISI, RC, ID,
planning

(2)

Dependencia
(60s-70s)

National integration/
Socialism

BIS, RC, ID,
planning

(3)

Soviet
(60s-80s)

National integration/
Socialism

BIS, RC, ID, planning
nationalization, NIEO

(4)

Self-Reliance
(70s-80s)

National integration/
Equal Interdependence

BIS, RC, AT, PBN,
NIEO

(5) Small open
Economies
(60s-80s)

ISI:
BIS:
RC:
ID:
PBN:
AT:

National integration/
Socialism

import substituting industrialization.
basic industry strategy.
regional cooperation.
income distribution.
provision of basic needs.
appropriate technology.
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ISI, BIS, RC,
planning, PBN, NIEO
export diversification

Notes
Green, however, acknowledges that the converse of this assumption
does not hold.

He recognizes that In certain cases some national

groups may see their interest best served by uniting with external
economic forces.
Roemer correctly points that
Western economics has not yet accepted national
independence
as
a
national
goal
of
development(...) . (The) goal of independence
raises fundamental differences on which economists
from the North and South are likely to find much
less common ground(Roemer,1981:429).
It is important to note that though the concern with economic
independence is not addressed in contemporary Western economics,
it was the concern of some of the now advanced countries in their
early stages of development.

Such concern was

reflected,

for

example, in the writings of Friedrich List who addressed the issue
in relation to the American economy in the late 19th Century.

For

a review of List's argument see Otfried Garbe, 1977.
Prebisch's

theoretical contributions

long before the establishment of ECLA.
Revista Economica as early as 1937.

on related

issues

started

His analysis appeared in
For a presentation of the

economic and social background within which Prebisch's thoughts
have evolved see Love, 1980.
In the 1940s, studies made by Kindleberger, Hilgerdt, and Singer
have

similarly questioned the

conventional

international

trade

theory and advanced an opposite hypothesis of a secular trend in

the terras of trade.

Singer and Prebisch, however, extended the

argument further to indicate the tendency for a steady decline
terms of trade of the developing countries (Sarker, 1986:355).
5.

Prebisch has elaborated this argument in recent articles; see for
example Prebisch (1980).

6.

The presentation on this

section will

only cover some of the

original work associated with dependencia in Latin America.
influential writers

(e.g.,

Samir Amin) have

Other

elaborated the

analysis for other regions.
7.

For an assessment of the evolution of the dependencia school see
Palma

8.

(1978).

Many critics have classified the writers within dependencia
differently.

For a summary of some

of the classifications

see

Chilcote (1981).
9.

There is, to a certain extent, an overlap between the work of ECLA
and that of the dependencia school.

Some critics (e.g., Chilcote,

1984) associate the work of both Sunkel and Furtado with ECLA.
Other critics (e.g., Palma, 1978), however, consider their work as
a distinct approach within dependencia.
agree that Sunkel's

and Furtado's

Both critics, however,

main emphasis

is on the

obstacles to national development, and that both have enhanced the
social and
10.

political perspective of ECLA.

For some references see Palma (1978),
(1972), and Werker

11.

Chilcote

(1981), Browett

(1985).

See for example Caporaso (1978), Ohierhenuan (1979) and Roxbourgh
(1979).
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12.

Based on

such confusion,

some

writers

have

argued

that

Cuba

depends on the Soviet Union as it did on the United States before
the revolution.
13.

This point will be analyzed in chapter III.

For a summary and critical assessment of the
path" see Thomas

(1978),

Ohiorhenuan

"Non

capitalist

(1979-80) , and Amirahmadi

(1987) .
14.

Berger has traced the origin of the term self-reliance to the
Chinese phrase that translate as "regeneration through our own
efforts"

which appeared

(mentioned in Galtung,

in Mao

1980:19).

Tse-Tung's

speech

in

1945

Another writer has traced its

origin to Ghandi's philosophy (mentioned in Sagasti, 1976:939).
15.

In his more recent article
economy constraints".
psychological,

Demas

economic,

system

political

of

and social phenomena

(e.g.,

high level of unemployment,

education) .

These

influenced by historical and external factors
western

the "political

These constraints reflect a complex set of

inappropriate level of consumption,
inappropriate

incorporates

phenomena
(e.g.,

are

impact of

consumption patterns brought about by media and tourists)

(Demas, 1976).
16.

The most recent collection of these studies is in Fagen et al.,
1986.

17.

The collection of these studies has been published in
under the title: Al Tanmia Al Mustakela Fi Al

Arabic

Watan Al Arabi

(Independent Development in the Arab Countries), Markaz Derasat
Alwehda Al Arabia, Lebanon, 1987.
18.

See for example the collection of studies in Ghai (1973).

19.

Sylvan argues that the higher the level of money incomes (wages,
salaries or peasant receipts) the less the money that is available
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to buy

the

addition,

complex

machinery

the higher

needed

this average

for

level

heavy
of

industry.

money

income

In
the

greater is the pressure for capital to be invested in consumer
goods rather than in producer goods.

Finally, by assuming that

heavy Industry requires higher reliance on foreign technology than
light industry, Sylvan argues that a rise In the income of the
average person implies a diminuation in the contingency of
investment on foreign technology.
20.

Sylvan's suggested mechanism implies that as
"average"

person

increases,

the

contingency

the income of the
of

investment

on

foreign technology will decrease and hence the degree of economic
dependence will also decrease.

However,

where this mechanism does not apply.

there are many

In some countries

cases
(e.g.,

some oil producing ones) the income of the average person was
raised substantially leading to an increase demand for consumption
goods. The demand, however, was not met by domestic production but
rather by increased imports of these goods.

On the other hand, in

a country like Cuba, the gradual move toward heavy Industry was
neither at the expense of suppressed incomes
person nor

has

it

of the

led to increased dependence

on

"average"
foreign

technology.
21.

President Kennedy remarked once that the most dependent powers in
the world were the super powers
Political

Economy

of

New

and

Butterworths, London & Boston.
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(Saunders
Old

(ed), 1981:74):

Industrial

The

Countries.

CHAPTER II

STRATEGIES OF ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE
Introduction
This chapter focuses

on the

four main strategies that have been

advocated by most schools of thought reviewed in the previous chapter.
They include the nationally conducted strategies of import-substituting
industrialization and basic industrialization and two strategies
constructed within

the broader

international

context:

regional

cooperation and the demand for the new international economic order
The focus on industrialization at the national level should not
imply the neglect of agriculture and the role of external trade. None
of the presented schools in chapter I advocates autarky or the neglect
of agriculture.

Rather, policies to benefit the trade and agriculture

sectors are conceived as important short and medium run strategies.
Besides fulfilling domestic consumption needs,

agricultural products

can serve as basic material in some of the industries and as exported
products which could secure additional foreign exchange needed
capital goods imports.
long-run strategy with

for

Industrialization, however, is conceived as the
the greatest

potential for accelerating the

development of the other sectors (as a direct stimulus to other new
activities through linkage effect) and for increasing the economy's
productive

capacity,

its

flexibility,

and

hence

its

economic

independence (see chapter I).
Industrialization has also been cited as contributing to other
goals.

Most writers would agree that
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"the principal potential of

industrialization was
growth"

(Hughes,

elimination of
living

in

1978:1).

its

To

contribution

economic

to

growth,

rapid
others

economic
add

the

human poverty and increasing the material standard of

(Sutcliffe,

productivity

seen

1972) by increasing the employment

and

supply

of

goods.

Beyond

level,

any

labor

theoretical

justification, however, industrialization has been perceived as one of
the most

important strategies by

industrialization

represented

high wages and development.

many political

progress,

leaders

stability,

"for whom

diversification,

Above all, it meant economic independence"

(Pazos, 1985-86: 58).
The process of industrialization in the now developed countries
took different forms.

It proceeded from a light industry emphasis to

heavy industry in Britain; a similar, but shorter process took place
later in other European countries and in the United
opposite

of

this

sequence was

pursued by

The

Soviet

Union where

priority was given to the development of heavy industry.

The debate

continues in the economic development
and similarities

between

the

the

States.

literature about the differences

pattern of

19^

century

industrial

development in the now advanced countries and the pattern in the Third
World.^

While many writers,

perspective,

see

these

two

especially within the dependencia

patterns

as

having

different

internal

dynamics and hence different outcomes, others (e.g., Gunnarson (1985)
and Warren (1980)) emphasize their similarity.

This debate will not be

presented here; it is sufficient to quote here Sutcliffe's evaluation
of these two positions:
The available statistics
extremes
in
the
industrialization record
wrong: both Warren's

suggest to me that both
argument
over
the
of the Third World are
optimistic view that
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industrialization, the equivalent of the process
which transformed the advanced countries, is now
taking place quite rapidly in the underdeveloped
ones; and the orthodox dependency view that hardly
anything significant is happening.
The truth
seems not to be midway between the two but more
complex and ambiguous than either.
A form of
industrialization has been taking place in quite a
wide spread manner.
But in many countries it is
composed of different elements which are not
homogeneous and do not unambiguously represent
economic modernaisation (Sutcliffe, 1984:128).
Various

theorists

different ways.

classify

the

types

of

industrialization

in

Some classify them according to their emphasis on

capital intensive vs. labor intensive industries, or on large vs. small
scale industries.

Roemer (1981: 166) further classifies the industrial

strategies

those

into

which

emphasize:

(1)

import-substituting

industrialization (ISI), (2) further processing of primary exports, (3)
promotion

of diversified, mostly manufactured

exports

(an

outward-

looking strategy), (4) basic industrialization (with specific emphasis
on heavy

producer goods industries),

intensive

industries.

The

"choice"

and (5)

small-scale

labor

of the industrial strategy will

depend on the social nature of the state and its goals,

and also

to a

large extent, on the level of economic development, the economy's size
and the available human, financial and natural resources.
In this chapter,
industry strategy

I will concentrate on ISI

and on

the basic

as the two major strategies that have been advocated

in the literature, with the former being more
Third world countries.

pursued by many of the

As argued by Ahmad,

(given) the current structure
of international
trade, it was inevitable that any attempt at
industrialization in the less developed countries
will result in import substitution (Ahmad,
1978:25).
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I. Import-Substituting Industrialization flSI^
ISI as a strategy aims at producing domestically the manufactured
goods which

were formerly imported.

ISI is generally perceived to

follow a sequence similar to the process of industrialization that took
place earlier in the advanced capitalist countries, i.e., starting from
the manufacture of finished consumer goods and then, through backward
linkage

effects,

moving

on

to the

production

of

intermediate

and
n

capital goods.

Different definitions of ISI appear in the literature.

In this dissertation, ISI is taken as the replacement of

the foreign

supply of goods and services by domestic production regardless of the
sequence of the process.
ISI was pursued by some Latin American countries in the 1920s-30s
mainly as a

response to some external events (World War I and the

Great Depression).

Production of mostly consumer goods took place in

that period in many Latin American countries as a result of a decline
in their foriegn exchange, decline in non-militery production in Europe
and United States and interuption of shipping.

It was only after the

Second World War and the elaborated work of ECLA that ISI became a
deliberate economic policy of development in many of the Third World
countries.

Different countries used different

their application of ISI.

These

instruments

tariffs, overvalued exchange rates, credit

policy instruments in
included

and cheap

protective
loans by

the

government to certain industries.

Theoretical assessment of ISI:
One gets the impression in reviewing the literature that ISI is an
outdated strategy

(Bhagwati,

1986)

results (Ballance et. al. , 1982).

that

led to many

As noted by Ahmad:
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disappointing
ISI "has been

portrayed as the single greatest disaster that has ever happened to the
LDCs" (Ahmad, 1978:8).

ISI has been

liberal and radical perspectives.
limits on

criticized from the conservative,
Neoclassical economists decry the

free trade and specialization according to

comparative

advantage. They oppose its main policy instruments of protection and
government intervention.

Accordingly they believe that ISI has led to

inefficiency and misallocation of resources.
negative social consequences, such as its

Liberals point to ISI's
failure to create direct

employment opportunities and its contribution to social and regional
inequality.

In addition, they criticize other structural consequences

such as the bias of ISI towards production of non-essential luxury
goods and its inevitable slowing down and exhaustion stage. Radical
writers,

on the other hand, view ISI as a development strategy that

serves the interest of the bourgeoisie (national and foreign) at
expense of the poorest majority (Loup, 1983: 196).

the

3

By its own definition, by its deliberate inward direction, and by
its

economic

sufficiency

and
and

neoclassical

political

aim

independence,

view

of

of

ISI

increasing
is

maximizing

the

incompatible
world

economy's

self-

with

basic

welfare

the

through

the

specialization of each country according to its "given" comparative
advantage.

Hence any socio-economic consequence of ISI is condemned by

neoclassical writers.
In pointing to inefficiency and "waste", these critics

tend to

decry the difficulties that are bound to occur in any initial attempt
at industrialization, planning or any other economic activity.
It is well to remember in this connection that
initial low productivities in manufacturing
activity are simply the cost of learning.
Low
productivities, in any event, are neither unique
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to import substituting industries nor are caused
by them. They are a pervasive fact of life in all
less developed countries (...). It makes no sense
to isolate import-substituting industries as the
only ones with low productivity and imply that
abandoning
them
will
somehow
increase
productivity ( Ahmad, 1978:38).
Most critics
and stopping
These

critics

extension.

cite ISI's inevitable tendency toward slowing down

after "easy" import-substitution opportunities are taken.
seem
As

to

ignore

the

different

Hirschman suggests,

possibilities

ISI can be

for

ISI

expanded by

the

possibilities of enlarging the market size, through some policies of
income redistribution and by the formation of common markets.
addition,

ISI

can

open up

new

opportunities

for

further

In

domestic

manufacture through the creation of new incomes and through backward
linkages (Hirschman, 1968:14).

Furthermore, this limitation would tend

to disappear when ISI is extended to intermediate and capital goods
production. In a recent assessment of Latin American countries, Fazos
argues that many countries have been progressively able to manufacture
substitute goods that are more difficult to produce as their technical
and managerial ability has developed (Pasos, 1985-86:61).

Hirschman

further challenges the claim that ISI tends to concentrate on nonessential luxury goods.
non

essential

He argues that ISI leads to a bias in favor of

industries only when

payments difficulties.

it is motivated by balance-of-

The main reason Hirschman gives is that the

control will
aim at permitting continued supply
of the more essential goods traditionally imported
at the cost of shutting out non-essentials and
thus cause domestic production of the latter to
become specially profitable (Hircschman, 1968:5).
However, a "deliberate development policy, is likely to produce exactly
the opposite bias "(Hirschman,1968: 5).
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While income and regional inequality have been exacerbated in many
countries

adopting

ISI,

the underlying cause

inequality must be understood within the
social structures.

of such social

dynamics specific to certain

The profile of the productive structure after the

pursuit of ISI reflects the demand profile which existed before.

This

demand profile was based, in most cases, on unequal income distribution
(Georgescu-Roegen, cited in

Baer, 1972: 108).

The existing relations

of production which determine the pattern of income distribution will
define the type of products (e.g., luxury goods vs. mass consumption
goods) that ISI domestically supplies, and not the other way around.
However, while
problems and

ISI may contribute to different economic and social
is not socially nuetral, it is important to acknowledge

that these problems were already in existence.

In other words, it is

misleading to attribute social and economic ills of a certain social
structure to the pursuit of a specific industrial strategy.^
The main question here, however, remains: what is the effect of
ISI

on

the broader

attempt

economic independence?
different

forms

of

at

increasing

the

country's

level

of

In his evaluation of the effect of ISI on
dependence,

Roemer

(1981)

argues

that

ISI

intensifies rather than ameliorates at least four types of dependence:
market dependence, technological dependence, foreign capital dependence
and economic inflexibility (the lack of the capacity to transform);
with positive impact only on reducing dependence on foreign managers
and entrepreneurs.
Many writers within the dependencia perspective believe that ISI
has encouraged the penetration of foreign
through

the

import

of

foreign

capital

interest

and

in the

technology,

aggravated the situation of "dependencia" (Sunkel, 1972).
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economy

which

has

The level of

economic dependence has indeed increased in those economies where ISI
(and industrialization in general) meant only the establishment
large

"assembly

plant"

dominant control

operations.

over decision making

marketing and other activities.
isolated pockets

in

linkages, and with

ISI

these
in

MNCs

production,

have

the

employment,

In addition, these plants often act as
backward or forward

small opportunities, if any, to develop indigenous

is

By the same token, similar consequences may

confined to

the production of consumer goods

(especially durables), without developing
goods

cases

these economies with no

technological capacity.
develop when

In

of

the capacity for capital

production.
Countries with no local capital goods capacity,
then, are forced to import not only the capital
goods but very often the whole package that goes
with it.
In so far as various aspects of the
package are inappropriate they have to accept
inappropriate patterns of development (Stewart,
1976:132) .

Some critics use different statistical indicators (e.g., imports
coefficients) to determine the impact of ISI on the economy's level of
dependency.

These

indicators, while helpful

cases, are misleading when
of

the

theoretical

generalized.

evaluations of

ISI

in assessing

specific

The basic problem with most
is that

they

are

done

in

isolation from reference to the specific socio-economic structure of
each

country.

They

tend

to be

methodologically

static

dynamic factors such as "accumulation of experiences
(Stewart,

1982) and

through the changes

(ignoring

and skill"

linkages). The impact on economic independence
in import composition, technology,

and

finance, should be evaluated within specific case studies.
considerations should be given to the long-term effects
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foreign
Specific
of the

structural change in the industrial process, the change in the import
components of the produced goods, the development of externalities and
linkages,

the

increasing

level

of

productivity

from

operating

experience and technological advances, and the changes in ownership of
the employed capital.

Taking all these factors into consideration will

provide a more profound evaluation of actual experiences.
while

ISI

has

intinsified

dependence and economic

in many

cases

inflexibility,

market,

Therefore,

foreign

capital

as argued by Roemer

(1981),

these outcomes are not the general case for all countries.

As will be

shown in chapter III, Cuba's adoption of a certain form of ISI(with
emphasis

on utilizing domestic resources) has decreased itsmarket

and

technological dependency, and has significantly increased the country's
economic flexibility.
The

attribution

consequences

to

ISI

of

many

reflects

negative
a naivete

social
similar

attribution of all the "evil" to machinery.

and
to

structural
the

common

It ignores the social

context within which the strategy (or machinery) has been applied. ISI
will definitely exacerbate income inequality and unemployment when it
is directed to the production of narrowly consumed goods.
The dominant classes in every society define a
"standard of living" which in turn defines a range
of required goods. When the range of goods that
can be produced internally is narrow relative to
the socially defined ranged of required goods,
then reliance on external sources of those goods
becomes a central
part of maintaining the
"standards of living" (Evans and Geriffi,
1982:115).
Further,

ISI will

exacerbate

economic

dependence

(through

increased foreign penetration), when the groups with power are those
whose interests coincide with those of foreign capital.

A national

state (with national bourgeoisie or workers/peasants base)
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that

actively intervens in the economy would tend to use stricter measures
with foreign capital.

In this respect,

the

state's regulation of

foreign investment becomes an important complementary policy to ISI.
Citing all the alleged negative

impacts

of ISI,

many writers

(e.g., Bhagwati, 1986) and financial institutions (e.g., World Bank)
announce its failure

and advocate

(EOI) as an alternative strategy.
this conclusion: First,

export-oriented

industrialization

These writers ignore two aspects of

the cited examples of

successful EOI (e.g.,

Brazil and South Korea) are in countries that have developed the strong
base for their industrial export through their
from ISI (Pazos (1985-86) and O'Brien (1979));

experience acquired
Second, the pursuit of

EOI will not necessarily alleviate the social and structural problems
attributed to ISI, since they are mostly an outcome of the specific
C

social system within which they are pursued.

Therefore,

instead of

abandoning ISI in favor of EOI, the latter can be adopted, in a later
stage,

as

a complementary

strategy and not

as

a substitute.

In

addition, instead of greater reliance on the market forces, the social
and structural

limitations

associated with

ISI

can be

reduced or

countered by pursuing additional policies such as:
(1) a more comprehensive process of economic planning.

This policy

would help in reducing the problems of the wasteful misallocation
of resources and regional Inequality.

Such a policy has been

pursued by many socialist countries.
(2) Emphasis

on applying

ISI

In intermediate and capital goods

sectors and not in the consumer goods sector.
many critics of ISI believe,

UNECLA argued that
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Contrary to what

import substitution with respect to a particular
consumer good, specifically if it is a consumer
durable, may cause more severe demands with
respect to investment and technical know-how than
other alternative substitution
possibilities in
the field of capital goods or intermediate
products (quoted in Havenvik, 1978:143).
Focus on these two sectors would have the dynamic tendency to
reduce foreign investment by developing an indigenous technical
capacity.

Such

policy has

been pursued

by

some

developing

countries (e.g., China, India).
(3)

Emphasis on the utilization of domestic resources in the different
industries. Such utilization will reduce the country's import of
raw materials,

and

would

increase

the

technical

capacity

increased experiences in adapting available resources

by

to final

needs.
(4)

Both

regional

cooperation and

the demand

for NIEO

should be

perceived as policies complementary with ISI. These complementary
policies could expand the market and counter the

"exhaustion"

possibilities.
Therefore,

instead

of dismissing

ISI

offhand because

of

its

alleged inefficiencies and limitations, Third World countries should
make a conscious choice based on a careful

examination of the

implications of ISI.

II. Basic Industrialization (BI)
While ISI has been
been supported by

advocated mainly

by ECLA, forms of BI have

Soviet theorists, self-reliance writers, writers on

small open economies, and some of the dependencia school writers (see
chapter I) .

ISI has been pursued for decades in many different Third

63

World countries; as a result many theoretical and empirical assessments
exist in the literature, which is not the case for BI.^
This strategy emphasizes investment in the producer-goods sector.
Such emphasis has been the center of the "Soviet industrialization
model"

of heavy

Feldman's model.

industry which was
Similar

theoretically

supported by

versions, adapted to developing countries,

have been put forth by Hahalanobis, Raj and Sen and De Bernis.^
however, differs from these models in some aspects.
presuppose the

BI,

These models

existence of large continental countries,

where

the

requirement and range of heavy industry is feasible; BI is a model for
the small underdeveloped economies which characterize most of the Third
World countries.

Another important difference is that these previous

models neglect the problem of technology and deal with technology as a
parameter and not as a variable (Stewart, 1976).

BI, on the other

hand, strongly emphasizes the development of an Indigenous technology
as part of the process of industrialization.
result

of

their

awareness

of

dynamic

In addition,

technological

and as a

changes,

BI's

advocates acknowledge a certain level of flexibility in the resources
O

base,

which other models do not.

higher

degree

of

domestic resources.

linkage

between

Such level of flexibility implies a
the

industry

and

the

available

Finally, while the previous models focus on the

conflict of investment allocation

between the producer-goods sector

(Department I) and the consumer-goods sector (Department II), BI's main
focus is on the convergence of domestic resource use, domestic demand
and domestic needs and the consequence development of the technological
capacity (with emphasis on

heavy industry as a complementary policy).

As Thomas argues:
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Our basic strategy for transforming these
economies (the small underdeveloped) is to plan
the convergence of domestic resource use, domestic
demand, and needs in such a way as to create the
basis of an indigenous technology (Thomas, 1974:
195).
BI involves the production of basic goods (basic in the Sraffian
sense)

i.e.,

goods

that

are used,

production of all other goods.
and the means of production.

directly or

indirectly,

in the

They consist essentially of wage goods

Analyzing the case of Tanzania, Rweyemamu

argues that: "these are the only goods that can transform our economy
from a dependency relationship to one of economic
(Rweyemamu,

1973:181).

More specifically,

basic goods with the two main
textiles.

Q

independence"

Thomas identifies these

industries:

iron and steel

and

To these main elements, he adds other important basic goods

which include: paper, plastic, rubber, glass, cement, fuel, industrial
chemicals and other intermediate and final materials.
of these goods, by providing strategic linkages,

The production

forms the backbone of

the industrial structures.
(If) these goods are not produced locally the
organic linkages between domestic demand and
domestic output will forever lie abroad in the
countries from which these imports are derived.
The growth of domestic
demand will then simply
result in transferring the bulk of the value added
(Thomas, 1974:196).
Stressing the importance of the

linkage effects has been long

addressed in the literature (Hirschman, 1958).

However, in addition to

the inter-sectoral and inter-industrial linkage, the advocates of BI
stress the general linkage among the selected industries
basic

goods)

and

domestic

resources

and

domestic

(providing

neesds.

This

additional linkage reduces the possibility of the negative outcome of
some of the "consumption linkages"

that occured in some developing
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countries.'*'®
importance

In addition, the early writing of Hirschman (1958) on the

of

the

linkages

effects

have

singled

out

the

relation

between the market size and economic size of the plant as the key
factor that would trigger private and public investment in backward and
forward linkages (Hirschman, 1977:77).

On the contrary, advocates of

B I , while stressing the importance of inter-sectoral and inter
industrial

linkages,

undermine

the market

size

as

a determinant

factor; instead they point out the size of generated surplus and its
allocation to industry (Thomas, 1974).

Finally, the advocates of BI

consider the linkage among domestic resources, demand and output as the
necessary condition for the growth

of an indigenous technology.

Many theoritical and empirical studies have shown that indigenous
technology develops when the industrial production is geared to
producer-goods.*■*■
final basic goods,

In an attempt to supply certain intermediate and
local technological

innovations would gradually,

through a process of accumulated experiences, skills and organization,
adapt the use of

available resources

to the production of

these

12

goods.

Theoretical assessment of BI:
In

his

survey

of

the

literature

on

resource-based

industrialization, Roemer argues that because of the low direct labor
coefficients of most of these industries (typically capital intensive),
they do not seem to be a good instrument for generating employment.
further argues,
should

however,

that the case

for these

basic

He

industries

rest not so much on the direct impact as on their indirect

effects through the linkage to other sectors (Roemer, 1979: 185).
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Further,

because

of

the

high

capital/labor

ratio,

labor

productivity in these industries is higher than in other sectors, hence
wages tend to be higher.
income concentration.
the

unequal

income

relations, and not

As a result, these industries might increase

However, as I argued earlier in the case of ISI,
distribution

is

an

outcome

of

certain

social

of industrial policy per se.

What is the effect of BI on economic independence? BI has the
potential to overcome the limitations of ISI.

By linking the structure

of production to domestic consumption, BI has a higher potential for
supplying wage goods (instead of luxury goods);
production

structure

to

domestic

resource

use,

and by linking the
it has

a higher

potential in the development of an indigenous technology.
The early stages of BI in most Third World countries, like those
of any other strategy,
assistance.

require external economic

In its intial stages, BI might

foreign technology and management.
considered as

and technological

increase dependence on

However, this "dependence" can be

"tactical" or "short-run" (as was argued in Chapter I)

when it is utilized for the development of a technological and
productive

base of the economy.

(The) approach is basically one of adaptation and
selection in order to strengthen the existing
basis of the machines sector.
It soon becomes
possible for internal technological advances and
adaptations to take place (Thomas 1974:215).
In addition,

because of

its domestic

orientation,

potential of reducing "market dependence" (Roemer, 1981).
the domestic economy does not mean, however,
trade.
dynamic.
use

BI has

the

Emphasis on

the absence of foreign

Foreign trade is conceived as an extension of the internal
As BI succeeds in creating a convergence of domestic resource

and domestic demand it creates the "capacity to convert domestic
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savings into investment goods and thereby allows for the potential
development of an export capacity in industrial goods"
1974:221).

(Thomas,

Hence, a better level of equal international exchange can

be achieved as a result of domestic changes.
Finally,

Thomas suggests

four other

industrial

activities

to

complement BI: (1) the development of machinery tools industry which is
"one of the most important areas of the capital goods sector which has
to be planned and integrated into the basic materials sector" (Thomas,
1974:212);

(2)

the

provision

of

infrastructural

and

overhead

facilities, particularly power and transportation; (3) the development
of

small scale

industrial

industry which would help

differentiation

in narrowing

(reducing regional

rural/urban

inequality);

(4)

the

development of agricultural industries which would increase the dynamic
interaction between the basic materials sector and all other sectors.
On one hand,

the basic industries provide necessary

agricultural sector (e.g., fertilizers, machinery).
hand,

input for the

And on the other

the agriculture sector provides inputs for further manufacturing

(e.g., textiles, food processing).
Specially when implemented with these
activities,

complementary

industrial

BI has a higher potential than ISI for increasing the

economy's capacity

to evolve

towards

a higher

degree

of

economic

13
independence.

III. Regional Cooperation
The Third World and the advanced capitalist countries differ in
terms of their motivation for regional cooperation.
embraces

regional

cooperation

to reduce
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its

The Third World

dependence

on

the

international market

and

fostering

domestic

industrialization.

The

advanced capitalist countries' cooperation experiences, however, have
been driven mainly by the political motive of maintaining security and
peace (Mytelka (1979: 10), and Axline (1981: 171)).
Regional cooperation is conceived by its main proponents as mainly
the

means

to

expand

the

internal market

with

the

consequence

of

accelerating industrialization, and strengthening the bargaining power
of the member group.
If economic integratioin results in a larger
markets and the achievement of scale economies, it
can be an important catalyst for increased
production, investment and employment.
Such
economies
seem
especially
important
in
manufacturing processes like steel, machinary and
chemicals.
Since these items are often inputs
into other production processes, the scale
economies may have important linkage effects
(Yeats, 1981:35).
The Third World experiences in economic cooperation have taken
different forms such as: free trade association (e.g., Latin America
Free Trade Association - LAFTA), trade preference associations (e.g.,
Latin America

Integration Association-LAIA), common

Central American Common Market),
Southern African Development

or other

markets

(e.g.,

integration units

(e.g.,

Coordination Conference

- S.A.D.C.C.).

Mytelka (1979) has classified integration efforts into three distinct
forms:
1.

Type

I, a laissez

involves

faire

integrative

system

(e.g.,

LAFTA).

It

three main issues: freeing trade within the region, the

application of a certain level of a common external tariff, and
the mobility of factors of production within the region.
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2.

Type

II,

a modified laissez

Community).

faire

system

(e.g.,

East African

It includes compensatory and corrective measures and

policies for regional planning.
3.

Type III, a dirigiste integrative system (e.g., The Andean Group).
It emphasizes both planning and regulatory measures within the
regional context.
Haskel

(1974) has classified the integration efforts as

those

"expansive" in nature and those that are "distributive" in nature. The
former would correspond to type I (in Mytelka's classification);

the

latter corresponds to type III and the mixture of the two corresponds
to type II.

Theoretical Assessment of regional cooperation:
Like ISI, regional cooperation has been criticized from varying
perspectives: the neoclassical,

the liberal and the radical writers.

Neoclassical writers either reject regional cooperation in general as
an obstacle to free

trade, or raise doubts about its suitability to

the Third world Countries on the ground that it will lead to trade
diversion instead of trade creation.^
hand, point to cumulative
participating countries.

Liberal writers, on the other

regional inequality experienced by
As a result of these countries'

the

initially

unequal levels of economic development, the gains from the integrative
efforts are likely to be distributed unevenly.

In addition, they point

to the failure of regional cooperation in reducing income inequality at
the national level.
trade

Radicals view regional cooperation that focuses on

liberation without prior policy changes

regional levels,

as

at

the national

and

another means to facilitate the pentration of

foreign capital.
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There exist various possible combinations of
alliances among domestic and foreign groups
promoting processes of integration which can
accentuate external dependency and/or generate
benefits which accrue basically to transtional
enterprises (Vaitsos, 1978:721).
External factors have great effect on regional cooperation than on
either

of

the

two

previous

strategies.

The

regional

cooperation

experiences of the Third World have been affected by other non regional
governments' actions and by the MNCs.
Perhaps no issue has contributed more than that of
"external penetration"--attempts by extra-regional
powers to take advantage of the newly created
regional opportunites and the consequent fear that
these outside powers would derive more benefit
from integration than would the intra-regional
participants (Schmitter, 1972:1).
In many of the established forms of cooperation and integration,
foreign monopoly domination in the regional area has increased,
attracted by improved facilities and market expansion.

In his analysis

of the industrial development in the Central American Common Market
(CACM), Herold argues that "the benefits of tariff reductions have
accrued mainly to large foreign firms (...).

Local enterprise appears

to have gained very little" ( Herold, 1976:174).
have provided

Many other studies

examples of different attempts by some of the developed

countries governments' (especially the United States) to influence

the

terms of economic integration among the less developed countries (LDCs)
to

serve

foreign

interests

and

to

increase

the

LDC's

(Schmitter, 1972; Axline, 1977; and Vaitsos, 1978).
Throughout history, government of hegemonic powers
have shown, in many cases,
a marked opposition
among less developing areas. (..) there have been
multiple attempts to formally integrate less
developed economies in customs unions, free trade
zones (or other trade arrangments) with certain
hegemonic powers. Such effors
had the dual
objective of both increasing the dependence of the
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dependence

former on the latter as well as excluding other
powers from interfering in established zones of
influence.
Finally, there have been efforts by
government of developed countries to influence or
even dictate the terms of economic integration
among LDCs so that such regional cooperation will
serve the interess of the non-member yet
intervening foreign forces (Vaitsos, 1978:727).
The

negative social and economic impacts and more important in

our case, the increased level of economic dependence, should not be
attributed

to

regional

cooperation as

such.

It

is

necessary

to

differentiate among the different types of cooperation efforts, and to
examine the process within a dynamic framework.
framework presented by Mytelka proves useful.

For this porpose, the
Most of the experienced

negative impacts were a result of integration efforts of type I , and to
a lesser extent of type II.

By its own definition and orientation,

type I, a laissez faire system does not include any deliberate
mechanisms that would equalize the distribution of gains among
participating countries.

Its

main goal

development as a result of market expansion.

is

to

Such

enhance

the

industrial

a goal without the

prior attempt to change the existing production structure would

limit

the rapid gains, "exaggerate economic asymmetries and produce unequal
gains among the participants" (Mytelka, 1979:12).

Assessing this type

of integration within the African context, Green concludes similarly.
Free trade in economic community rules may hamper
regulation of both production and trade in ways
which would not serve the interests of the
community and its members considered individually;
they may even make impossible steps to ensure net
gains to all members and thus create stressess
threatening the community's previous existence - a
situation which clearly did develop in the
unregulated pre-Treaty East African Common Market
(Green, 1973:50).
In

addition,

the

laissez

faire

attitude

of

this

integration is extended to dealings with foreign capital.
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type

of

The absence

of regulatory measures towards foreign capital has led, In many cases,
to further penetration of MNCs activities into the regional area and
their increased benefits and generated surplus, as the member countries
compete with each other to which will provide the most favorable terms
to foreign investors,

"war of

incentives"

Examples of such foreign penetration

(Vaitsos,

1979:730).

occured in the case of LAFTA

where a set of reciprocity agreements, initiated by MNCs, dominated the
Pharmacutical,
Some of

electronic

and machines

sectors

(Mytelka,

1979:19).

these limitations are avoided in type II system where the main

objective is to equalize the distribution of gains among the members.
It includes compensatory and corrective measures that tend to reduce
distributional inequality.
Despite its superiority to type I regarding the distributional
impacts, type II integration system does not

directly adopt

the goal

of increasing the level of economic independence; and as such it lacks
certain

essential

measures.

A

regional

policy

regulating

foreign

investment and technology transfer is the most important measure of
reducing external dependency.

The lack of such measure, as in the case

of types I and II, lead to the penetration of direct foreign investment
(DFI) into the regional area.

DFI implies both the control or strong

influence over decision making and over the generated surplus, hence
the aggravation of the region's dependency.
The starting point for a policy aimed at reduction
of dependence is the adoption of regional measures
regulating foreign investment and transfer of
technology, including the designation of certain
sectors of
the economy
in which
foreign
participation will be limited or totally excluded
(Axline, 1977: 97).
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Considering both economic and political aspects of integration,
Mytelka argues that type III integration (the dirigiste integrative
system) is superior to type I and II In reducing both the polarization
effects and external dependence.
compensatory and corrective

In addition to the inclusion of

measures,

type

III

includes

direct

measures to control and regulate foreign investment and the transfer of
technology.
Therefore, when addressing the

issue of economic

independence,

both theoretically and practically, only type III should be considered
since

it

is

the only

type

that

from

the

outset

takes

economic

independence as a goal and advocates specific measures for achieving
it.
While

type III integration is

the most

effective

in reducing

economic dependence, it is also the most difficult to achieve. Besides
requiring the establishment of a well-functioning complex system of
institutions

and

a

high

level

of

coordinated

requires the strong commitment of the member
return, requires the support of

planning,

states.

type

III

The latter, in

internal social forces whose interest

is strongly related to the development of domestic productive capacity.
Besides differentiating between the types of integration systems
when evaluating the impact of regional
independence,
framework

cooperation on economic

one should also adopt a dynamic

would

take

into

consideration such

framework.
elements

as:

This
the

accumulation of experiences in dealing with MNCs and the increasing
bargaining power of the Third World Countries
increasing efficiency in

(Vaitsos,

1973);

the

multinational planning; and the changes in

the balance of the internal social forces.^
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Regional
external

cooperation,

as

elements than the

argued

before,

Is

more

affected

by

previous strategies; it is confined not

only by the national social structure and political forces, but also by
the regional ones.
national

and

Therefore, despite its importance in strengthening

regional

power

once

successful,

regional

cooperation

confronts more practical obstacles than the other strategies.

IV.

The New International Economic Order (NIEtn
N1E0 is

a demand by Third World nations

interdependence in the world economy.

for a more

genuine

It stems from the continuing

frustrations of these nations with the present economic order. Despite
the

growth

of manufactured goods

exports

countries, this growth has been confined to
countries (specifically the newly
The majority, however, still
many

cases

economic

face

industrialized countries

(NICs)).

rely on exporting raw materials and in

deteriorating

In addition,

developing

certain products and few

terms

of trade, given the

crises of the advanced countries

protectionism.

from the

and their

repeated
increased

the increasing volume of debt and its

accumulated interest payments continue as a major problem facing both
rich and poor

developing countries (see inicators in Tables (1), (2),

and (3)).
The demand for changes in the international economic order by the
Third World

countries

goes

back to

the mid

1950s. ^

The

recent

attention, however, stems from the Declaration and Programme of Action
of NIE0 which was adopted in a special session of the United Nations
(UN) General Assembly in 1974, and from the Lima Declaration and Plan
of Action in 1975.

The desire for both national independence and
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mutual interdependence was emphasized in the main principles of these
declarations:
Full permanent sovereignty of every state over its
natural resources.
In order to safeguard these
resources, each state is entitled to exercise
effective control over them and their exploitation
with means suitable to its own situation,
including the right to nationalization or transfer
of ownership to its nationals, (...).
No state
may be subjected to economic, political or any
other type of coercion to prevent the free full
exercise of its inalienable right (The Declaration
on the Establishment of NIEO, (in: Laszlo, et.
al., 1979: 159).
The Third World

demand for a NIEO covers different economic,

political and social issues.
1.

These issues are: 18

Aid and assistance issues: attaining the UN development assistance
target (0.7%
assistance

of the advanced countries' GNP); securing technical
and eliminating

brain

drain;

renegotiating

the

developing countries' debt; undertaking special measures to assist
the least developed countries among the Third World; and

using

funds from disarmament for development.
2.

International and trade issues: Improving the terms of trade of
the

developing

negotiations);
countries

to

countries

(through

tariff

and

non-tariff

adjusting the economic policies of the advanced
facilitate

the

expansion

and

diversification

of

exports of the developing ones; strengthening the economic and
technical cooperation among the developing countries.
3.

international financial issues: reforming the
monentary

system;

assuring

a

fuller

international

participation

of

the

developing countries in the World Bank and IMF decision making;
and increasing the transfer of resources through these financial
institutions.

76

4.

Industrialisation,
issues:

technology

negotiating

the

transfer

redeployment

capacities to developing countries;

and
of

business

industrial

practices
productive

establishing mechanisms

for

transfer of technology; regulating and supervising the activities
of the MNCs

(to prevent

their

interference

affairs and regulate the repatriation
5.

Social

issues,

in the

internal

of profit).

which include nationally

oriented policies

providing a more equitable income distribution

and raising the

standards of living.
6.

Political and institutional

issues,

policies that would assure economic
world

nations,

their control

which focus mainly
sovereignty

over their natural

on

of theThird
resources and

property, and their choice of economic and social system.
These demands would obviously require major concessions from the
advanced countries, and as such
are opposed by them.

are not acceptable, and in many cases

In addition,

rejected by the MNCs because

these

demands have been also

they limit and regulate their activities

and hence reduce their potential profit.
(The) large industrial countries need secure
sources of raw materials so badly that they will
be willing to pay the price of neutralizing
economic nationalists who threaten to upset the
old and dependable system.
There is nothing in
history or logic to suggest that corporate boards
of directors (...) will simply sit and let the
price and terms of supply be dictated to them by
outsiders, if they have other options availabe to
them (Moran, 1974:238).
Magdoff notes
outright

refusal

that such rejection

takes one of two forms: "(1)

to institute the proposed reforms, and (2) advocacy

of counter proposals

that

either

are
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mere

window-dressing

or

are

designed to meet their own needs, such as obtaining more secure flows
of raw materials from the Third World" (Magdoff, 1978:4).

Theoretical assessmeent of NIEO:
The

opposition to NIEO

perspectives.

is

also

stated

in

some

theoretical

Traditional trade theory, which is based on a harmonious

view of the world (where economic relations are assumed to lead to a
mutual economic benefits to all parties involved), sees NIEO as an
intervention in the free play of
reflected,

in more concrete

the market.

terms,

(prepared for the World Bank).

This

position was

in the Brandt Commision

The report

emphasized

the

report
shared

economic interests between the "North" and the "South" and the need for
further cooperation, with the consequent implication of undermining the
IQ

need for a NIEO.

Liberals, as with other strategies, question NIEO's

ability to reduce income inequality within the developing countries
(Tucker, 1977).

Some radicals, on the other hand, raise doubts about

NIEO's proposals ability to sigificantly alter the present order, and
view NIEO as only a reformist movement (Magdoff, 1978; and Amin, 1982).
Therefore,

even

if NIEO

succeeds

in affecting

the

form

of

the

distribution between the advanced countries and the developing ones,
radicals

question its ability to

alter the

underlying unequal

relationship between them.
The dichotomized distribution of agricultural and
raw material production, characteristic of the
colonial and post-colonial periods, is now to be
replaced by one in which DCs reserve for
themselves the new technologies while the UDCs
(under developed countries) specialize in the old,
low technology industries. The content of the
dichotomy changes, but the
dichotomy remains
(Baumgartner and Burns, 1981:322).
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If one accepts that the underlying nature of economic relations is
that of conflict and not of harmony, and that the international market
structure is of a monopolistic and/or oligopolistic nature and not of
perfect competition,
irrelevant.

the neoclassical objection to NIEO becomes

On the other hand, NIEO should not be

the internal income distribution.

expected to change

As with the case of the previous

strategies, the pattern of income

distribution

is an outcome

of

specific relations of production and not of a specific strategy per se.
The gains from NIEO may be reaped only by certain groups when these
groups are in control of the national economy, while being distributed
in a more egalitarian

manner when the social forces in power are those

which represent the interests of the majority.

Assessing the impact of

NIEO on the provision of basic needs, Stewart shows that there is no
support for

claims that NIEO leads to a redistibution of income. She

also argues that NIEO measures will be favorable to basic needs

only

in cases where the government is supportive of basic needs strategy
(Stewart, 1982:56-7).
The radical critique is the most relevant to the main issue here,
namely economic independence.

The argument that NIEO has not succeeded

in altering the existing order is acknowledged even by the
proponents

strong

of NIEO:

The results of the NIEO programme's first decade
show that the developing countries have achieved
very little in changing the international trade
system, while finding themselves in even greater
financial dependence on Western monetary and
credit agencies (Obminsky, 1984: 87).
The main reasons

for these

limitations

are:

the

continued

resistance of the advanced countries and MNCs; and the heterogeneous
political and social nature of the participants in the demand for NIEO,
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a hetergeneity which limits their common position and reduces it, in
many cases, to some redistributional issues (Tarabrin, 1982:25).
The evaluation of the impact of NIEO on economic
should be viewed, however,

independence

within a dynamic perspective.

Therefore,

NIEO should be evaluated not as a mere list of demands but rather as a
dynamic process,

and

taking into consideration the

impact of the

changing balance of forces in the international arena.
While earlier attempts by the developing countries to reap
concessions

and

recognition

from

the

advanced

countries

were

not

successful, the recent attempts in the 1970s were backed up by certain
historical factors: the increased power of the oil producing countries
through

their

organization

OPEC

and

the

independent Third World countries in the UN.
out

another

changing

factor:

the

increased

number

of

the

Neerso (1978) has pointed

growing

consciousness

in

the

developing countries that foreign investment became too expensive for
them and has negative

impacts on their economies.

"reflects that even in the non-socialist

This factor

developing

countries

governments and local industrialists have become more nationalistic
because they feel themselves dominated by foreign investors" (Neerso,
1978:113).
In addition,

NIEO should be viewed,

despite

its associated

limitations, as a collective means to increase Third World countries'
economic

and

political

power

in

the

world

economy.

However,

the

utilization of this power and of the economic gains (e.g., better terms
of trade, improved terms of the debt, and reduced economic barriers to
their exports) will differ according to the social context and national
objectives.

These gains can be utilized for example to further develop

the domestic basic industries where such strategy is nationally
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adopted, and hence facilitate the economy's

transition to a higher

degree of economic independence.
Without a capital goods industry, the developing
countries, if they realize the rates of growth
corresponding to the Lima objectives cannot escape
from dependence.
The latter will be accentuated
by industrialisation (Tiberghien, 1979:242).
Such positive impact of NIEO on economic independence requires the
prior national objective and commitment, pursued by the state, toward
increasing the level of economic independence.
In the third world version of NIEO, a strong and
activist state becomes
the gurantee
that
industrial scene will consist of integrated
manufacturing process rather than a collection of
partial units without local linkages (Amin,
1982:11).
Therefore, NIEO can be considered as an important complementary
strategy to national industrialization for achieving a higher degree of
economic independence.

In addition, because of its broad demands that

would benefit all developing countries and hence its higher potential
in uniting different social

and economic

systems,

NIEO

seems more

feasible and less restrictive than regional cooperation.

Conclusion and further remarks:
In this

chapter

I have

examined

four

strategies

- ISI,

BI,

regional cooperation, and NIEO - in an attempt to assess their impact
on achieving a higher degree of economic independence for the Third
World.

The examination of each of these strategies revealed important

relevant policies that should be taken into consideration:
First, developing countries
and MNCs'

activities

in

the outflows of surplus, 20

need to regulate foreign investment

the domestic economy.

They

need

and the social and political
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to reduce

interference

in the domestic economy.

21

The form of regulation and its outcome will

differ depending on the nature of the economic activity and on the
bargaining power of both the host country and the foreign investor.
One of these

important forms,

which has been adopted

in many

developing countries, is establishing a joint venture (with public or
private local ownership) instead of a fully owned subsidiary.

The host

countries can also limit the outflow of surplus by limiting the amount
of money

foreign companies

are allowed

to invest,

and by

forcing

foreign investors to reinvest part of their profit in the domestic
economy

(Neerso, 1978:118).

In his analysis of the relations between

the host country and foreign investors, Moran offers an alternative
dynamic model
models.

to

the

"reactionary

alliance"

or

"mutual

advantage"

Instead of adopting the static notion of the "host country",

his "balance of power" model acknowledges the different outcomes of the
domestic

social

interaction and

the consequent different outcomes in

dealing with foreign investors (Moran, 1974: chapter 6).

Such dynamic

perspective takes into consideration

social power

within the developing country

and

the changes in the

its accumulation of experience

in

dealing with foreign investors.
Second, developing countries

need to regulate the transfer of

technology and to develop an indigenous technological capacity.
need stems from the recognition, by many writers on the subject,
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This
that

technological dependence continues to be the main form of dependency of
the developing countries.

Regulating technology transfer should not

imply the termination of technology imports nor the advocacy of the use
of "appropriate

technology".

Rather

it implies

adaption

and

selection of certain technologies that would strengthen the productive
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sector (e.g., of certain basic industries).
be used in accordance

These technologies should

with the planned process

indigenous technological capacity which in turn,

of developing an
as argued earlier,

requires the development of the capital goods sector. "(Probablly) the
crucial question is thus: how can we mix technologies with distinct
technological

features

such

that

correspond to desired ones (...)?"
Third.

and

political

results

(O'Brien, 1979:514).

developing countries need a deliberate policy of income

redistribution.

In evaluating each of the strategies it was emphasized

that these strategies do not
income

social

inequality

inequality).

(and

However,

in themselves

similarly
as

was

to

contribute

unemployent

argued

in

to reducing

and

chapter

I,

regional
income

redistribution is an important policy in the process of attaining a
higher degree of economic

independence

(as a means

to increase

aggregate demand, to reduce the outflow of surplus, and to increase the
level of productivity and mass support),
Fourth. the
interventionist

three

above

"necessary"

role of the state

on the market forces).

policies

call

for

an

in the economy (instead of relying

Vithout this

"sufficient" condition, the three

above policies would have little, if any, impact on achieving a higher
level of economic independence.

The strong active role of the state

will, in turn, depend on three basic factors (White, 1984:98-100):
i)

The social nature of the state: the state may embody the interests
of three different forces:

a) the state itself as a matrix of

distinct "autonomous" interests;

b) a hegemonic class or class

coalition; c) the nation vis-a-vis other nations, where the state
asserts

an

independent

national

interests.
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interest

and

opposes

foreign

li)

The state*s politico-admlnstrative capacity which involves three
dimensions:

a)

its

political

capacity

to

support for industrialization programs;
reasonably
technical

efficient

capacity

administrative

mobilize

widespread

b) the existence of
institutions;

to analyze problems

and

formulate

and

c)

feasible

solutions.
iii) The

specific

modes

organizatiion

of

involvement

of

the

state

in

the

of the social and economic processes to further

industrialization.
Therefore, the state's active participation is an important
condition in: regulating foreign investment and MNCs' activities in a
way that insures a positive contribution to the development of the
productive capacity of the economy,

adapting foreign

technology

in

accordance with the national objective of developing the productive and
technological capacity,
redistribution.

and establishing direct measures for

income

These regulatory socio-economic factors would increase

the four strategies' potential for achieving a higher level of economic
independence.^
In evaluating the four strategies I have argued that national
industrialization,

especially

in

the

form of

BI,

has

the

highest

potential in increasing the economy's level of economic independence.
Both regional

long

run

strategies basically because they face more external obstacles,

and

because

their

cooperation and NIEO can be considered as

outcome,

if

successful,

will

be

different

at

each

national level according to the internal social and economic structure.
While
development

stressing

the

importance

of

the

internal

processes

of

in leading to a higher level of economic independence, I
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am not downplaying the importance of
factors.

These

the international or external

Include: the huge accumulated debt and its increasing

interest payment, the negative social and economic impact of some of
the MNCs' activities,

the continued economic crisis of the advanced

countries

increased protectionism and the consequent

and their

deteriorating terms of trade of the developing countries' exports, and
the covert and overt political

and military

intervention

in those

countries that attempt establishing a more independent economy (the
examples of Grenada and Nicaragua are still fresh in mind).

25

To argue

that these factors play no role ignores both the historical impact of
colonization in these countries,

and the deficiences of the present

economic order that has largely served the interests of the advanced
capitalist countries.

However, while these external factors might, in

some cases, shape the internal structure, I believe that the national
factors

(e.g.,

the internal pattern of income distribution,

the

production structure and the industrial and technological capacity),
which are defined by the internal social structure and the interests of
the social groups in power, in most cases play the principal role in
the

process of development

towards a higher

26

independence.
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level of economic

Table 1

World Trade Growth, 1973-82 (percent)

World trade
growth

1973

1974

1975

1976

1978

1978

1979

1980

1981

12.5

4.0

-4.0

11.5

4.5

5.0

6.5

1.5

0.0

1982

-2,0

Source: World Development Report 1983:1

Table 2

Debt Indicators for Developing Countries, 1970-84

1970

1974

1976

1978

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

Ratio of debt
to GNP:

14.1

15.4

18.1

21.0

20.9

22.4

26.3

32.3

33.8

Ratio of debt
to export:

108.9

80.5

100.2

113.1

89.8

96.8

115.0

130.8

135.4

Total debt (Bilions
of Dollars):
68

141

204

313

430

488

546

620

686

Source: World Development Report 1985:24
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Table 3

Terms of Trade of Developing Countries
1973-82 (1978-100)

Developing countries

Changes in terms of trade
(percentage)
1973-76

1979-82

Changes in purchasing
power of export
(percentage)
1973-76

1979-82

Low-income
12.1

-3.2

58.5

15.7

-15.3

-13.8

-18.7

-3.5

oil importers

-9.5

-10.7

4.5

2.5

oil exportes

59.9

31.8

71.0

11.5

Asia
Africa
Middle-income

Source: World Development Report

1983:13
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Notes
1.

Gerschenkron has examined early in the 1960s the differences that
existed between the industrialized countries and backward ones.
He argued that as a result of specific institutional instruments
(e.g.,

the state,

the banks)

that existed

in the backward

countries, the rate of industrial growth and the productive and
organizational structures of the industry differed in the advanced
countries and backward ones (Gerschenkran, 1962: chapter I).
2.

For a classification of these definitions see Ahmad (1978)

and

Havnevik (1978).
3.

This view is shared by most writers of the dependencia school.

4.

Cline has concluded,

in his review of literature article,

that

income distribution is insinsitive to the industrial structure or
industrial policies (Cline, 1975).
5.

In evaluating the industrial experiences

in Latin America,

Havenevik concludes that the structural charactereristic of
underdevelopment (e.g., high income and regional inequality,
destorted

sectoral

growth

and

financial

and

technological

dependency) continued in the case of Brazil even after adopting
EOI.

Another study, by Morley and Williamson, testing export-led

growth and ISI showed that the range of Gini coefficients was only
0.42 to 0.45 at the end of a 12-year period (Roemer, 1979:187).
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6.

For this reason the analysis of this section will depend mostly on
the work of Rweyemamu

(1973) and Thomas

(1974),

the two main

proponents of this strategy.
7.

For a critical assessment of these models see Stewart (1976), and
Aliouche (1987).

8.

Thomas cites six technological considerations which allow further
flexibility in the resources

base (e.g.,

various technological

processes which allow the physical sustitution of one resource
input for another in producing the same product; and technological
development which leads to increasing output per unit of

input

(Thomas, 1974:202-5).
9.

In examining the input/output matrices of

different industrial

countries, Thomas notices that, despite the multiplicity of final
products, the material content of

these products

is skewed

in

favor of these two elements (Thomas, 1974:195).
10. In his recent assessment of the

linkages effects, Hirschman notes

that
during the first phases of export expansion in the
countries of periphery an important effect, is not
the creation of new industries to satisfy rising
consumer demand,
but
the
destruction
of
established handicraft and artisan activities as
labor is withdrawn from them for staple production
and as new imports of consumer goods compete
successfully with them (Hirschman, 1977:72).
11.

See

for example

Stewart

(1976),

Rosenberg

(1976)

and

the

different studies in Ernst (1979).
12.

For example, sponge iron, which

is an essential component in the

steel industry, can be reduced from iron ore using natural gas
instead of cok.

This process was first developed in Mexico and

then adopted by several industrial countries (Roemer, 1979:181).
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13.

This conclusion Is also supported by Roemer (1981).

14.

See list ofreferences on this position

in Axline

(1974:84).

Neoclassical writers who argue in favor of regional cooperation
advocate type I, the laissez-faire system.
15.

The form and development of the integration system are defined by
the internal

social forces.

The declining power of the landed

oligarchy and its replacement by financial,

commercial

and

industrial bourgeoisies explains the replacement of LAFTA (type I)
by the Andean Group (type III).
16.

The different social forces in each country affect, for example,
the adopted measures of regulating foreign investment and transfer
of technology.

Even among the capitalist oriented economies of

the Andean Group, the differences in the economic and social power
of the national bourgeoisie have affected the implementation of
Decision 24

(regulating foreign investment) and eventually its

replacement with

less restrictive measures

(Mytelka,

1979:73).

For an additional analysis of the impact of the domestic social
forces on the different positions adopted by

the Andean countries

see Mytelka, 1973.
17.

In 1959 twenty nine countries met in the Asian-African conference
in Bandung and called for

establishing

new measures to eliminate

the fluctuations in the prices of raw materials exports.
18.

The following classification is based on a UNCTAD study by Laszalo
et. al. , (1978) which offers a valuable detailed presentation of
all

these

issues.

For another

demands see Edwards (1985:236).
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summary of

the proposals

and

19.

For an excellent critique of the Brandt Report
underlying assumptions

of harmony

of economic

and of the

relations,

see

Navaro (1984).
20.

This outflow is

reflected in the high profits extracted from: low

domestic wages,

low interest on domestic

loans

concessions guaranteed by the local government,
of some inputs
21.

and other

and overpricing

practiced by the MNCs.

For an excellent acount of such interfernce see Barnet and Muller
(1974).

22.

See collection of studies in Ernst (1979).

23.

This

term

is

frequently

used

in

the

literature

implication that only "appropriate" forms of
are

suitable

for the

"appropriateness"

is

developing

with

the

technology transfer

countries.

defined differently by

However,

different

the

writers

(e.g., Small scale production, and labor intinsive). As O'Brien
correctly argues this notion cannot be discussed in isolation from
the social structure and the objectives pursed by the social and
political

groups

in

power.

Hence,

"appropriate" will depend on who

the

exact

definition

of

is defining it and for what

porpose (O'Brien, 1979:512).
24.

In stressing the state's role, however, I do not view the state as
an autonomous entitiy independent of the rest of the economy; but
rather

as

a

social

institution

that

perpetuate

the

dominant

class's interests through the process

of capital

accumulation.

For a critical analysis of the "relative autonomy of the state"
position see Gulalp (1987).

91

25. For an excellent recent assessment of such economic and military
interventionist policies in the Third World by the United States,
see Halliday (1987).
US economic power, as much as or even more than
its military power, gives it the capacity to exert
forms of control on third world societies and
states and to impose its wishes on them, whether
directly and bilaterally, or through influence on
the
policies
of
multilateral
agencies
(Halliday, 1987:16).
26.

In

most cases

certain

internal

social

groups

facilitate

expansition of the MNCs' role in the domestic economy.

the

MNCs, for

example, reap higher profits in these economies where the state
(pushed by certain powerful groups)
different means such as:

guarantee these profits by

extensive tax holidays, suppression of

workers' real wages and weakening and eliminating their strikes
and trade unions.
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CHAPTER III

ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE:

THE CUBAN EXPERIENCE

"The only wealth and liberty that last and bring
good are those that are created and won with one's
own hand”.
(Jose Marti)
"Sovereignty Is the right of a nation to choose
it's direction and control its destiny.
Without
this basic condition, everything else - state,
government, culture - lacks national sense; it is
folly. The paramount objective of the Revolution,
therefore, is to affirm the full sovereignty of
Cuba".
(Nuestra Ruzon: Manifesto - Program of the 26 of
July movement)
"The Pillars of political sovereignty that were
built on January 1, 1959, can only be consolidated
when absolute economic independence is achieved".
(Che Guevara)

Introduction
The theoretical investigation of economic independence,

its

concepts and the proposed strategies for achieving it, were the subject
of the first and second chapters.

An empirical investigation,

the

subject of this chapter, entails examining specific cases within the
Third World.
This chapter examines the Cuban experience

in reducing its

previous heritage of dependency, a legacy of colonial and neocolonial
domination.

I shall examine the actual transformation process that

took place utilizing the

theoretical concepts
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raised

in the

first

chapter, and then compare the actually adopted strategies with those
discussed in the second chapter.
Two

reasons

underlie

choosing

Cuba as

a

case

study

for

the

theoretical theme of economic independence:
i)

Economic independence is one of Cuba's declared and continuously
emphas ized obj ectives;

ii)

Cuba's economic and social development and the question of its
independence have been the center of a continuous debate since the
1960s.

While some writers recognize Cuba's profound achievements

in changing its economic and social structure and hence reducing
its previous

dependency,

others argue

replaced one

dependency with

another,

that Cuba has simply

exchanging

its

previous

relationship with the United States (U.S.) for its current one
with the Soviet Union (U.S.S.R.).
the

latter position,

In this chapter I argue against

demonstrating

that Cuba has

successfully

altered its economic and social structure towards a higher level
of economic independence.
In demonstrating this transition I utilize the concept of economic
independence as a higher level of national integration; this approach
differs from that of focusing on some external factors (e.g., trade
ratios and orientation) which has been utilized by other studies which
also demonstrated Cuba's increased level of independence
LeoGrande

(1979),

Brundenius

other valuable studies

(1984)).

(e.g., Edquist

(e.g.,

This study also differ from
(1985),

UNIDO

(1986)) by

its

specific focus on the issue of economic independence.
Viewing economic independence as a process necessitates adopting
an historical

perspective

in

assessing

this

process.

perspective allows one to understand the different
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Such

a

internal and

external social, political and economic factors that shaped the initial
status of the long process under examination,

and hence leads to a

better understanding of the process itself and its future prospects.
In

assessing

the

Cuban

experience,

an

historical

presentation

is

indispensable in clarifying the nature and extent of dependency that
characterized the Cuban economy

for more

than

four centuries',

and

hence, in facilitating the understanding of the extent of its success
in reducing this dependency and achieving a higher level of economic
independence in a period of less than thirty years.
historical

background will

highlight

the

unequal

and

The following
exploitative

nature of the pre-revolution Cuban-U.S. relationship.

Historical Background:
[A]

Cuba under Spanish domination

2

Cuba was claimed for Spain by Columbus in 1492, and was settled by
the Spanish starting in the 1510's.

Because of its strategic location

and lack of substantial minerals, Cuba served as a service colony for
the commercial

and military Spanish fleets.

The native

Indian

population was mostly employed in minor economic activities and in
serving the settlers.
economic conditions,

Due to the brutal treatment, poor health and
the native population was gradually eliminated.

They were replaced by black slaves brought onto the island from Africa.
While engaged basically in tobacco and coffee cultivation, Cuba moved
in the latter 18th century into sugar cultivation on a large scale.
With the expansion of sugar production, an increasing number of
black slaves was brought to the

island.

The sugar expansion also

brought unprecedented wealth to the island,
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wealth that was mainly

appropriated by the Spanish oligarchy which consisted of two white
groups:
Spain).
slavery,

the

Creoles

(born in Cuba)

Sharing the

sane

and the

Feninsulares

opposition to abolishing the

(born

in

system of

the two groups conflicted in their political and economic

aspirations.

The

pro-Spain

peninsulares

favored

Spanish

colonial

control, while the Creoles, politically and economically restricted,
favored independence.

However,

as Spain accepted the agreement

initiated by England to abolish the system of slavery
receiving a loan from England for military needs)

(in hope of

Spain's role as the

defendant of white Cubans against the black population was undermined.
Rejecting Spain's new policy on slavery,

some of the wealthy Cubans

formed the annexationist movement (Club de Havana) which allied with
the United States.

In an proclamation they declared:

Cuba, united to this strong, and respected nation
[U.S.], whose southern interests could be
identified with hers, would be assured serenity
and future prosperity; her riches and her whole
territory triple its value.
Liberty would be
given to private enterprise and the system of
hateful and harmful restrictions which paralysed
commerce would be destroyed (in Hugh Thomas, 1971:
212).
The movement was supported by pro-slavery groups in the United
States and by business groups who recognized the tremendous economic
potential of the island.
1823,

In a letter sent to the Minister to Spain in

the Secretary of the State John Quincy Adam stated the U.S.

interest in Cuba:
These islands (Cuba and Puerto Rico) from their
local position are natural appendages to the North
American continent; and one of them, Cuba, almost
in sight of our shores, from a multitude of
consideration has become an object of transcedent
importance to the political and commercial
interests of our union. (...) (The) nature of its
productions and its wants, furnishing the supplies
and needing the return of a commerce immensely
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profitable and mutually beneficial; give it an
importance in the sum of our national interest
(...)•
(In) looking forward to the probable
course of event, for the short period of half a
century it is scarcely possible to resist the
convention that the annexation of Cuba to our
federal republic will be indispensable to the
continuance and integrity of the union itself (in
Smith, 1963: 27) (emphasis added).
In 1847, the U.S. government made a secret offer to buy Cuba from
Spain for §100 million, an offer that was strongly rejected by Spain
(taxes in Cuba already brought Spain §10 million a year).
The annexation schemes ended, however, with the ascending power of
the anti-slavery groups within the United States and the outbreak of
the Civil War in the United States in 1861.
Facing internal economic and political difficulties, Spain imposed
a new tax on the island in 1867.
and

economic

revolutionary

depression,
upheaval

the

took

Suffering already from enormous taxes
Cubans

place

planters and poor black Cubans.

in

opposed
1868

Spanish

involving

control.
small

A

coffee

The first independence war against

Spain continued for ten years without Cuba's liberation.^

Despite the

unsuccessful outcome of the first independence war, the struggle had
t

profound national effects.

t

Leaders of this war (e.g. Maximo Gomez and

Antonio Maceo) were to have a tremendous impact in stimulating the
nationalist aspirations.
activities

succeeded

In addition,

the

continued

in firmly eliminating

revolutionary

the slavery

system,

providing the ground for the second independence war that started in
1895.
In

the meantime,

while

Cuba was

still

a

Spanish

colony

the

American capitalists began, in the 1880's and 1890's, investing in the
island, buying mills and land from Cuban owners who had been harmed by
the drop in sugar prices and who lacked the necessary capital for more
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efficient production.

By 1896 American investment was reported to be

$50 million

and mining properties

of

sugar

(Huberman and

Sweezy,

1961:13).
While the Cuban revolutionary forces, led by Jose Marti, Maximo
r

Gomez and Antonio Maceo,

were involved in preparing for the second

independence war, American interest in the island increased and the
calls

started

again

for

justification for a U.S.
"humanitarian"

appeals

business community,

the

annexation

of

Cuba,"*

intervention was based

within

the

United

States

the economic interest was not

on

While

the

"security"

and

Congress
a secret.

and

the
In a

letter to General Draper (congressman from Massachusetts) Edwin Atkin
(a Massachusetts capitalist and businessman who had significant
investment and property in Cuba) wrote in 1896:
to whom can the American property - holders
look for protection? We could hardly expect that
Spain would continue to defend our rights; the
insurgents are not in position to do so, even if
they were disposed, and in my opinion the only
alternative would be the landing of United States
troops. Whether the country would be prepared to
take such extreme action is a question that should
be considered, and whether the sentimental feeling
of sympathy with the Cubans should out weigh the
property interests amounting to $30,000,000 of
United States citizens in Cuba (in Smith,
1963:94).
The eventual U.S.

intervention

enhancing the Spanish defeat,

took place

in 1896.

While

the American intervention deprived the

rebels their objective of establishing an independent and sovereign
republic.

As the Treaty of Paris was signed between Spain and the

United States, Cuba was "liberated” as a Spanish colony to become a
U.S. protectorate for three years.

Shortly after the end of the war

the Mew York World correctly predicted that, "whatever may be decided
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as to the political future of Cuba,

its

industrial and commercial

future will be directed by American enterprise and stimulated with
American capital" (in Foner, 1972 (v.2):466).

[B]

Cuba under United States domination:
In

1900,

in an attempt

"independence",

to

lay

the

groundwork

for

Cuba's

the American military governor General Wood was

instructed by the U.S. Congress to call for a constitutional convention
in Havana.

The constitution was to outline, among other things, the

future relations between Cuba and the United States.

In 1901,

the

United States submitted to the convention delegates a set of articles
known

as

the

Platt Amendment.

The

articles

dictated

terms

that

restricted Cuba's sovereignty in order to serve the U.S. interest:^
Article I: That the government of Cuba shall never
enter into any treaty or other compact with any
foreign power or power which will impair or tend
to impair the independence of Cuba (...).
Article III: That the government of Cuba consents
that the United States may exercise the right to
intervene
for
the
preservation
of
Cuban
independence, the maintenance of a government
adequate for the protection of life, property, and
individual liberty (...).
Article VII: That to enable the United States to
maintain the independence of Cuba, and to protect
the people there of, as well as for its own
defense, the government of Cuba will sell or lease
to the United States land necessary for coaling or
naval stations of certain specific points to be
agreed upon with the President of the United
States.
As recognized by Huberman and Sweezy (1961) Cuba had no choice but
to accept.

This acceptance in no way reflected the national consensus,
$

as expressed by one of the Cuban delegates, Juan Gomez:
To reserve to the United States the faculty of
deciding for themselves when independence is
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menaced, and when, therefore, they ought to
intervene to preserve it, is equivalent to
delivering up the key to our house, so that they
can enter it at all hours, when the desire takes
them (...)■ If it belongs to the United States to
determine what Cuban government merits the
qualification "adequate" (...) only those Cuban
governments will live which count on its support
and benevolence (Huberman and Sweezy, 1961:17).
9

Gomez's reservations were to prove accurate.
(though

the military

occupation

was

ended

in

Under the treaty
1902),

intervened in Cuba in 1906-1909, 1912 and 1917.

U.S.

troops

In addition, all the

governments that have succeeded since then (with the limited exception
of Grau's

government)

were

those

supported by

the United

States.

However, at the same time radical and progressive national movements
(e.g., Cuban Committee of National and Civil Renovation, the University
Students Federation and the Communist Party)

reviving Jose Marti's

ideas, opposed U.S. hegemony.
Though formulated in political

terms,

the Platt Amendment was

really an expression of the U.S. economic interest in Cuba.
trade

treaty followed the Platt

tariff preferences
penetration.

to U.S.

Amendment

providing

goods and allowing U.S.

In 1903, a

20-40 percent

capital

In addition to the flow of U.S. capital,

further

thousands of

Haitian, Jamaican and Chinese workers were brought to Cuba to insure a
steady supply of cheap labor (Huberman and Sweezy, 1961:19).
Though mainly dominating the Sugar industry, American investment
penetrated the electrical, telephone and railway services, the mining
industry, and real estate (20-30 percent of Cuban territory was owned
or leased by American companies (Huberman and Sweezy,

1961:19). From

1906-1924 American investment increased from around $50 million to $500
million

(Benjamin 1977:14).

After the collapse of the high sugar

prices between 1919 and 1920 many Cuban banks,
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unable to meet their

obligations, were forced to close.
mostly American.

They were replaced by foreign banks

The financial crisis of 1921 further affected the

Cuban sugar merchants and planters, and increased the foreign banks'
possession of the Cuban properties.
In 1933, Cuba experienced a major social and political change.

As

a result of the continued frustration with the repressive and corrupt
government of Machado,

different hetrogeneous

forces forced the government out.

social

and

political

The change took place with U.S.

involvement which advised Machado to take a "leave of absence", and
prepared for another figure (Cespedes) to succeed him.

However, the

new government was overthrown in a coup led by Batista who handed the
power

to

a

five-man

advocating new

executive

reforms,

structural changes.

the

committee

headed by

government was

unable

Grau.

Though

to bring

about

Facing both domestic and external pressures (from

the United States) the Grau government resigned in 1934 replaced by
Batista who

remained

in power

till

1944.

Between

1944

and

1952

different presidents from the Autentico Party (which proposed moderate
nationalist reforms) governed until the second coup d'etat by Batista
who seized power and remained president until 1959.
During this period an intensive union of students, workers and
farmers organized, demanding radical reforms.

The potential threat of

these groups on foreign and domestic business and commercial interests
was

temporarily neutralized by Batista and his

However,

reformist

as recognized by O'Connor,
Batista was caught in an enormous contradiction,
one which he helped to create twenty years
earlier.
Unlike economic growth (...), economic
development required national autonomy; political
stability,
the
precondition
for
foreign
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attempts.

investment, required dependence on Washington
(O'Connor, 1970:30).
During this period and especially after the Second World War, the
Cuban economy became yet more tied to the United States.

Perhaps one

of the best indicators of the volume of involvement of the U.S. capital
in Cuba was stated in the U.S. Department of Commerce report on Cuba in
1956 (see Table 1).
The only foreign investments of importance are
those
of
the
United
States.
American
participation exceeds 90 percent in the telephone
and electric service, about 50 percent in public
service railways, and roughly 40 percent in raw
sugar production.
The Cuban branches of United
States banks are entrusted with almost one forth
of all banks deposits (...). Cuba ranked third in
Latin America in value of United States direct
investments in 1953, outranked only by Venezuela
and Brazil.
In his critical assessment of Cuba's history Francisco Segnera
(1972:148-50)^

pointed

out

three

main

characteristics

of U.S.

investment in Cuba:
1)

while taking place in Cuba, U.S. investment benefited mostly the
United States: a) the input supply of equipment, machines and some
of the raw materials was brought from the United States which did
not allow the creation of linkages in the Cuban economy; b) the
high

payment

of

salaries

went

to

American

administrative

employees; c) most of the generated surplus was sent out and/or
invested in the same sectors, which did not help in diversifying
the economy.
2)

The American investment established an international division of
labor (characteristic of that era of colonialism) where the Cuban
economy was basically specialized in sugar, tobacco,
exports.
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and mineral

3)

The Cuban economy was gradually denationalized as a result of
increased U.S. ownership and economic and financial control over
major

sectors.

transportation,

In

addition,

the

electricity...

different

services

etc.) were not,

as

(banks,

in other

developed economies to serve the industrial development, but were
artifically created as channels to serve American capital without
developing the Cuban economy.
As recognized by Boorstein (1968), decisions about investment in
Cuba were

governed

by

foreign

interests.

In

addition,

American

investors kept significant parts of the land unutilized in order to
prevent the fall of sugar prices.

Moreover,

as a result of the total

sugar production quota determined by the U.S. Congress, each sugar mill
was confined to a certain maximum production.
notes

these

innovations

"quotas were not conducive
(...).

It

is not

surprising

Furthermore, as Ritter

to

output

that

- increasing

grinding techniques

remained relatively stagnant in post war years" (Ritter, 1974:38).
In addition to the economic impact on the Cuban economy, American
investments significantly impacted the social structure.

The economic

domination of the U.S. capital weakened and in many cases eliminated
the independent small property owners of agricultural land and sugar
mills.

In addition, thousands of tobacco and sugar planters lost their

farms and became tenants and

sharecroppers.In 1927, Ramiro Guerra

wrote:
When all this toil of centuries seemed to be
almost completed
and fruits could at last be
enjoyed by their children, the sugar latifundium
which had ruined
the West Indies with its two
informidable instruments, foreign capital and
imported cheap labor, invaded the
island. Its
appearance marked the beginning of the whole
destruction of
our small and medium-sized
properties and the reduction of our land owners
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and independent farmers, backbone of our nation,
to the lowly condition of a proletariat being
stifled by that economic asphyxiation which
afflicts the country today from one end to the
other (quoted in Foner, 1971 (v,2):480).
In addition, American investment further weakened the already weak
national bourgeois

class.

American

(e.g., Mexico,

countries

This

class,

unlike

Brazil

that

in other Latin

and Argentina),

almost destroyed in the long war against the Spanish,

had

been

leading to a

stronger position of the landed oligarchy who did not oppose Spanish
domination.

The

remnant of this weak bourgeois

further destroyed by American investment,

or was

class was

either

incorporated in a

dependent relation (e.g., importers, bankers, real estate operators and
retail stores owners).
deteriorated for the
population;

And finally, economic and social conditions
largest

and poorest

section

of

the

the economic conditions of the cane fields workers

Cuban
(who

were unemployed for six to nine months a year) were further depressed
by the high profits of the sugar industry and the importation of cheap
labor.
It seems appropriate to end this section with the conclusion of a
Foreign Policy Association study:

in winning political freedom from

Spain "Cuba lost control over its economic resources" (quoted in Foner,
1972 (v.2):483).

In addition,

Cuba,

in its asymmetric relationship

with the United States, lost its own decision making, and its political
and economic independence.

The Cuban Development Experience:
The economic and social program of the movement of 26th of July
(M26J) that led the revolution in 1959 was inspired by the historical
national sentiment of the Cuban people as expressed in the writings of
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9

Jose Marti.

The program was stated before the revolution in Castro's

speeches at his trial in 1953,

in the manifesto - program of M26J

(Nuestra Ruzon), and in other speeches and declarations.
called for

structural change

"problem of land,
housing,

of

the

The program

economy that would solve

the problem of industrialization,

the

the problem of

the problem of education and the problem of the people's

health, (...) along with restoration of civil liberties and political
democracy"

(Castro,

1984:24).

In

more

concrete

terms,

the

M26J

manifesto-program specified different political, economic, education,
judicial, and international measures.

The economic measures included

the following (in LLerena, 1978:301):
- Government policy aimed at ensuring economic independence of
Cuba.
Development of new sources of production and employment.
- Agrarian reform.
Creation of production centers (e.g. factories and farms).
- Diversification

of

agricultural

production

and

measures

to

assure a market for farm products.
- Study and promotion of cooperative system.
- Nationalization of public utilities.
- Encouragement of investment of domestic capital.
- Progressive increase of productivity per worker and per capita
income.
- Expansion of foreign trade.
The Cuban transformation process passed through different stages
as a result of changes in both objective and subjective factors: the
internal and external material reality facing the economy,
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and the

evolution in leaders'

understanding of these

factors

and their

accumulated experiences in dealing with them.

The First Stage (1960-1963)

:

Immediately after taking power, the revolutionary government
embarked

on

an

attempt

to

implement

the

M26J

program

which

corresponded, to a large extent with ECLA's propositions: emphasis on
land reform, industrialization (specifically in ISI form), and income
redistribution.

The new government was very keen on diversifying

agricultural output to achieve food self-sufficiency and to break away
from the historical

dependence on production and

export of

sugar.

There was a strong sentiment against sugar production which was viewed
as the cause and manifestation of Cuba's economic dependency.
addition,

there

was

a

strong

desire

to

expand

and

intensify

In
the

industrial base by installing a wide range of ISI and heavy industry
(including metallurgy,

chemical products,

machinery transportation equipment).

heavy engineering and

The goal, as expressed by Boti,

the minister of the economy, was to "transfer the Cuba economy from an
agricultural

and

colonial

structure

to

an

industrialized

and

independent structure" (quoted in Ritter, 1974:134).
The expected pace of achieving the ambitious goals was unrealistic
given mainly
experience.

the
The

industrialization,

underdevelopment
ambitious

of

program

agricultural

the
of

economy

and

simultaneous

diversification

and

lack

of

rapid
income

redistribution soon came into conflict with the hard material reality.
The initial attempt at agricultural diversification did not bring about
the expected output; absolute physical output in 1963 was 86 percent of
the previous general level (Ritter, 1974:146).
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And as a result of the

de-emphasis on sugar,
declined.

foreign exchange earnings from its export

Meanwhile the

industrial program of

pressure on the economy.

Due

to

the lack of

ISI put

tremendous

a basic

industrial

structure and misidentification of the appropriate industries to
utilize domestic resources, there was a high increase in imports of raw
materials and capital goods.

As expressed by Che Guevara, then the

Minister of Industry:
We failed to put the proper emphasis on the
utilization of our own resources; we worked with
the fixed purpose of producing substitutes for
finished imported articles, without clearly seeing
that these articles are made with raw materials
(quoted in Ritter, 1974:153).
As a result there was a further pressure on foreign exchange,
leading ultimately to a balance of payment deficit.

The economy was

further constrained by the underdevelopment of the productive forces.
In addition to the lack of technical and capital equipment, Cuba lost
many of its skilled and professional workers who immigrated.

"Of the

300 agronomists working in Cuba in 1959 approximately 270 left the
country" (Gutelman, in Bonachea and Valdes, 1972:234).

In addition,

the absence of consistent and comprehensive planning due to lack of
planning experience played a role in the sluggish outcome.
these

internal

emerging

difficulties,

constrained by U.S. hostility,

the

economy was

Besides
further

its cancellation of the sugar

quota

import from Cuba, and its economic embargo.^®
As a result of these difficulties and of the continuous debates
and evaluation,

the Cuban leadership decided by

1963 to change

its

economic policies.
This period should not be viewed, however,

as a failure.

The

first four years of the revolution were critical ones in which the new
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political system was established and its stability against internal and
external political and military pressures was insured.

It was also a

period of radical transformation from a market economy to a centrally
planned one,
external

with

massive

economic

international
importantly,

nationalization

orientation

capitalist

shifted

system

the period was

to

(see
from

the

one in which

Table

2)

dealing

socialist

and

the

with

the

one.

More

the new revolutionary

government applied its strong social commitment to a massive income
redistribution (see Table 3), provision of social services and reducing
unemployment.

In addition, during this stage serious attempts were

made to develop the mechanical and technical capacity of the economy.
Early in 1961, the Ministry of Industry established The Commission for
the Mechanization

of the

Cane

Harvest

(Edquist,

1985:34).

prototypes were designed and constructed for the harvest.
most of the machines developed (e.g.,

the MC-1)

satisfactory results in increasing productivity,
discontinued while

further experiments continued.

cane was loaded manually.

Early
However,

did not achieve

and production was
Before 1959, all

As the result of shortage in labor, efforts

were directed to design and produce machines to left sugar cane.

In

the early 1960s, the construction of lifting machines (the "criollas")
started in Cuba producing between 400 and 500 units.

The criollas

units were used in the 1963 harvest; however, the machines led to less
than 1.5 percent of mechanized loading at that time (Edquist, 1985:36).

The Second Stage (1964-1970') :
While industrialization and economic diversification continued to
be the general goals, the Cuban government came to realize that these
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goals should be carried on as a long-term process given the immediate
need to increase both the productive capacity of the economy and the
economic and social conditions of the Cuban people.
The new policy
brought back

(adopted in the medium range plan of 1964-70)

emphasis

on

sugar production.

The

Cuban

government

gradually abandoned the previous conception of sugar production as a
mere product of colonial and neocolonial domination, and hence as a
symptom of Cuba's dependency, and came to recognize sugar as the major
national source of capital accumulation needed

for any attempt

increase the country's level of development and independence.

to

This new

realization was expressed by Guevara as:
The entire economic history of Cuba has
demonstrated that no other agricultural activity
would give such returns as those yielded by the
cultivation of sugar cane. At the outset of the
revolution many of us were not aware of this basic
economic fact, because a fetishistic idea
connected sugar with our dependence on imperialism
and with the misery in the rural areas, without
analysing the real cause: the relation to the
unequal balance of trade (quoted in Pollitt,
1986:200).
In 1963,

Castro

announced

that

increasing

debt

could

not

be

tolerated and that industrialization would be financed by expansion of
sugar production (Edelstein, 1981:234).
accelerating

sugar production

for

Thus the new policy emphasized
exports,

utilizing

comparative advantage of sugar production in Cuba.

the

high

This new emphasis

is justified as sugar cane's production cost in Cuba is relatively less
than world beet sugar production costs, and the relatively low cost of
import inputs needed for the development of the sugar industry compared
to import Input costs for other sectors of the Cuban economy.

Sugar

export became the source of primitive capital accumulation,

and the

sugar industry was acting as department I of the economy.

As was
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described earlier, the source of primitive capital accumulation in the
small

open

economies

is

mainly generated,

not

from

the

labor

or

peasants' surplus, as experienced by larger socialist economies (e.g.,
USSR),

but

rather

from

international market.

the

Hence,

differential

rent

earned

in

the

the export sector act as the leading

sector in these small economies (see Chapter I , section on small open
economies).
In addition to serving as the major sector for generating the
needed

foreign

industrialization,

exchange

and

hence

to

finance

future

heavy

the sugar industry was also a stimulant to other

economic activities through backward and forward linkages.

For

example, fertilizers, pesticides and farm machinery would be developed
as

backward

linkages,

while

forward

linkages

provide

cattle

food

(utilizing molasses), paper production (utilizing bagasse), and other
chemical and plywood complexes (utilizing sugar derivatives) (Ritter,
1974:167).

Therefore, unlike the first strategy that attempted to

substitute for all imports (ISI), the new strategy emphasized those
that would utilize domestic resources.
The emphasis on sugar production, however, was not the only focus
of the plans in this stage.

Other agricultural products (e.g., rice,

beans, vegetables) were also considered as means of satisfying domestic
consumption, and as future export possibilities.
In addition to industries geared to the sugar production (e.g.,
milling machinery),

emphasis was given to other industries that

supplied inputs for agriculture sectors and used its output, and those
that provided some basic
processing,

textile,

materials

(e.g.,

construction materials
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farm machinery,

food

and cement production).

Thus, in this stage, industry was strongly linked to the agricultural
sector (see Table 4) ,
other non-agricultural

In addition, attention was given to developing
industries e.g.,

the extractive

and

fishing

industries.
One
producing

of the

important features of this stage was

ten million tons

achieved yet.

By 1970,

of

the

sugar which was

target year,

million tons short of the target volume.

the

the

goal

highest

of

to be

the production fell

1.5

However, the 8.5 million tons

was the highest in the country's history.

The failure to produce the

margin difference was not, however, the problem;

the mobilization of

the human and capital capacity towards that target had much greater
negative impact.

The leadership came to realize that the economy's

productive capacity was not yet ready for the achievement of this goal.
In addressing thefirst congress in 1975,

Castro explained the problems

that hindered the target production:
This endeavour was
one of the most noble and
enthusiastic undertaken by our people in this
period of the construction of socialism.
Nevertheless,
it
could not
be
achieved.
Industrial investments were not yet yielding
fruit.
Great imbalances in the rest of the
economy were caused by pressing problem of labor
force required in ever growing quantities for the
sugar cane harvests, circumstances in which the
mechanization of the harvest was being delayed for
technical reasons. There were also shortcoming in
organization, and inadequate direction and
economic management methods. Reality proved to be
more powerful than our intentions.
It was
necessary to rectify this situation and give up
the achievement of this objective for some years
(Castro, in Griffiths and Griffiths, 1979:71).
Despite the failure to produce the targeted output of sugar, and
despite the pressure that this target put on the economy, Cuba was able
to develop a structural productive

capacity.

In the

sector, Ritter describes the important accomplishments as:
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agricultural

In
attempting
to
achieve
its
ambitious
agricultural objectives, Cuba has laid a solid
foundation for agricultural expansion in the
1970s.
Though the objectives for 1970 may not
have been fulfilled, Cuba has irrigated vast
areas, planted extensive areas under fruit trees,
trained agronomists, agricultural specialists, and
established research capabilities in some lines of
agriculture (Ritter, 1974:198).
The development of human,

physical and technical capacity was

clear in other non-agricultural

sectors.

In

this stage

also

different

mechanical workshops were developed as part of the Ministry of Sugar
Industry and the Ministry of Basic Industry which produced some of the
needed equipment and machinery

(see Table

content of

still high.

this equipment was

5);

however,

While

the

still

import

importing

mechanical harvesters and loaders from Australia and the Soviet Union,
Cuban engineers and technicians continued their experimental work in
both adapting these harvesters to the Cuban condition^
designing new harvesters.

As recognized by Edquist,

the

and in
early

experimental attempts though sometime costly
... created a very important pool of knowledge and
experience. For example, thousands of workers had
been educated to operate, maintain and repair
harvesting machines.
There has also been
considerable "learning by trying" in harvest
design and production.
In addition the attempts
to mechanize cutting had pointed to the crucial
importance of preparing the cane fields in such a
way that they were suited to the use of cane
harvesters (Edquist, 1985:45).
In addition to the mechanical workshops,

different research

institutions were established in this stage (e.g., the Digital Research
Center and microelectronic laboratory) to construct and develop some
prototypes of silicon transistors and minicomputers (Montero, 1987:37).
In general, the high rate of investment in plant and equipment,
increasing the

capital

stock by

50-75

112

percent

during

this

period

(MacEwan,

1981:158),

furthered

the

expansion

of

the

physical

and

technical capacity of the economy.
While some of the agricultural output, agricultural industries and
non-agricultural industries expanded, a similar expansion in the light
consumer industries was not matched at this stage (see Table 6).
One of the strong achievements of this stage was establishing a
strong link between the agricultural and industrial sectors of the
economy.

This link can be seen in the development of backward and

forward industrial linkages.

Contrary to the previous "simultaneous

battle",

12

as

"unbalanced growth model"

the

the new strategy fitted with what is known in the literature
or the

"turnpike"

strategy which

emphasizes the development of the most efficient sector as the leading
one and then utilizing the generated surplus to finance the development
of new industries (Barkin, 1972:

).

Another important accomplishment has been further provision of
basic

needs

in the

form of public

services

(e.g.,

health,

and

education), reducing income inequality and increasing the employment
level

(see Figure 1, 2, and Table 7).

consumption did not

significantly

Though the total

increase,

regional

level of

inequality

in

income and consumption was reduced by providing more services (e.g.,
new houses, schools, etc.) to the rural areas than to the urban ones.
While gross national product per capital may well
have declined in revolutionary Cuba, an average of
0.5 percent per year in the 1960-76 period
according to one estimate (World Bank, 1979:20),
the various equalizing policies might be expected
to have increased the well-being of the population
at large (Gugler, 1980:37)
The urban-rural disparity has been greatly reduced by different direct
and indirect measures.

These

measures

unemployment among agricultural workers,
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include:

elimination of

introduction of a rationing

system, provision of free social services in rural as well as urban
areas, establishment of a wage scale in 1963 which minimized the ruralurban wages differentials and finally the total elimination of this
differential in 1968 (Gugler, 1980:31).

The Third Stage (1970-80):
As a result of the failure to produce the target output of ten
million tons of sugar in 1970 and the pressures this attempt put on the
economy, a new strategy called for a more balanced development.
emphasis

on sugar

important level.

production was

reduced,

though

remaining

The
at an

Higher emphasis was put on industrialization as the

top priority without, however, creating a new imbalance.

In his report

to the Party Congress, Castro expressed this new direction:
The industrialization process in the country is
to be significantly accelerated. During the first
years of the Revolution, there was no other
alternative but to concentrate on agricultural
production. At this stage, the closest attention
is to be given to agriculture, but the main
emphasis is to be on industrialization (quoted in
MacEwan, 1981:201).
The main guideline for this stage was establishing and expanding
industrialization especially in export branches

(sugar and nickel),

those industries that replace imports, those that supported agriculture
production (e.g., chemical and machine industries), those of consumer
goods
the

(e.g., the food and textile industries),

production

of

construction

materials

and those related to

(Montero,

1984:18).

In

addition, attention was given to the development of the light industry
that would provide a wider range of consumer goods (e.g., clothing and
furniture); emphasis

on the provision

continued.
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of public

consumption

goods

At this stage the government stressed the need to increase the
economy's

efficiency.

increasing labor's

The

emphasis

productivity

on

efficiency

(reduction of work

was

sought

absenteeism

in
and

increasing skills), in more efficient use of resources (especially raw
materials and fuel) and in intensifying mechanization in the productive
sectors.
In his report to the Second Congress of the Party, Castro declared
that despite some external and internal problems (the drop in the world
sugar prices and the higher inflation rate of the capitalist world,
causing a drop in the terms of trade by 53 percent; and the damage
done

to the agriculture sector by many plant and animal diseases,

reducing the output in some cases by 90 percent), the economy was able
to attain over the last five years (1975-80) an annual increase in the
gross social product of 4 percent at constant prices.

He then added:

Not only have we attained this rate of growth, but
we have also improved our efficiency in various
ways. Labor productivity has risen at an annual
rate of 3.4 percent (...), input of materials, the
chief component in productive consumption, also
dropped in relative terms, as reflected in greater
efficiency in use of raw materials, energy and
fuel - although we are still far from achieving
the efficiency we should and can obtain (Castro,
1980:9).
During

the

last

five

years

of

this

country's infrastructure was extended. 13

period

(1975-1980),

the

Investment rose by more than

13 billion pesos (75 percent more than during the previous stage) and
with 35 percent of this increase allocated to industry (which is three
times higher than in the previous stage) .

The agriculture sector was

allocated 19 percent of the total investment as opposed to 40 percent
in the previous stage.

Despite the reduction of the investment share

in the agriculture sector and the plant and animal diseases that struck
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this sector in this period, agricultural production grew at annual rate
of 3.5 percent with sugar cane harvest reaching 8 million tons in 1979,
the second largest in the country's history.
agricultural

sector

reflected:

continued

This achievement in the
increasing

level

of

mechanization leading to a higher level of productivity (see below);
increased irrigation and use of fertilizers; increased human expertise
(more than 5,600 university agricultural specialist and 15,000 high
school agricultural

technicians were graduated in the period); the

completion of more than a thousand agricultural-related projects (e.g.,
dairies, nurseries, poultry farms and feeding facilities).
The

growth

in

other

productive

sectors

continued.

The

industry grew at 14 percent, the light industry at 23 percent,

food
the

fishing industry (supplying for both increased domestic consumption and
exports), at 29 percent.

The construction industry continued as one of

the major industries of the economy supplying: industrial and hydraulic
projects,

roads and highways,

transportation facilities,

hotels

and

public services projects (e.g., schools, hospitals, day cares centers
and houses).

In

the

first

five years

(1970-75)

the

construction

industry was involved more in the completion of previous projects than
in new ones.
Basic

industry grew at an annual rate of 5 percent extending

electric power generation with a reduction in fuel consumption per
kilowatt hour by more than 10 percent between 1975 and 1980.

However,

the generated electricity was still short of supplying all homes.

This

period also witnessed a continued increasing production of other basic
materials e.g., chemical products, papers, glass, and rubber.

The iron

and steel and machine industries grew at annual rate of 6.7 percent,
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increasing the production of steel smelting, buses, consumers' durable
goods

(refrigerators,

radios and television sets),

electric cables,

batteries, and agricultural equipment (see Tables 8, 9, 10).
The development of the infrastructural and productive structure
was accompanied by an increase in both the human and technical
capacity.

Besides the growing number of agricultural experts

technicians,

there has been more advancement of the workers'

and

skills

through education and technical training in the other sectors of the
economy.

In the technical sphere, efforts continued in the development

of sugar cane mechanical cutters.

Previous efforts to mechanize sugar

loading led to an 80 percent level of mechanization in the loading
process by

1970.

However,

no

similar mechanization

capacity

was

achieved for the harvesting process, in which level of mechanization
was only 1 percent (see Table 11).
while

still

importing

cane

Ferguson harvestors), Cuban

During the early 1970s, however,

harvesters
technicians

from
were

Australia
able

to

(the

Massey

improve

the

Libertadora harvester which was designed in the late 1960s. A Cuban
designed Libertadora was manufactured in West Germany

and used

in

Cuba.^
The Cuban contribution was of considerable
importance in this division of labour, since they
provided the basic concept. It is therefore an
example of transfer of a technique from a
developing socialist country to an industrialized
capitalist country (Gdquist, 1985:129).
In addition, in the same period the KTP-1 harvester was developed
by joint effort of Cuban and Soviet technicians.

After trials,

the

KTP-1 was initially manufactured in the Soviet Union and later with the
technical assistance of the Soviet Union, a Cuban factory finally began
operation in 1977.

After some difficulties in the initial production
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phase, production increased from 30 units in 1977

to 501

in 1980;

meanwhile the production of KTP-1 harvesters for Cuba in the Soviet
Union was reduced and then terminated by 1979 (Edquist, 1985:133).
utilization of both imported harvesters

The

(in a gradually decreasing

number) and the nationally produced ones has increased the percentage
of sugar-cane harvesting mechanization from 1 percent in the beginning
of this stage

(1970)

to a total of 45 percent

in 1980,

with

the

nationally produced harvesters accounting for an increasing percentage
(see Table 12).

By the end of this stage sugar loading mechanization

was 98 percent.

The gradual ability to produce the Cuban designed

harvesters

reflects

the

gradual

broader

development

of

the

Cuban

mechanical industry and accumulated knowledge and experience.
As

a

result

of

the

increased

level

of

mechanization

in

the

agricultural sector, employment has decreased (by almost 10 percent) in
relative and absolute terms in this sector at this stage.

The released

workers have been employed in newly created jobs

in the industrial

sector (mining, manufacturing and construction)

and in services

(Brundenius, 1983:66).
One of the significant features of this stage was export expansion
of a wider range of new products, such as seafood and citrus.
1967 to 1980 Cuba introduced 115 new export products

From

(Brundenius,

1985:40), hence reducing the percentage of the sugar component of its
exports.
Another important feature of this stage which facilitated Cuba's
stable economic growth despite the deteriorating terms of trade with
the capitalist world was Cuba's joining CMEA (The Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance) in 1972 (this point will be further elaborated in
the section on the "Soviet-dependency").
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In brief, the major achievement of this stage was the reduction of
previous economic imbalances and the establishment of a more balanced
economy.
sugar

In addition, despite the reduction in relative investment,

and

agricultural

mechanization.

production

The technological

increased

success,

as

a

result

of

leading to a higher

mechanization of the agricultural sector, reflects both the development
of the mechanical industry and the increased linkage between the two
sectors.

Finally,

consumption

of both

in

this

stage

the

Cuban people’s level

consumer

goods

and public

services

of

increased

significantly as a result of the increased production (see Tables 6, 13,
and Figure 1) .

Cuba by this stage had established a structure that

would lead to achieving the goals foreseen in the early stage, namely a
higher

level

of

industrialization,

agricultural

and

export

diversification, and a more egalitarian income distribution.

The Fourth Stage figSO-SS1):
In the Second Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba, held in
1980,

the socioeconomic guidelines

approved.

The main goal of this

for the
stage,

1981-85 period were

as

reflected

in these

guidelines, was the continued emphasis on industry in various branches
and parts of the country.

In addition, the guideline emphasized the

continued goal of developing and intensifying those industrial branches
that would utilize domestic resources

(e.g.,

the

food and

fishing

industries) and those with the highest potential exports (e.g., sugar,
nickel

and

citrus

industries)

with

a view

towards

of

increasing

exports, replacing imports and raising the people's consumption levels
(Socioeconomic Guidelines for the 1981-85 period, 1981:11-12).
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As well

as

the

continued

export diversification,

general

goals

of

Industrialization,

import substitution and an increase

in the

standards of living, the guidelines focused on increasing productivity
and efficiency of the economy in the spheres of labor productivity, raw
materials and fuel consumption, technological development, and planning
and managerial organization.

This last goal has been pursued mainly by

introducing greater flexibility and financial responsibility (through
self-financing and self-management mechanism) in the production units.
The investment priority in this stage was set in accordance with
the general goals with the main emphasis of the 1980-85 plan remaining
on industrial investment.

Of the total investment in this period,

17.88 billion pesos, 36 percent was allotted to industry, 23.3 percent
to agriculture and 11.8 percent to transportation (Castro, 1986:2).
The second five year plan specifically pointed to the development
and

construction

of

different

agricultural,

mechanical,

transport,

electrical and non-electrical machinery and equipment, in addition to
the construction of new sugar refineries.

Further, the plan pointed

out the importance of
the creation of a new base of development,
planning and manufacture of new types and models
of equipment for automobile transport (both
freight and passenger) and for railways, including
technical and feasibility studies, technical
projects, a greater part of the equipment (60% or
more)
with
construction,
erection
and
commissioning of the said installations with the
object of continuing to replace imports of those
products which can be manufactured in the country
and also to create new exportable items (quoted in
Brundenius, 1987:103).
The

actual overall growthof the Gross Social Product (GSP)

1981-85 was 7.3 percent (above the planned growth rate of
(UNIDO, 1986:1).

during

5percent)

Material production rose by 8 percent; the industrial
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sector growth accounted for approximately 76 percent of the GSP in 1985
(Banco Nacional De Cuba, 1986:6).

More than 90 percent of the increase

in the industrial output was generated from the non-sugar industrial
branches (UNIDO, 1986:6) reflecting a significant development of the
non-sugar industrial structure of the economy, a major step towards
economic diversification (see Figure 3).
The high growth of the non-electrical and machinery industry (see
Tables 14 and 15) increased the domestic supply of needed spare parts.
In 1984 430 million pesos worth of spare parts were made or repaired in
Cuba, saving on foreign imports (UNIDO, 1986:6).
electrical

industry

has

significantly

In addition, the non

increased

the

supply

of

agricultural machinery (e.g., harvesters and planting equipment),
transportation machinery (e.g., buses, railway wagons) (see Table 16).
The machinery industry has produced 600 KTP-1 mechanical harvesters
annually since 1981 (about 65 percent of total world annual production)
(EIU,

1986-87:13). As a result of the increased number of produced

harvester machines, 62 percent of the 1985 sugar harvest was mechanized
as opposed

to 45 percent

at the

end of

the previous

stage.

In

addition, technical experiments continued in this stage leading to the
development of a new, more powerful cane harvester the KTP-2 (Castro,
1986:3) .
The electrical machinery industry high growth rate in this period
of 15.1 percent increased the supply of different consumer appliances
(e.g.,

radios,

T.V.

sets and refrigerators),

in addition to other

intermediate products (e.g., electric wires and cables).

Further, the

breakthrough development of this industry is the exportation, for the
first

time,

of

computer

equipment

to
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the

Soviet Union

(Montero,

1988:43).

The computer industry output accounted for 2 percent of the

total output of capital goods in Cuba (Brundenius, 1987:106).
The food and light industries continued to grow at an annual
growth of 6.1 and 8.8 percent respectively.*"®
also been registered

Important growth has

in construction projects;

in this

period 45

percent were industrial projects (e.g., the construction of a new glass
container factory, a textile complex, a nickel complex,

seven sugar

mills, a paper complex, and an oil refinery).*"®

In addition to the

industrial projects,

provided building

materials

the construction sector

for different agricultural

(e.g.,

dairy farms and

cattle

farms) and social projects (e.g., public health centers and housing). 17
As a result of the higher industrial productivity especially in
the manufacture of cane-harvest machines and in grinding

capacity,

sugar production increased by 12.2 percent over the previous five year
period, with a stable average annual production of 8 million tons.

The

integration of the machine and sugar industry reached a higher level In
this stage.

Seven new sugar mills, with Cuban technical design and a

majority of Cuban-made equipment, were constructed.

18

In addition, the

vertical integration process was reflected in the formation of the
agro-industrial complexes in 1980 freeing the Ministry of Agriculture
from the sugar cane activities which were assigned to the Ministry of
Sugar Industry (Feuer, 1987:70).
The actual high growth of the different branches of the industrial
sector,

though

accompanied by

an

increasing

level

of

domestic

production of some capital goods and spare parts, increased the volume
of imported intermediate and capital goods (see Table 17).

However,

between 1970 and 1983, the percentage of manufactured imports in total
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imports dropped from 58.9 percent to 44.7 percent (see Figure 4).

This

reduction in the share of manufactured imports, given the expansion and
high growth rate of the industrial sector, reflects the success of ISI
in both intermediate and capital goods.
significant

domestic

replacement

is

Another

reflected

indicator of the
in

the

Domestic

Procurement Ratio (DPR) 19 for capital goods which has increased from
16.9 percent in 1970 to 31.8 in 1984 (Brundenius, 1987:109) (see Table
18).

In addition,

Table

17 shows the effective

reduction of the

imports of consumer goods which was achieved by increasing the domestic
production of these goods.

Consumer goods accounted for 63.1 percent

of total material value added in 1982 (UNIDO, 1986:xii).

In addition

to reflecting the significant replacement of imports, the increase in
consumer goods production also reflects the state's commitment to the
satisfaction of basic needs and raising the people's consumption level.
Significant efforts at import substituting are also reflected in
other fields like medicines,

with domestic production satisfying 83

percent of the domestic needs
this stage the use of oil
eliminated;

(Zimbalist,

1987:18), and energy.

in raw sugar production was

In

totally

the sugar industry instead used the sugar bagasse as a

fuel, saving 1,709,000 tons of oil.

This latter replacement reflects

the technological development of adapting domestic resources

to

domestic production and of the total energy self-sufficiency of the
sugar industry.

Attempts are being made to increase the energy supply

from bagasse beyond the

sugar

industry.

Twenty million

tons

are

produced each year (equivalent to 4.5 million tons of oil) which covers
30 percent of the national primary energy consumption with a potential
increase to an equivalent of 7.5 million tons of oil (CubaBusiness,
1987:5).

Partial replacement of imported oil has also been achieved
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through the reduction of its unit consumption in different sectors and
by increasing the volume of national oil extracting

(Crude oil

production increased from 60,000 tons in 1959 to 938,000 tons in 1986).
Experiments are also underway to adapt the use of Cuban oil, which has
a high sulfur content,

in power generation and industry to replace

imported oil (CubaBusiness, 1987:4-5).
The more efficient use of resources has been an important factor
in the actual growth rates in this period.

The major factor, however,

stems from the higher labor productivity and the positive ratio between
the growth in productivity (4.3 percent) and the growth in mean wages
(1.16 percent)

(Banco Nacional De Cuba,

1986:16).

A study of the

impact of increasing productivity on the mercantile production70 showed
that an increase in productivity of 5.1 percent in 1984 was responsible
for a 72.6 percent increase in the mercantile production of the Cuban
industry (UNIDO, 1986:19).

Labor productivity in the industrial sector

increased by

however,

5 percent;

between

1981

and

1984

labor

productivity increased by 35 percent in the non-electrical machinery
sector, by 24 percent in the electrical machinery sector, and by 11
percent

in

the metal

products

sector with an

salaries of 9 percent (Brundenius, 1987:105),

average

increase

in

Higher productivity has

also been registered in the sugar industry where a reduction of 48
percent

of

the manual

cane-cutters

since

1980

took place

due

to

increased level of mechanization in this sector (Castro, 1986:3).
The fuller utilization of existing resources, by increasing labor
and capital productivity and reducing waste,

is a strategy that is

continuously emphasized and pushed by the Cuban leadership.

This means

of surplus generation is socially and politically more palatable than
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sacrificing current consumption (Zimbalist, 1987:8).

This increase in

the productivity of the working force has been achieved through the
continuous massive effort to increase the level of education and health
services, in addition to increasing the level of personal consumption
which grew by 9 percent in 1984 (United Nations, 1986:212).

Increased

productivity has also been facilitated by organizational changes:
higher degree of decentralization is taking place
production

units

more

flexibility

allowing

in decision-making

and

a

the
more

responsibility in self-financing (see Table 19).
In

addition

substituting,

to

the

significant

accomplishment

the Cuban economy witnessed some

in

import

significant changes,

though to a lesser degree, in its attempts at export diversification.
The share of sugar in total exports dropped from 86.8 percent during
the previous stage to 75.7 percent during 1983-84 (Zimbalist, 1987:18).
Further, exports of non-traditional goods to the convertible currency
markets increased by an average of 40 percent during the 1981-85 period
(see Table 20).

In addition to the 115 new non-sugar related export

products introduced in the previous period (1976-80), Cuba introduced
11 more products.

Exports of citrus products,

recycled raw materials,

oil and

sea products,

its by-products,

ferrous

steel,

and non-

ferrous metals, and other products increased (Banco Nacional De Cuba,
1986:8).

As a result of the significant savings in oil consumption,

Cuba has been able, based on an agreement with the Soviet Union, to re
export oil in the convertible currency market.
million from selling imported oil

(UNIDO,

Cuba earned about $540
1986:2).

Exports

of

manufactured goods increased in this period, though registering a small
share (1.3 percent) of total export (see Figure 5).

This small share

includes an increasing volume of different manufactured goods,
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e.g.,

different chemical products, wires and cables, appliance, spare parts
and irrigation equipment (CEE, 1986:267).
Cuba exported some computer parts
stage,

And as mentioned earlier

to the Soviet Union during this

though still on a small scale.

Efforts are being made to

increase the share of manufactured exports especially by exporting to
other developing countries.

91

The highest potential non-sugar hard

currency earning industries at this stage and till the 1990s are the
nickel industry, fishery industry, citrus industry and tourism.
As

a result of the effective efforts at import substituting and

export diversification the Cuban economy was able

to register hard

currency surpluses in 1981, 1982, and 1983 (see Table 21).
Not enough data is available at this point to assess the third
five year plan (1985-90), and hence its assessment has to be postponed.
However,

some

prior

information

about

the

direction of

this

plan

indicates no major shift in the strategy adopted in the last two plan
periods; Cuba will continue to give priority to the industrial sector
with

specific

industries.

emphasis
Out

of

on

the

import

substituting

government

total

and

export-oriented

investment

budget

23.14

billion pesos (29 percent more than the preceding plan) 45 percent is
allotted to the industrial sector.
sugar cane by-products
industry,

and derivatives

light industry, basic industry,

electronic
(Castro,

Attention is given to expanding the

industry,

1986:8-9).

oil extraction,
In addition,

industries,

agricultural

the machine industry,

the

transportation and tourism

the plan highlights

the need to

improve efficiency in the use of raw materials, quality of products and
services, and productivity through a better organization of work.
new emphasis is to be put on intensive rather than extensive measures.
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A

Measures aimed at conservation and rational use of
energy, other material resources, labor and
productive facilities are to be given priority.
Increases in production capacities should be
achieved through modernization wherever possible
rather than investment in new facilities (Castro,
1986:9).
While the final assessment of this last period (1985-90) has to
wait, given the already established productive structure of the economy
and the outcome of the previous five year plans, it is safe to assume
that the outcome will be, to a large extent,
planned objectives.

in accordance with the

In addition, and as predicted by a recent study:

"Cuba can be expected to remain among the few of the underdeveloped
world with a positive growth record over the remainder of

the decade"

(EIU, 1986-87:8).

Critical assessment of the Cuban development process:
Judging from the initial economic and social conditions of the
Cuban economy before the revolution and the relatively short period of
transition,

Cuba

has successfully altered

structure towards a higher

its

level of national

economic

and

integration.

social
Though

facing many difficulties the economy was able, during its first and
second stages (1960-70), to lay the economic and social foundation of a
productive structure that allowed for future development.

This

foundation enabled the economy to sustain a relatively high growth rate
—

as compared to other Latin American countries (see Table 22)
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—

and to pursue its initial goals especially those of industrialization
and increasing the standards of living.
investment

in

the most

productive

After the initial extensive

sectors

of

the

economy

and

utilization of the surplus in developing other sectors, the economy has
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been able to develop a higher productive capacity and a more effective
utilization of its human and natural resources.
The strong and planned commitment to industrializing the economy
has increased the level of integration between the different sectors of
the economy, the level of national technological capacity, the level of
domestic economic surplus,

and the standards of living

(through

increases in both private and public goods and employment).

A recent

UNIDO study of the industrial development in Cuba summarizes some of
the indicators of these achievements:
Within the framework of new industrial policy
followed by the new regime since 1960, new sugar
factories were built designed by the Cuban
themselves, using 60 percent of Cuban-made
equipment.
The level of development reached in
this sector enabled Cuba to begin exporting sugar
production technology.
Modern
production
facilities were erected in chemical industry to
produce sulphuric and citric acids, varnishes and
dyes, fertilizers, insecticides, glass, paper,
etc.
Expansion, reconstruction and modernization
of many enterprises permitted a significant
increase in the production of steel, a greater
volume of capital goods, and the setting up of new
sectors like the production of buses, agricultural
equipments, household appliances, TV and radio
sets, computers, etc. (UNIDO, 1986:28).
The Cuban development process, judged in decades and not in years,
reflects
economy.

an

increasingly

stable

and

consistent orientation

of

Adjusting and postponing the ambitious initial goals,

the
and

through a process of learning, the Cuban leadership has been able to
pursue the planned goal of constructing a higher level of national
economic

integration

and

hence

a

higher

degree

of

economic

independence.
The positive assessment of the Cuban development experience should
not

imply the ease of the transitional process or the

continued difficulties and problems.
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absence

of

Perhaps the harshest and most

consistent

criticism

and

articulation

difficulties comes from Castro.

of

these

problems

and

In his Third Congress report, after

listing the major accomplishments of the Cuban economy during the 198085 period, he argued
(Nevertheless), we could have made better use of
our resources and our efforts. Our work has been
far from its best.
Deficiencies and shortcoming
still persist and we must call them by their names
and fight against them with all our might (Castro,
1986:6).
He then preceded with a long list of specific problems.

Though

increasing the level of national production and technological capacity,
the Cuban economy still depends on importing an important part of its
intermediate and capital goods.
enterprises level,

Some of the productive sectors, at the

reflect low levels of efficiency,

produced goods and productivity.

quality of

Shortages and delays of

supplies

still exist in the economy affecting both domestic needs and export
commitments. For example,
(Delays) in the development and introduction of
new more productive disease resistant varieties,
low quality seed; ill-timed planting weeding and
cultivation
delays,
among
other
factors
contributed to the low density of many cane fields
which causes limited agricultural yield (Castro,
1986:6).
The low levels of efficiency,

quality and productivity are

attributed mainly to technological and organizational deficiencies.
One of our most serious problems has been the
absence of comprehensive national planning for
economic development (...)
Our scientific and
technological work has not been sufficiently
linked to research topics that will provide
concrete solutions to our main economic problems,
nor has it been organized adequately to avoid
duplication of efforts; and research is still
scattered. As a result our modest achievements do
not correspond to the resources allocated (Castro,
1986:6).
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Through the years

the Cuban society has been going through an

intensive public debate on how to better orient the economy; how to
improve its productivity; what priorities should be followed, and what
means

should be utilized.

centralization vs.

Debates

decentralization,

continue

on

the

degree

on the extent of economic

of
and

financial flexibility

at the enterprise level, on moral vs. material

incentives

of

as means

increasing

productivity, and

on

different

organizational and technological means to increase economic efficiency.
The most recent organizational attempt ongoing in the Cuban economy now
is what

is known as

the

’rectification'

process,

a return to

the

earlier revolutionary spirit of higher productivity, a downplaying of
material incentives, an acceleration of volunteer work, and an attack
on bureaucratic practices

that have

evolved.

The new process has

managed to mobilize a

large number of minibrigades workers who engage

for a certain period

in building houses, clinics, day care

centers,

etc., and who are paid by the enterprises they normally work for.

The

minibrigades workers usually work for 10-12 hours per day instead of 56 hours

at a normal work place.

(CubaBusiness, 1987:7).

The

enterprises, at the same time, utilize the remaining working force to
accomplish their normal level of productivity.

The new process has

been a major factor in increasing productivity of the Cuban economy
during the 1980s; it has also been an important factor in increasing
the level of mass participation in organization and decision making.
A different type of criticism of the Cuban experience comes from
outside observers.

These critiques generally revolve around issues of

continued "sugar dependency," "export dependency," debt burden and what
is

referred

to

as

"Soviet

dependency,"

addressed in the next section.
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These

critiques

will

be

Cuba's Dependency:
Three types of dependency are usually attributed to the Cuban
economy in the literature:
"Soviet dependency".

"trade dependency", sugar dependency" and

In this section I will be addressing,

in some

detail, both "sugar dependency" and "Soviet dependency"; however,

I

will not address "trade dependency" for two main reasons:
First, on an empirical level, the claim of Cuba's increased trade
dependency, as has been continuously stated in the literature e.g., by
Mesa-Lago

(1979,

1985), has already been countered on the basis of

errors in measurement.

Brundenius (1984:61-64) has pointed out two

measurement errors which led to Mesa-Lago's biased calculations and
wrong conclusion: (1) he compared prerevolutionary data series, which
related exports to GNP, with post revolutionary data which relates
exports to gross material product (GMF), which is smaller than GNP; and
(2) he related exports in current prices (which are rising over time)
to GMP, which is given in constant prices.
errors,

Adjusting for these two

Brundenius' estimates show that Cuba's dependency on trade has

decreased since 1970 (see Table 23).

A similar conclusion was also

reached in an earlier study by LeoGrande (1979).
Second,

and more importantly, an economy's dependence on trade

does not negate, in my opinion, this economy's independence.

As was

argued in the first chapter, such external factors by themselves are
very misleading indicators of an economy's level of dependency.
who attribute economic dependency
confusing

two

"dependency" vs.
school).

different

situations

"dependence"

Rather,

the

to

such external

which

are

Those

factors

distinguished

are
as

(see chapter I, section on dependency

economy's

level
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of

dependency

or

economic

Independence is a function of its level of productive and structural
capacity and of its internal degree of integration.

In many cases an

increase in the export level is an indication of the economy's
increased productive capacity (which is the case for most developed
economies, e.g., Japan).

Measures like export/GNP could be utilized as

indicators of the degree of an economy's openness.

Hence a high ratio

of export/GNP, for example, indicates a high degree of openness which
is a characteristic of many small developed and developing countries.
Cuba has been and will continue to be a small open economy; the major
issue, however, is the structure of the export sector and its degree of
integration with the rest of the economy.

Examination of the Cuban

economic and social transformation process reveals a structural change
of the different sectors of the economy including the export one.

The

export sector in Cuba has served as the leading sector through which
the primitive capital accumulation has been generated; the latter then
has

been utilized

addition,

to develop

one of the major

other

problems

sectors

of

the

economy.

usually associated with

In
trade

dependency is an economy's external vulnerability; in the Cuban case,
the economy has been able

to reduce

its external vulnerability by

increasing its productive capacity, by diversifying its exports, and by
securing stable prices and volumes of its major exports through trading
with the socialist bloc.

Hence the Cuban export sector has not been an

isolated pocket or an enclave sector, but rather it has been acting as
an important generator of national surplus and has been closely linked
to the development of the rest of the economy.
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"Sugar Dependency":
Many critics of the Cuban development process argue that Cuba has
failed to alter its sugar monoculture (e.g., Goure and Weinkle (1972),
Mesa-Lago

(1981)).

However,

as has been

shown

earlier,

sugar

production's share in both allotted Investment and total exports has
fallen.

A close look at the sugar cultivation and production process

in the Cuban economy reveals further major structural changes that have
taken place in this sector.

Such changes, as will be shown, have led

to a growing level of independence of the sugar industry in terms of
its inputs and to a higher level of integration with the rest of the
economy.
First, sugar cultivation and production are no longer an isolated
pocket

in the economy with massive

transfer of surplus.

foreign ownership

and external

It is no longer merely an agricultural activity,

but rather an agro-industrial one that has been highly integrated with
the rest of the economy (see Figure 5).

Some of the major mechanisms

of such integration are reflected in the following:
a.

The sugar industry's surplus, generated through the export
sector, has been utilized to finance the development of other
productive and nonproductive sectors.

The generated surplus

in the sugar industry has been the major source of national
capital accumulation that has been utilized since the second
development stage to finance the development of the whole
economy.
b.

The development of the sugar industry has stimulated a series
of

backward

and

industries include:

forward

linkages.

Backward

linkage

the chemical industry (fertilizers and

pesticides), the construction
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industry

and

the mechanical

industry (irrigation equipment, cane sugar harvesters).

The

development of the latter industry has, beside increasing the
mechanization
increased

level

of

the economy's

the

sugar

production

process,

technical capacity and hence

its

productivity by freeing an increasing number of workers from
sugar

activities.

In

addition,

the

development

of

the

national production of cane harvest equipment has increased
the economy's know-how technology in this field and allowed
Cuba to export it

to other countries.

Forward

linkages

industries include different industri.es, that process sugar
by-products.

There are in Cuba now more than 10 plants that

produce paper, newsprint, cardboard and particle board from
bagasse; and 11 plants that produce torula yeast from sugar,
molasses and animal feed.

Now the newly developed sugar

mills have a Cuban-developed
from recycled

factory waste

system producing
(Feuer,

1987:80).

fertilizers
Cuba

now

produces more than twenty sugar by-products; in addition to
fuel and paper making some of these by-products have been
used in medicine

and construction

(CubaBusiness, 1987:6).

Further, the sugar Industry has been a supplier of fuel to
other economic activities.

Energy from bagasse is a major

national source of energy representing 30 percent of primary
national consumption (CubaBusiness, 1987:7).

The sugar

industry, hence, has been a major contributor to the adopted
strategies of import substitution and export diversification.
Second, the productivity of the sugar industry has significantly
increased despite the gradual reduction of its investment share.
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This

increasing productivity has been achieved through major improvement in
the land irrigation system, the cultivation process

(improved use of

fertilizers and pesticides), the level of education and training of the
employed labor force, and the level of mechanization.

As a result of

this latter effort Cuba today has as many sugar combines as all other
sugar producing countries together.

Today 100 percent of sugar loading

is mechanized, and more than two-thirds of the cutting activities are
mechanized

(with some places

Perez, 1986:3).

reaching more

than 80 percent)

(Juan

Along side at this process of mechanization there has

been a reduction of the employed manual cane cutters.

In the 1960s,

mechanical loaders freed about 50,000 workers from sugar activities,
and the cutting machines freed between 120,000-16,000 workers in the
1970s (Edquist, 1985:167).

The present mechanization level has reduced

the number of workers from 350,000 in 1970 to 72,000 in 1985 (Castro,
1986:3).
Third, despite the gradual fall in its share of investment and its
increased productivity,

the sugar industry has witnessed a gradual

significant reduction of its costs.

In addition to decreasing the

number of workers it needs, the sugar industry has totally eliminated
its consumption of imported oil, replacing it with energy from bagasse.
The

sugar

sufficient.

agro-industrial

complexes

now

are

totally

energy

self-

Further, national technological development has increased

the share of equipment and machines produced nationally.

The newly

constructed sugar mill centers are Cuban designed with the majority of
the equipment nationally produced.

In

1985 Cuba was

reported

to

produce 77 percent of the total value of its milling equipment, with
the rest imported from CMEA (15 percent) and capitalist economies (7
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percent), significantly reducing the cost of earlier hard

currency

imports (Pollitt, 1986:210).
Fourth, since 1979 (with the exception of the 1986 harvest, the
year of hurricane Kate) sugar production has been stable, averaging 8
million tons, a level which is close to the 1970 sugar output, without
however,

the economic and social

accompanied that harvest.

pressures

and imbalances

This stable production,

that

together with the

stable and guaranteed purchases by the Soviet Union and other socialist
countries, has significantly reduced the economy's previous level of
vulnerability to
prices.

fluctuations of both

production

and world

market

This increased stability has facilitated planning and the

fulfillment of major social and economic projects.
Fifth,

the social organization

structurally changed.

of sugar production

has

also

With foreign ownership totally eliminated since

the beginning of the revolution, state farms produced most sugar cane
while independent farmers accounted for the rest.

Through the mid

1970s, and as a result of conscious decisions, the cooperative form of
production gradually increased.

By 1985 there were about 430 cane

cooperatives encompassing 31,000 farmers and producing two thirds of
all cane

produced

in

the private

sector

(Feuer,

1987:71).

Labor

employment in sugar production (which constitutes about one-sixth of
the Cuban population) is no longer subject to seasonal fluctuations.
In addition, the sugar cane labor force is no longer dominated by low
paid and technically low equipped farmers.

Sugar workers include those

involved in sugar cultivation (weeding, fertilizing, irrigating, etc.),
and a large number of qualified engineers, agronomists and technicians.
Today,

a single sugar agro-industry complex has more

engineers

and technicians

than

an

qualified

entire province had before
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the

revolution (Juan Perez, 1986:3).

This increase in the level of skills

and training has been accompanied by an increase in the standards of
living of these workers.
social services
higher wages

In addition to employment security, increased

(housing,

health,

education), sugar workers receive

(15 percent higher) than those with comparable work in

other sectors.

Further, work organization has changed, introducing a

fourth shift in the factories, allowing the workers for the first time
to take a weekly day off during the harvest (Feuer, 1987:78).
These significant social, economic and technical changes in sugar
production structure indicate the development of this sector towards a
higher level of productivity and integration with the
economy.

rest of the

The development of this sector has been the major factor in

the development of the whole economy.

However, despite the attained

stability in production and the increased level of productivity,

the

Cuban economy is still affected by the fluctuations of world sugar
prices.
The bulk of the Cuban sugar output

is sold

to

the

socialist

countries at high stable prices; however, because of its need for hard
currency, Cuba attempts to sell some of its output to other countries.
Due to the drastic fall in sugar prices
price established in the

(falling below the minimum

international sugar agreement

i.e.,

$0.13 per pound) Cuba lost $500 million in the early 1980s
1986:1).

In addition,

below
(UNIDO,

sugar cane harvests are affected by certain

disease and weather conditions as are other agricultural activities.
The 1986 harvest was affected by a severe drought and by Hurricane
Kate,

reducing planned output and forcing Cuba to purchase half a

million tons

of sugar

in the world market
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to

fulfill

its

export

commitment to the USSR (Feuer, 1987:74).
of

However, while these problems

low international prices and fluctuations

in weather

conditions

harshly affect all sugar exporting economies, the effect on the Cuban
economy has been minimized by its stable selling to the CMEA, by its
continuous effort at improving the use of fertilizers and pesticides
and increasing the level

of mechanization,

achievement at export diversification.

and by

its

significant

Further, a comparative look at

the effect of the severe drop of the international sugar prices on the
Cuban economy before and
change.
adjust

after

the

revolution

While today Cuba's loss of
its

plans

postponing some

reveals

significant

foreign exchange forces

of

its development

it to

projects

and

cutting down some of its imports from the capitalist economies, the
pre-revolution impact of such fall in prices (e.g., the 1920 fall in
sugar prices) caused a further loss of national ownership of sugar and
land property, collapse of the financial system and severe unemployment
leading to different social problems.
Therefore, while sugar production continues to play a major role
in

the Cuban

economy,

it

is very

misleading

to

equate

the

pre

revolutionary social and economic structure of the sugar sector with
the current one. The higher level of productive and technical capacity
of the agro-industrial sugar complexes in Cuba today and their higher
level of integration with the rest of the economy definitely indicate a
higher level of independence.

As Pollitt concludes in his important

study:
The growing 'independence' of the sugar industry
for its inputs of machinery and equipment in
particular contrasted sharply with its preRevolutionary condition and should have modified
its common depiction as the post-Revolutionary
economy's
most
comprehensive
symbol
of
'dependence' (Pollitt, 1986:212).
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"Soviet Dependency":
All

through the previous presentation

in this

chapter

I have

examined the development of the Cuban economy by focusing mainly on
changes

in internal dynamics

technical

capacity...

(e.g.,

etc.).

decision-making,

This

story

remains

productive and
partial

without

reflecting on the role of the Soviet assistance in the Cuban case.
Such

assistance,

as

has

been

continually

expressed

by

the

Cuban

leadership, has been of extreme importance in facilitating the Cuban
transition.
Without the decisive, steady, and generous aid of
the Soviet people, our country could not have
survived the confrontation with imperialism. They
bought our sugar when our market was brutally
suppressed by the United States; they supplied us
with raw materials and fuel which we could not
have acquired in any other part of the world; they
caused to arrive free arms with which we opposed
the mercenaries at the Bay of Pigs and equipped our
forces in order to impose the high price on any
direct aggression by the United States; they
supported our economy in extraordinary fashion in
the critical years of the blockade (Castro, quoted
in Blaster, 1979:229).
It is the volume and consistency of this assistance that has led
many critics

(e.g., Goure and Weinkle

(1972),

and Mesa-Lago

(1974,

1981)) to the claim that Cuba has simply replaced one dependency with
another,

Cuba's previous relationship with the United States with its

current one with the USSR.

This claim is known in the literature as

the "Sovietization of Cuba" thesis.

Further,

even some sympathetic

writers (e.g., Fagen (1978), Edelstein (1981) and MacEwan (1981)), who
recognize the positive social and economic effects of the Cuban-Soviet
relationship, argue that such achievements have been at the expense of
Cuba's loss of its independence in political decision making especially
in Cuba's foreign policy in Africa.

*
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The claim of the 'new dependency'

in the literature is usually

substantiated with estimates of the volume of the Soviet subsidies and
assistance to Cuba.

One of the most quoted estimates is that provided

by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
as $3.1 billion per year

(or over $8

The CIA's estimate is given
million a day).

Different

analysts, however, have pointed out many distorted factors that have
been assumed in reaching this estimate (e.g., Zimbalist (1983), Radell
(1983),

and Turits

(1987)).

This

estimate,

and

other Western

calculations, reach over-valued figures by comparing the price Soviets
paid for sugar with official world market prices, rather than with the
subsidized prices at which actual exchange takes place (Radell, 1983).
In addition, the CIA estimate was derived from a year when the Soviet
price subsidy was unrepresentive (Zimbalist, 1983).

Furthermore, the

calculation underestimates the cost of the tied nature of the Soviet
aid e.g., non convertible currency^ (Turits, 1987).

Just by adjusting

for one of the distorted factors, the CIA figure drops by more than
half (Zimbalist, 1983:145).

To reach an exact estimate of the Soviet

subsidy is impossible given the absence of official data of the actual
debt owed to the USSR and the different implicit forms of assistance.
However, in my opinion, the nature and consequences of this assistance
are what pose an important issue rather than its volume.
While

the

volume

of

the

Soviet

assistance

to

Cuba has

been

overestimated, the nature of this assistance has been also obscured in
the literature.

Many critics of the Cuban development process argue

that Cuban-Soviet relationship has hindered the development of
economy towards an independent status.

the

They view Cuba's change of its

initial ambitious strategy (after 1963) of rapid industrialization and
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economic diversification and its returned emphasis on sugar as an move
imposed by the Soviets.
Faced with the realization that its Cuban rescue
operation was developing into a costly long-term
economic undertaking, Moscow apparently persuaded
or forced Cuba to rethink its development policy
and return to traditional concentration on sugar
production (Goure and Weinkle, 1972:72) (emphasis
is added).
As

Fitzgerald

correctly

argues

in

a

recent

article,

the

Sovietization of Cuba thesis assumes rather than shows Soviet pressure
(Fitzgerald,

1987-88:447).

In

addition,

this

understanding of the actual material conditions

claim
(e.g.,

lacks
the

the

initial

underdeveloped productive capacity, shortage of foreign exchange, lack
of experience and the U.S. blockade) that had the major role in shaping
the policies adopted.

Furthermore, the advocates of this thesis try to

undermine important favorable aspects of the Cuban-Soviet relationship
that stand in contrast with the
examination

of

these

favorable

Cuban-U.S.
aspects

will

relationship;
show

the

hence

an

fallacy

of

equating the two relations.
Some favorable aspects of the Cuban-Soviet relationship include:
first, Cuba's relationship with the USSR and other socialist countries
since the 1960s has meant a guaranteed market for Cuba's sugar exports,
allowing it to sell higher volumes of sugar
before the revolution.

than its total export

As pointed out by Castro in 1970, Cuba's sugar

production is no longer limited by an externally determined quota or by
available markets, but rather by Cuba's own production capacity:
The problem facing our country ever since it began
large-scale trade relations with the socialist
camp (...) has been one of production, not
markets.
Our economy has enough markets for any
amount of sugar it can produce (Castro, 1970:264).
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This

guaranteed market has

an

important

role

in facilitating

the

development of the technical and productive capacity of the Cuban sugar
industry.

This role contrasts with the pre-revolutionary conditions in

which the imposed quota by the United States hindered the economic
justification for increasing production and technical innovations.
In addition to the guaranteed markets,

the Cuban-Soviet

trade

relationship has provided Cuba with high and stable prices as compared
to the highly fluctuating world market prices (see Table 24) .

Due to

the decline in world prices Cuba redirected 1.7 million tons of sugar
in 1983-84 to the socialist countries.

This redirection earned Cuba

1656 million pesos as opposed to 219 million pesos had this amount been
sold at the prevailing world prices (United Nations, 1986:226).

The

opposite trend has also taken place; when sugar prices in the world
market increase, Cuba's proportion of sugar exports to the socialist
countries decreases.

"Therefore, it seems that export of sugar to the

Soviet block has followed a counter-cyclical policy which

seeks to

cushion the negative consequences of variations in the world market"
(Carciofi, 1983:217).

The predictable stable income from sugar exports

has eased Cuba's planning process especially after 1972 the year of
Cuba* joint membership in CMEA and of an increase the prices the Soviet
paid for sugar.
After the congress, our country will have
fiveyear plan for economic development for the first
time. As the basis of this plan, we know exactly
how much sugar we will be sending to the USSR in
this five-year period, at what prices, and which
consumer goods, raw materials and producer goods
will be coming in from that country.
In more or
less similar terms we also know how much sugar
will be exported to other socialist countries, the
goods to be received in return and their prices.
However, the prices of sugar exports and those of
the goods that we must buy in the capitalist
countries remain unknown (Castro, 1979:74).
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In addition to the favorable prices paid for sugar exports, Cuba's
terms of trade with the USSR in general are far superior (in magnitude
and stability) to those of Cuba with the market economies (see Figure
6).

Such favorable terms have been achieved by applying an index

mechanism that relates the prices of Cuba's exports (sugar and non
sugar) to those of Cuba's imports from these countries.
Given

the

international

conditions

facing

most

developing

countries, and especially the sugar exporting ones (e.g., deteriorating
sugar prices and reduction in demand due to an

increasing use of

artificial sweeteners), Cuba's trade relation with the USSR and other
socialist economies has strengthened the Cuban economy.
Second,

Soviet economic assistance

to

Cuba

has been

utilized

mostly in the development of the productive and technical capacity of
the economy.
90 percent

Data for the period from 1960 to 1973 show that more than
of the Soviet

economic

assistance

was

directed

to the

productive sectors with the industrial sector accounting for more than
three-fourths of total

assistance

(see Table

25).

Since

then,

socialist economic and technical assistance has been coordinated
through different technical and scientific commissions within the CMEA.
The socialist countries and specifically the USSR have
different productive projects in Cuba
economy.

The

socialist

assistance

financed

in different sectors

has played

a

major role

of the
in the

development of the sugar industry; it has been utilized to build and
renovate

more

than 100

sugar mills.

In addition,

the

socialist

technical and scientific cooperation has been directed to increasing
the agricultural

productive

capacity

by

improving

the

quality

of

fertilizers and pesticides and by helping to increase the level of
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mechanization.

First the Soviet Union provided some harvesters; and

then it produced the Cuban designed harvesters; and finally, it helped
finance the construction of a harvester factory that started operation
in Cuba in 1978.

In addition to facilitating increases in agricultural

productivity, socialist and particularly Soviet assistance has enhanced
Cuba's

industrial productivity.

The

assistance

has

been

directed

towards the development of the nickel, citrus, fishery, transportation,
electrical, and non-electrical industries.
and others,

In all these industries,

socialist assistance has been provided

in the form of

finance, equipment, raw materials and technical specialists.
Therefore, contrary to the claim made by some writers (Eckstein,
1982:112)

that

Cuba's

integration

into

the

socialist

block

has

restricted its capacity to produce marketable exports, socialist
assistance has been a major support to those sectors that led to the
increase in export diversification (e.g., nickel, sea products, citrus,
sugar by-products).

In addition,

Cuba's

increased

efficiency

and

technical capacity, especially in the sugar Industry have reduced its
consumption of Soviet

oil and

allowed

earning a major source of hard currency.

it

to reexport

the

surplus

As noted in a recent study on

import substituting efforts in Cuba:
The drive to substitute domestic sources for
imports - strongly encouraged by the Soviet Union
which is cutting back petroleum deliveries to all
its CMEA members - is gathering pace (Cuba
Business, 1987:6).
Such recent

developments counter the claim of Cuba's

increased

9

dependency on Soviet deliveries (Goure and Weinkel, 1972:73).
Hence Soviet and socialist assistance has been directed to the
development of those sectors that contribute most to
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the economy's

strategic goal of industrialization with emphasis on ISI and export
diversification.
Third, the Cuban-Soviet relationship involves neither an outflow
of surplus from the Cuban economy nor any control over decision making.
Though Cuba's new law of investment allows joint ventures with foreign
capital, it does not allow any form of direct foreign investment, one
of the major mechanisms of the previous U.S. control.
As the second chapter suggests, direct foreign investment involves
mechanisms of control over the productive sectors of the economy and
grants foreign investors both control over decision making and surplus
appropriation.

Hence the elimination of any form of foreign control in

Cuba is a reflection of Cuba's increased control over its economic and
social decision making.

Unlike the United States in pre-revolutionary

times, the USSR does not control or own any property or productive
resources in Cuba.
countries
countries.

has

In addition, Cuba's relationship with the socialist

not prevented

In fact,

its

economic

relations

Cuba's position within CMEA,

with

other

especially with

Soviet backing , has facilitated its acquisition of hard currency loans
from different capitalist financial institutions and governments.
The increasing level of integration with the Soviet Union and the
socialist

countries

is not a result

of an

imposed relation or

dependency but rather of the better terms offered by the socialist
countries and of a rejection of Cuban trade by many capitalist
countries.

The Cuban leadership has continually expressed the desire

to establish economic relations equally with the socialist countries,
the capitalist countries and the developing ones.

However,

Cuba's

initial desire of to diversify trade partners has been curtailed by the
U.S. economic blockade which has imposed severe restrictions not only
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on U.S.-Cuban economic relations but also on Cuba's
other capitalist economies.

relations with

However, with the easing of the economic

blockade by some of these countries, Cuba has increased its trade and
economic relations with the West especially

when it offers better

terms (trade with Western countries - excluding the United States accounted for more than 40 percent of total trade in 1975 as a result
of increases in sugar prices).
with

the

West,

Cuba

signed

In an effort to expand trade relations
in

1985

a

series

of

bilateral

trade

agreements (UNIDO, 1986:xii).
These favorable aspects of the Cuban-Soviet relationship - and of
Cuba's relationship to the socialist countries in general - show that
the simple comparison of volumes or percentages of trade as indicators
of continued dependency is very misleading.
continually
thesis.

reported by

For example,

advocates
Mesa-Lago

of
(1974)

This type of comparison is

the

"Sovietization

argued that

Cuba

of

Cuba"

is

still

dependent by showing that Cuba has always relied on one country for 70
percent of its trade - the United States before the revolution and the
USSR since then.

As has been argued in the first chapter, attempts by

some writers to analyze dependency situations in quantitative terms,
focusing mainly on external factors (e.g., imports, exports) has led to
a misleading confusion of equalizing "dependency" with "dependence."
While Cuba continues to depend on Soviet assistance in its development
process

towards

structuring an integrated productive

economy,

this

dependence takes a fundamentally different form from the previous CubaU.S. relationship within which the Cuban economy was subjected to a
process of denationalization, external decision making and transfer of
surplus.

Hence, while Cuba's

previous relationship with the United
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States can be characterized as one of dependency (as the term has been
utilized by the dependency school),

Cuba's current relationship with

the USSR can be characterized as one of dependence (in the sense of
external reliance). Such dependence used to accelerate the development
of the economy's productive capacity and its internal integration, can
be viewed as a "short-run" or "tactical" dependence (see Chapter I).
In addition,

Cuba's utilization of the socialist assistance to

facilitate the economy's productivity and growth has not been achieved
at the expense of any sacrifices of the people's standards of living.
To the contrary,

the Soviet and socialist assistance has eased the

the Cuban government's social commitments. 26
Finally, the importance of the socialist - and particularly Soviet
- assistance
Cubans'

in the Cuban development process should not deny the

own efforts in this process.

The major dynamics of Cuban

development have been determined by Cuba's internal elements e.g., the
choice of strategy and decision making of the revolutionary government,
the committed efforts at increasing the standards of living which in
turn facilitated both the development of human resources and the social
stability of the country,

the increasingly efficient utilization of

resources and the encouragement of scientific and technological
innovations.

Further, the role of socialist assistance in the Cuban

development process
exceptional
blockade.

economic

should be

assessed within

and political pressure

of

the
the

context

the

continued U.S.

As HacEwan and Zimbalist have observed:
If we are to deny the Cubans and their social
system credit for the economic accomplishments
because of this (Soviet) aid, then we must also
give them tremendous credit for those same
accomplishments in light of the U.S. blockade. It
is probably impossible to quantify accurately
either the benefits of the aid or the costs of the
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of

blockade.
Crude estimates, however, suggest that
both figures are in same order of magnitude; the
roughly $10 billion plus that the Cubans are said
to owe the Soviets is approximately balanced by
the burdens of the blockade over the years
(HacEwan and Zimbalist, 1984;5).

Cuba's Debt:
Despite the high sustained growth of the economy and the increased
productivity,

Cuba's

foreign

debt has

been

increasing.

High

international liquidity and the increased level of sugar prices have
resulted in increases

in funds made available

private banks and governments,
However,

in the

early

1980s

to Cuba by Western

especially after

and as a result

of

the mid 1970s.
a

discriminatory

international financial policy towards Cuba, many of the Western banks
tightened their lending to Cuba.^
study,

As Turits (1987) showed in a recent

the Cuban liquidity crisis in 1982

announced

its

inability

to

meet

the

(the Cuban National Bank

payment

and

requested

a

rescheduling) was largely an outcome of restrictive financial treatment
by Western banks despite Cuba's strong position relative to most other
Latin American countries.

This observation has been shared by UNCTAD:

The percentage reduction in current Cuban debt
was particularly large, and amounted to 25
percent, or three times the median reduction on
the group of 28 countries whose debt fell in the
last years. This seems almost paradoxical in light
of the fact that ten of the other 27 countries
were already behind on their payments at the end
of 1981, while Cuba experienced no such problem
until the withdrawals of short-term credit in 1982
(quoted in Turits, 1987:172).
Cuba managed to reschedule its debt in 1982, and again in 1986.
In 1986, for the first time, Cuba fell behind in payments on its short
term commercial debt.

As a result of further negotiation, Western

government creditors of the Paris Club agreed to reschedule Cuba's debt
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of $75 million falling due in 1986 over ten years with six years grace;
and

they

offered

additional

credit

(CubaBusiness, 1987:1).

Cuba

currently owes $3.4 billion to Western banks and governments.
result of

the changes

in

international

As a

financial policies,

Cuba's

short term loans and trade credit now constitute a higher portion of
its

overall

debt

(see Table 26)

flexible sources of funds,

because

these

they have led to

are

costly and

a higher

transfer

in
of

resources especially in the last few years.
Despite

the

increase

in

the

debt

burden

(total

debt

service/exports averaged about 42 percent in 1980-84 (see Table 27)),
Cuba's GSP has sustained a high growth rate
during

the

addition,

1980s with
during

rescheduling

this

industrial
same

negotiations

(more than

growth scoring even higher.

period

Cuba's

did not

lead

management
to

an

of

adoption

traditional austerity measures taken in other countries.
shown earlier,

7 percent)

Cuba's strong commitment to increasing

the

In
debt

of

the

As has been
standards

of

living has continued all through its different stages of development,
with

a higher

emphasis

in the

recent years

availability of private and public
increased.
spheres

goods;

The austerity measures,

hence,

affecting social consumption and

rather in organization and production.
emphasized efforts to accelerate
efficiency.
those

heavy

addition,

the

wages have

have not been taken in

standards

of

living,

but

Cuban leadership has strongly

the economy's productivity and

In addition, investment priority has been directed towards

sectors

fishery,

in

on increasing

with

the

highest

and citrus industries),

industries), and

other

export
to

(sugar,

import substituting

foreign
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exchange

nickel,

(light and

earning

sectors

(tourism).

Both personal savings

(a new people's

Saving Bank was

established offering 2 percent interest) and joint ventures have been
encouraged.
volume

Finally,

Cuba's

austerity measures

have

of its imports of capital and Intermediate

machinery,

transport equipment,

affected
goods

and chemical products)

the

(e.g.,

from the

capitalist countries, which despite their small share in Cuba's total
imports,

still play an essential part

in the economy's productive

capacity.
Cuba's
unknown.

debt

with

the

USSR

and

other

socialist

economies

is

However, though larger than Cuba's other debt, its burden is

significantly smaller.

In addition to trade credits from the USSR -

which require no cash payments - the financial credits are offered at
long repayment period (over 25 years) and low interest rate (2 percent
per annum).
Perhaps the most important issue in assessing the national debt
for any economy is the way this debt is utilized internally.

Cuba's

leadership has long recognized foreign capital as an important means to
accelerate the economy's productive capacity and hence its long-run
goal of increased independence.
As an underdeveloped country embarked on an
accelerated program of socioeconomic development,
Cuba needs foreign funding to increase production
of those branches that will - in the long run guarantee a self-sustained economic development.
It is therefore essential
to concentrate
investments and products imported with foreign
credit in those lines of production and services
that will help integrate and develop our economy,
raise our peoples' standards of living, increase
the amount and value of exports and reduce imports
(Socioeconomic Guidelines for the 1981-85 Period,
1986:21).
Unlike many other countries where foreign funding is sometimes
channeled outward through imports of
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luxury goods,

or

deposits

in

foreign banks, or spent on unproductive investment, Cuba has utilized
its foreign funding in accordance with

its strategic goals.

Such

planned and controlled utilization of foreign finance in increasing the
productive capacity of the

economy reflects a

"short-run"

form of

dependence as opposed to a "long-run" one.

Conclusion and further remarks:
If economic independence is viewed as a function of the internal
level

of productive

internal integration,

and

technical

capacity

and

of

the

degree

of

then the Cuban economy undoubtedly has become

more independent since the revolution and especially since the 1970s.
Other studies reached a similar conclusion about Cuba's reduced
level of dependency e.g., LeoGrande (1979), and Brundenius (1984:6268);

however,

independence.

these
They

studies
focus

adopted

mainly

on

a different
some

volumes, percentages and direction of trade.

external

conception of
factors

e.g.,

While such indicators are

important they remain partial; and any short run quantitative change of
the variables may misleadingly indicate the reversal of the process.
One of the definitions of economic independence adopted by the
different essays in a volume edited by Ghai is the ability of a country
to effectively

formulate

and

execute

its

own economic

and

policies without coercive external pressures (Ghai, 1973:xi).

social
Cuba's

previous relationship with the United States reflected the lack of such
independence, with U.S.

investors dominating the Cuban economy

and

hence controlling its economic decision making, and the U.S. Congress
dictating Cuba's political terms.

Cuba's current relationship with the

USSR, on the other hand, reflects no such control; to the contrary this
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relationship has

facilitated the development

of

towards a higher level of economic independence.

the

Cuban

economy

Though Cuba still

depends on the USSR, this dependence structurally differs in its form
and consequences from Cuba's previous dependency on the United States.
Cuba's dependence on Soviet assistance and on some
intermediate goods, imports,

capital and

and financial loans from capitalist

economies can be characterized as a short-run dependence which

is

essential for building up the economy's productive capacity and to
further its level of independence.
Cuba's increased level of productive and technical capacity and of
national integration has been achieved mainly through a planned effort
of industrialization.

The

revolutionary leadership recognized long

before the revolution the immense need for industrialization.

Castro

expressed the importance of industrialization when outlining the
program of the 26 of July Movement in his defense trial in 1953:
Except for a few food, lumber and textile
industries, Cuba continues to be primarily a
producer of raw materials. We export sugar to
import candy, we export hides to import shoes, we
export iron to import plows...
Every one agrees
with the urgent need to industrialize the nation,
that we need steel industries, paper and chemical
industries, that we must improve our cattle and
grain production,
the techniques and
the
processing in our food industry in order to
protect ourselves (Castro, 1984:25).
Since the revolution, Cuba has been able to develop an industrial
structure that has allowed it to substitute for previously imported
consumer, intermediate and capital goods.

A non selective program of

ISI was adopted in the beginning of the

revolution,

which did not

recognize the underdevelopment of the productive structure
available domestic resources.

and the

As a result the program increased the.

imports of raw materials, intermediate and capital goods.
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Recognizing

these emerging problems,
programs,

the leadership soon adjusted its ambitious

concentrating on those

industries

that utilized

resources and those with the highest potential
needed surplus.

output

to

domestic
generate

In addition, the emphasis on the sugar industry was

accompanied by the development of other industries with backward and
forward linkages.

Meanwhile special attention was given to developing

a basic industrial and technological capacity.
the food and light industries.

ISI took place also in

Within a transitional period of less

than thirty years, Cuba has been able to expand its basic and heavy
industries.

The adopted industrial strategy, hence, took the forms of

both ISI and basic industrialization.

In addition, Cuban planners put

strong emphasis on export diversification (with the goal of increasing
export

of manufactures),

which

increased

the

economy's

foreign exchange and reduced its external vulnerability.

sources

of

Emphasis on

industrialization, which gained momentum in the 1970s, continues as the
main goal for the future.

In reflecting on the development strategy up

to the year 2000, Castro emphasized industrialization and other major
obj ectives.
The strategy's main economic objective is to speed
up the country's industrialization process.
The
determining factors of future economic development
and industrialization process demand increasing
and diversifying exports; substituting imports
(particularly from the capitalist area); further
integrating the national economy; using natural
resources rationally; increasing efficiency in
social production while economizing on resources
(especially imports) (Castro, 1986:9).
In another sphere, Cuba has adopted the long run goal of enhancing
economic

cooperation efforts with

especially with those

in the

other

Third World

Latin American

countries

and Caribbean

and

region.

Despite the successful internal efforts at developing the Cuban
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economy, Cuban leadership recognized that future development cannot be
achieved in isolation.

As Castro said in 1974:

"A small,

Latin American country can do absolutely nothing. ..

isolated

In the future only

large communities will be in a position to face the great problems of
humanity" (quote in F. Fitzgerald, 1987-88:443).

Economic cooperation

among developing countries is viewed as a very

important

strategy

toward increasing their level of independence:
There are several reasons why cooperation among
Third World countries is necessary. The first and
more general reason is the fact that it is a
fighting
instrument
against
neo-colonial
dependence stemming from old historical links with
former metropolis, embodied in relations of deep
subordination in production, trade, finance,
technology, and intellectual and cultural fields.
If anything shows with absolute clarity the
historical path our countries have followed, it is
the noxious effect of dependence on market-economy
developed countries (Castro, 1983:158).
Cuba gave very

special

attention to

improve bilateral

and

multilateral agreements with other Latin American and Caribbean
countries. Cuba now has diplomatic and trade relations with many Latin
American and Caribbean countries, while in 1960 such relations were
limited

only

to Mexico

(as

a

result

of

isolating

measures by the rest of the regional countries).
became

and

boycotting

In addition, Cuba

an active member in different Latin American and

cooperative

organizations

that

development and independence.

have

adopted

the

goal

of

Caribbean
economic

Cuba's affiliations can be categorized

into two types: broad regional cooperative organizations and specific
purpose centered groups (Reed, 1979:229).

The first type includes the

Latin American Economic System (SELA), and the Caribbean Committee of
Development and Cooperation (CCDC) which was

formed by ECLA.

Both

organizations seek to promote regional integration through different
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common production and marketing activities.

The second type includes

the Latin American Energy Organization (OLADE) , the Latin American and
Caribbean

Sugar

Exporting

Group

(GEPLACEA), and

Multinational Shipping Company (NAMACUR)

the

Caribbean

(Reed, 1979:300).

Cuba has

taken an active role In all these organizations in addition to engaging
in other bilateral economic and technical agreements with some of the
Latin American countries.

As recognized by Reed (1979), though Cuba

has long-run economic interests in these organizational efforts, Cuba's
immediate benefits, are mostly symbolic.

The form of cooperation which

the Cuban leadership considers appropriate corresponds to the dirigiste
form of cooperation, the hardest to achieve (see Chapter II, section on
regional cooperation):
Cooperation among underdeveloped countries must be
based on the coordination of internal efforts and
include, as an important component, actual and
effective forms of control over transnational
activities, coupled with full sovereignty over our
natural resources and economic activities, to
prevent the so called South-South cooperation from
becoming another mechanism aimed at increasing the
profits of such conglomerates (Castro, 1983:160).
Cuba

has pursued

a similar

active

role

in

the

developing

countries' demands contained in the New International Economic Order
(NIE0).

It has been taken this role within different United Nation

organizations

and

through

the

Non-Aligned

Movement.

Castro

continuously stresses this demand as an important means to facilitate
Third World development.
Now for us to develop, canceling the debt would
not be enough.
It would also be necessary to
implement the new international economic order
approved by UN ten years ago and which was
promoted and defended by Mexico, Algeria, and
several other countries, Cuba among them.
All
this was agreed upon at the UN ten years ago by
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the immense majority of member countries, yet it
has not been implemented (Castro, 1985:6).
As in the case of regional cooperation,
promoting

the NIEO does not

especially with

the more

stem

equal

Cuba's active role in

from immediateeconomic

terms

of

trade Cuba

need

haswith

the

socialist countries.
None of what we are doing is being done in the
interest of our country, because we are the least
affected by the dramatic crisis and have no
economic stagnation, no downturn. We are in fact
advancing at a fine pace, our hard currency debt
is small, our economic relations with socialist
countries are excellent, the prices for our goods
are satisfactory, and non of what we are doing is
out of national economic interest or of political
interest of overcoming
isolation. We arefighting
for more far-reaching
objectives (...) for
the
interest of Latin America and the Third World
(Castro, 1985:17).
Therefore, while Cuba has embarked on the national strategy of
ISI, basic industrialization and export diversification with successful
outcomes, the long run results of its efforts in regional cooperation
and NIEO are, to a large extent, dependent also on other countries'
committed efforts and their long run collective struggle for economic
independence.

Hence the latter two strategies are currently restricted

by external obstacles related to differences in political and economic
interests of the different involved countries.
Cuba's successful national efforts at increasing the productive
and

technical

capacity have

enabled

it

to expand and

improve

the

standards of living of the Cuban population with an impressive
provision of basic needs, significant reduction of income and regional
inequality and an elimination of unemployment.
Cuban

development

boundaries.

has

also

been

28

extended

Cuba has provided financial,
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The outgrowth of the
beyond

the

technological,

national

educational

and military assistance to other developing countries.

Hundreds of

Cuban teachers, doctors and technicians have provided different social
services in other countries
Further,

(e.g., Nicaragua,

Jamaica,

Angola).

Cuba has provided technical and educational assistance by

accepting thousands of students from other developing countries in its
schools and educational and technical institutions.

This assistance

reflects both Cuba's strong solidarity with other developing countries
and its increased level of productivity and development.
Cuba's higher level of economic independence can also be judged by
applying its own definition of economic independence.

As was stated in

the 26 of July movement program (Nuestra Razon) in 1956:
The principle of economic independence requires
that the greatest possible percentage of the
profits of national production remain within the
country.
When for whatever reason the bulk of
these profits flows abroad, the balance of
payments is disturbed and the country consequently
becomes increasingly subservient and impoverished;
the means of production and development in the
interests of the country but for the benefit of
the private interest that control them.
Oncethat
pattern is established, the country
loses its
economic sovereignty and becomes for all practical
purposes a commercial colony (Nuestra Razon, in
Llerena, 1978:293).
Cuba's increased level of productive and technical capacity and
national integration, its ability to formulate and execute economic and
social policies without external pressures, and its control over the
national surplus demonstrate that Cuba has undoubtedly succeeded in
increasing its level of economic independence.

Cuba has laid a solid

foundation for the dynamic mechanism that can bring about higher future
productivity,

economic diversification and national integration,

hence a higher future level of economic independence.

and

This trend,

based mainly on changes of internal dynamics, will gain momentum with
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the gradual easing of the economic blockade and Cuba'
cooperation with other developing countries.
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further

Table 1

U.S. Direct Investments In Cuba, 1929-1958 (Million Dollars)

1929

1936

1940

1046

1950

1953

1958

Agriculture*
Petroleum
Mining
Manufacturing
Public utilities
Commerce
Other

575
9
**
45
215
15
60

265
6
**
27
315
15
38

241
10
**

76

227
15
15
40
251
12
8

263
20
15
54
271
21
13

265
24
70
58
297
24
18

265
90
180
80
344
35
7

Total

919

666

560

568

657

756

1,001

* - includes sugar mills;
Source:

233

** - included in "Other" category

Brundenius, 1984:17

Table 2

Nationalization of Means of Production
(in % Production)

Sector

Agriculture
Industry
Construction
Transportation
Retail trade
Wholesale and export trade
Banking
Education

Source:

1961

1963

1968

37
85
80
92
52
100
100
100

70
95
98
95
75
100
100
100

70
100
100
100
100
100
100
100

Brunner, 1977:30
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Table 3

Estimated Income Distribution in Cuba 1953, 1962 and 1973
(IS, Income Shares: CS, Cumulative Shares)

1953
Deciles

0-10
10-20
20-30
30-40
40-50
50-60
60-70
70-80
80-90
90-100
(Top 5%)
Total
Gini coefficients

IS

0.6
1.5
1.9
2.2
4.6
6.4
10.8
12.0
21.5
38.5
(28.0)
100.0

1962
CS

0.6
2.1
4.0
6.2
10.8
17.2
28.0
40.0
61.5
100.0

0.56

Source: Brundenius, 1981: 1089
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IS

2.5
3.7
4.8
6.2
6.8
9.5
12.0
13.1
18.4
23.0
(12.7)
100.0

1973
CS

2.5
6.2
11.0
17.2
24.0
33.5
45.5
58.6
77.0
100,0

0.35

IS

2.9
4.9
5.4
7.1
8,7
10.5
12.5
13.5
15.1
19.9
(9.5)
100.0

CS

2.9
7.8
13.2
20.3
29.0
39.5
51.5
65.0
80.1
100.0

0.2!

Table 4

Acquisition of Farm Machinery, 1966-70

1966

Bulldozers
Tractors (tracked)
Tractors (rubber tires)
Lifters
Tractocareodores
Graders
Ploughs
Cultivators
Planters, sowers
Fumlgators
Reapers, harvesters
Combines
Chaoeadores
Harrows
Motors of all kinds
Airplanes
Wagons, carts, wheel
barrows
Excavators
Mechanical workshops
Electrical plants
Silocosechadores

128
930
2,861
1,123
67
145
3,259
52
31
16
1,321
n.a
10
15
2,791
6
-457

1967

678
1,428
4,268
1,001
232
115
29
1,115
3
271
1,303
n.a.
1,000
2,120
5,367
5
2,273
43
20
414
382

1968

(230)a
1,098
5,608
1,500
(102)
(105)
11,468
__b
(150)
7,191
(485)
325
293c
1,629c
(1,050)
-4,550
(115)
9
(339)
522

1969

1970

n.a
n.a
(325)
1,208
7,774
(8,370)
1,500
(1,500)
n.a
n.a
n.a
n.a
7,567 (11,300)
8,200d (6,400)
n.a.
n.a
(24,445)
n.a
n.a
423
(705)
257°
1,439c
(2,360)
n.a
n.a
n.a
n.a
13,184
n.a
45
n.a
600

(5,866)
n.a
(841)
n.a

na - not available
aFigures in parentheses indicate planned, not realized, acquisitions,
k--indicates a probably figure of zero
°Domestic production or assembly
Source:

Ritter, 1974:176
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Table 5

Fabrication of Sugar Milling Equipment, 1965-69
(Units)

Equipment Type

1965

1966

1967

1968

1969

Total

42
2
23
3
17
5
5

39
12
60
5
29
5
11
10
13

82
22
64
14
36
12
20
2
10
1
23
102
2
69
6

37
58
44
7
26
11
17
12
11
10
34
12

4

38
124
12
44
19

100
17
88
19
47
8
35
4
9
1
21
144
10
57
26

22

500
111
279
48
155
41
88
28
45
12
116
427
32
170
77

156

421

586

465

301

1,929

Calentadores
Cristalizadores
Condensadore s
Evaporadores
Tachos
Vapor-Cellis
Clarificadores
Vasos
Tanque Aqua Returno
Tanque Miel Final
Cuchellas Picar Cana
Enfriamlento Blanchard
Calendrias
Eyectores
Romanes
Total

Source:

2

45
8

Ritter, 1974:180
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Table 6

Output of Durable Consumer Goods, 1963-80

Refrigerators
(units)

1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980

1,093
11,871
1,711
730
19
2,080
5,841
20,168
30,097
40,220
42,001
50,012
43,687
46,274
45,573
55,622
25,002

Gas Stoves
(units)

8,727
29,645
10,228
46,024
34,878
6,440
4,155
6,009
30,010
30,000
40,112
45,079
53,627
49,327
51,717
51,233
35,652
na

Kerosene
Stoves
(units)

Radio Rec.
(units)

TV Sets
(units)

38,569
41,642
81,861
43,068
7,312
20,853
500
2,150
25,381
50,800
72,250
100,000
104,000
79,000
102,465
73,272
107,127
107,100

Brundenius, 1984:158.
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19,135
12,706
31,283
23,928
42,223
112,635
92,325
120,005
120,628
143,272
200,000

25,600
28,000
33,000
51,166
52,414
40,290

Table 7

Some Characteristics of the Cuban Labor Force, 1960-1980

Unemployment Rates (%)

1960
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980

Source:

11.8
1.3
2.8
3.9
4.8
5.3
4.1

Brundenius, 1984:73.
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Table 8

Output of Transport Equipment and Machinery (Except Electrical)

Transport Equipment

Buses
(units)

1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980

300
800
575
1,137
1,255
1,718
1,266
1,970
1,805
2,440
1,846

Fishing Boats
(units)

36
53
87
105
131
137
156
152
139
93
120

Machinery (except electrical)

Wagons for
Sugarcane
(units)

24
1,606
1,650
3,906
3,000
3,600
3,600
3,000
3,000
3,900
3,410

Trailers
(units)

Combines
(units)

52
105
105
50
50
90
283
100
140
n.a

30
165
360
501

Water Pumps
(units)

Inputs for
Sugar Industry
(m. pesos)

1,497
4,256
5,742
8,812
14,130
14,851
3,672
1,201
511
585
3,415

28.2
59.8
28.7
40.4
73.5
97.0
81.3
94.3
860.9
608.0
na

♦agricultural distribution centers run by the state; na = not available
Source:

Brundenius, 1984:154

Inputs for
Acopios*
(m. pesos)

102.2
225.9
40.5
25.1
10.0
9.8

Table 9

Output of Electrical Equipment, Electric Power, and Mining Industry

Electrical Equipment
Electrical
Cables
(km)

1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980

13,122
19,894
19,174
32,869
28,951
27,287
30,273
21,356
26,313
42,046
38,000

Mining Industry

Telephone
Cables
(km)

Batteries
(units)

Electrical
Wires
(mt)

Electric
Power
(million)
(kwH)

4,631
7,923
5,192
4,060
4,767
4,635
2,780
3,658
3,108
3,753
6,667

95.2
90.4
108.3
111.6
126.4
139.4
98.8
97.4
136.6
177.9
301.9

825
1,144
1,330
1,002
1,164
1,332
975
657
1,388
2,362
2,547

4,888
5,021
5,265
5,703
6,018
6,583
7,191
7,707
8,481
9,401
9,896

Copper
Refractory
Concentrates Nickel
Chrome
(OOOrnt)*
(OOOrnt)* (OOOrnt)*

0.4
—
1.8
2.1
2.9
2.8
2.9
2.6
2.8
2.8
3.3

36.8
36.5
36.8
35.2
33.9
37.3
37.0
36.8
34.8
32.3
38.2

na = not available; * = metal content; ** = excluding autogeneration in sugar industry
Source:

Brundenius, 1984:155

22.8
13.9
37.1
37.2
37.7
36.1
19.1
20.4
28.8
28.2
28.5

Table 10

Output of Sulphuric Acid, Rayon Tire Cords, Fertilizers, Insecticides, Herbicides,
Paper Pulp, Newsprint, Tires, and Matches

Sulphuric
Acid
(mt)

Rayon Tire
Cords
(mt)

Fetilizers
(OOOmt)

Insec
ticides
(mt)

Herbi
cides
(mt)

Paper
Pulp
(OOOmt)

Newsprint
Tires
(OOOmt) (000 units)

Matches
(m. boxes!

1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979

322
368
400
385
384
418
392
375
347
297

1,131
1,425
1,521
1,268
1,674
2,154
1,637
440
1,415
1,586

577
565
620
663
728
749
798
863
945
873

1,414
2,988
3,416
4,424
5,200
5,426
3,591
2,660
3,013
4,414

2,203
2,594
2,738
2,715
2,766
3,102
3,118
na
na
na

33.7
36.0
35.0
43.0
42.6
36.3
40.9
37.5
33.9
29.5

18.9
22.0
24.7
26.9
28.5
32.0
32.3
31.1
35.6
34.9

301.9
751.2
381.1
371.5
390.8
367.8
266.4
171.9
294.5
302.0

370.7
428.2
457.2
439.6
414.3
424.4
425.1
430.8
414.1
370.5

1980

401

1,648

1,059

na

na

29.9

36.7

386.6

383.4

* = 1975; na = not available
Source:

Brundenius, 1984:157

Table 11

Mechanization of Cane-Cutting and Loading in Cuba, 1963-81

% of cane harvested
by combine harvester

1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981

Source:

% of manually cut care
loaded mechanically

1
20
26-32
44-6
53-7
61-8
65-74
82-5
87
89-96
93-4
96
96
97
97
98
98
98
98

-

1-2
2-3
2-3
3
2
1
3
7
11
18
25
32
36
38
42
45
50

Edquist, 1985:38
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Table 12

Percentage of Cane Mechanically Cut by Various Harvesters
in Cuba, 1971-80

Llbertadora
1400

1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980

Source:

1
3
4
4
5
4
4
4
4

MasseyFerguson

1
4
7
10
12
13
13
10
10
9

Edquist, 1985:51
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KTP-1

-

1
4
9
14
19
24
28
32

Others

2
2
”

Total

3
7
11
18
25
32
36
38
42
45

Table 13

Output of Nondurable Consumer Goods, 1969-1980

1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980

Source:

Leather
Shoes
(000 units)

Cotton Cloth
(million m)

13,261
12,052
14,217
14,390
14,760
13,512
15,513
14,979
13,449
14,685
13,759
12,927

91.3
75.7
87.1
98.0
117.1
127.9
137.6
134.1
148.9
154.4
148.4
157.4

Brundenius, 1984:159.

Rayon Cloth
(million m)

4.4
2.2
8.1
7.4
6.8
3.8
6.3
5.1
2.7
1.5
1.5
na

Rice
(OOOmt)

Wheat Flour
(OOOmt)

87.9
182.8
134.4
184.7
139.5
206.5
222.8
210.9
241.4
238.4
202.6
225.2

147.9
159.7
175.3
177.6
178.4
184.3
176.1
165.4
176.4
174.9
160.5
271.0

Beef
(OOOmt)

104.5
104.9
100.8
99.0
84.6
69.8
67.7
80.5
87.5
83.4
78.8
80.3

Pork
(OOOmt)

Condensed and
Evaporated Milk
(OOOmt)

2.6
7.6
10.0
11.4
12.9
19.0
24.2
29.1
33.7
34.9
34.0
34.2

69.2
68.1
77.9
49.4
58.6
57.3
62.1
62.1
63.2
63.0
65.2
66.3

Table 14

Gross Value of Production of Engineering Goods Industries, 1975-85
(Million Pesos, 1981 Prices)

Non-electrical
machinery*
(1SIC 382 & 384)
Value
Index

1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985+

253.7
275.0
292.4
359.2
420.1
434.4
553.4
642.7
746.0
876.2
866.4

100.0
108.4
115.3
141.6
165.6
171.2
218.1
253.3
294.0
345.4
380.9

Electrical
machinery
(ISIC 383)
Value
Index

50.7
52.4
55.9
64.0
78.3
75.4
100.6
88.5
119.4
144.5
152.0

Metal products
(ISIC 381)
Value
Index

100.0
103.4
110.3
126.2
154.4
148.7
198.4
174.6
235.5
285.0
299.8

*Including transport equipment
+Estimate based on first 11 months of 1985
Source:

Brundenius, 1987:104
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89.4
93.0
97.2
112.1
118.5
123.2
141.4
158.4
186.0
203.9
203.5

100.0
104.0
108.7
125.4
132.6
137.8
158.2
177.2
208.0
228.1
227.6

Total
(ISIC 38)
Index
Value

393.8
420.4
445.5
535.3
616.9
642.0
795.4
889.6
1,051.4
1,224.6
1,321.9

100.0
106.8
113.1
135.9
156.9
163.0
202.0
225.9
267.0
311.0
335.7

Table 15

Growth Rates of Various Cuban Industries

Growth, compared to
previous year (%)

- Metal products

15

- Mining and ferrous metallurgy

15

- Non-electric machinery building industry

10

- Electrotechnical and electronics

12

- Chemical industry

13

- Paper and cellulose industry

22

- Textile industry

24

- Alcoholic beveral and tobacco industry

17

- Graphics industry

13

Source:

Banco Nacional De Cuba, 1986:17
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Table 16

Industrial Output, Selected Products, 1965-1984 (Selected Years)

Product

Profifled steel
Corrugated steel bars
Sugar cane harvesters
Vessels
Buses
Lorries
Tires
Mineral fertilizers
Man-made fibres
Textiles
Wearing apparel
Cement
Carts for sugar
transportation
Household refrigerators
Radio sets
TV sets
Household gas stoves
Storage batteries
Electric wires and cable
(up to 1 KV)
Wire
Computers
Mini computers

Source:

UNIDO, 1986:17

Unit

1965

1970

1980

1984

thousands tones
thousand tons
units
units
units
thousands
thousands
thousand tons
thousand tons
million sq. m.
millions
thousand tons

36.0
26.3
-

140.0
85.0
36
300

303.8
260.2
501
120
1,846
0.6
387
1,405
4.9
159
25.5
2,831

338.2
270.5
631
,.t
2,219
0.5
450
1,446
3.8
172
31.7
3,347

thousands
thousands
thousands
thousands
thousands
thousands
thousands
kilometres
thousand tons
thousands
units

2.0
11.9
81.9

•* ,
• ••
* ••

*

•

*

•

•• •

202
591
2.4
78
22.2
742
•

10.2
102.1

5.8
19.1
6.0
95.2

23.6
7.3
-

13.1
0.5
-

-

3.4
25.0
200.0
40.3
6.9
301.9
38.0
8.2
13.8
38

...

22.4
253.4
91.6
♦♦

4

335.1
• ••
•• •

Table 17

Cuba:

Imports of Goods, CIF

Percentage
breakdown

Millions of pesos
1980

1982

1983

1984*

1975

1983

Growth rates

1984*

Total
4,617 5,531 6,218 7,207 100.0 100.0 100.0
According to use and economic purpose
Consumer goods
10.9
763
787
12.2
535
757
13.3
Intermediate goods
2,823 3,501 4,082 4,833 63.1
65.6
67.1
—
—
Petroleum and petroleum products
9.9
29.4
898 1,481 1,831
-—
Fertilizers
1.9
81
112
121
2.9
--Herbicides and pesticides
76
60
110
1.8
1.7
-Rolled steel
139
114
178
3.9
2.9
--Accessories and spare parts
2.1
86
3.0
105
129
Remainder
1,584 1,588 1,713
41.8
27.5
Capital goods
Complete piantb
Tractors
Buses and lorries
Remainder
On the basic of ISIC categories
Food and live animals
Beverages and tobacco
Inedible raw materials, except fuels
Fuels and lubricants, minerals
and related products
Animal and vegetable oils and fats
Chemical products
Manufactured goods, classified
chiefly by material
Machinery and transport equipment
Miscellaneous manufactured articles

1,269 1,266
535
535
73
37
115
161
582 ■ 497
746
16
188
912
57
291
679
1,639
99

23.6
1,379 1,587
-6.1
589
— ' 0.4
61
-163
2.4
—
566
14.7

UN, 1986:229

22.0
—
—
---

788
9
202

—
---

19.1
5.9

12.7
0.1
3.2

-—
—

1,498 1,845
48
65
358
421

----

10.3
1.3
7.9

29.7
1.0
6.8

__
—
--

717
1,712
193

-—

18,4
31.2
5.8

12.3
30.5
3.7

-—

811
10
185

763
1,895
229

" "

Source:

22.2
9.5
1.0
2.6
9.1

1981
10.5
25.6
13.5
27.8
25.4
19.8
24.1
17.4
3.5

1983

1982
8.3

12.4

1984*
15.9

13.5 -0.8 4.0
9.3 16.6 18.4
-28.3 23.6
-9.7
8.1
-5.0 45.2
-1.7 27.8 —
—
4.0 22.9
7.9 --3.1

-2.3
2.2 8.9
11.3 -10.3 10.2
33.5 49.6 -17.3
12.2
24.8
1.2
6.9 13.9
-20.1

15.1
—
—
-—

-5.3
9.2

—
—
--

28.4
27.9
-0.7 -16.6
7.8
14.0

23.2
36.2
17.7

—
—
—

11.1
4.9
11.1

6.4
10.6
19.0

—
—

2.8
-29.7
14.3

5.7
-11.5
-15.9

-4.9
-0.4
74.5

-

2.7

Table 18

Production, Imports and Apparent Consumption of Machinery
and Equipment* 1963-84 (Million Pesos)

Production+
(1)
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984

48.2
49.4
44.0
46.5
49.4
60.8
56.4
84.9
103.2
119.6
161.0
200.1
253.7
275.0
292.4
359.2
420.1
434.4
553.4
642.7
746.0
876.2

Imports
(2)

110.0
127.7
123.4
123.6
238.7
282.4
360.3
419.0
378.5
216.9
291.8
436.7
852.4
964.3
1,324.3
1,151.7
1,133.7
1,427.6
1,502.0
1,447.7
1,610.7
1,878.1

Apparent
consumption
(3)
158.2
177.1
167.4
170.1
288.1
343.2
416.6
502.9
481.7
336.5
452.8
636.8
1,106.1
1,239.3
1,616.7
1,510.9
1,553.8
1,826.0
2,055.4
2,090.4
2,356.7
2,754.3

Domestic
procurement
ratio
(4) - (1)(3)
30.5
27.9
26.3
27.3
17.1
17.7
13.5
16.9
21.4
35.5
35.6
31.4
22.9
22.0
18.1
23.8
27.0
23.3
26.9
30.7
31.7
31.8

*Non-electrical machinery only (including transport equipment)
+Constant prices
Source: Brundenius, 1987:109

175

Table 19

Origin of the Resources for Financing
for the Investment Program
(in Percent)

1981

Budget
Enterprises' own sources:
profits, depreciation
funds
and fixed assets

Source:

1982

1983

1984

1985

99

87

84

72

70

1

13

16

28

30

Banco Nacional de Cuba, 1986:6

Table 20

Growth Rate of Non-Traditional Exports, 1981-85

1981

Non-traditional
exports

Source:

47.0

1982

93.2

1983

1984

1985

123.1

144.7

177.2

Banco Nacional de Cuba, 1986:10
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Average annual
Growth rate (%)

40.0%

Table 21

Cuba's Balance of Payment In Freely Convertible Currency

Balance on current account
Merchandise balance
Exports FOB
Imports FOB

Source:

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

-523

-139

-45

51

297

263

-207

-136
595
-731

99
367
285
606
441
73
680 1,248 1,406 1,356 1,234 1, 136
-581
-881 -1,121
-750
-793 1, 063

UN, 1986:231

Table 22

Latin America:

Evolution of Total Gross Domestic Product
(Annual Growth Rates)

19701974

1975
1978

19791980

1981

1982

1983

1984

19811984

Cuba

8.7

6.0

3.2

15.1

3.1

3.8

7.4

32.4

Latin America

7.0

4.8

6.1

1.7

-1.0

-3.1

3.2

0.6

Source:

UN, 1986:15 (See Footnote 21)
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Table 23

Cuba's Trade Dependency, 1946-1980

Exports as % of GMP
(constant prices)

1965
1970
1974
1978
1980

Exports as % of GDP
(constant prices)

13.5
15.5
9.8
9.0
8.1

16.7
19.4
12.7
12.4
11.1

Source: Brundenius, 1984:75
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Table 24

Sugar: Production, Exports and Export Prices

Thousands of tons

Year

1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984

Source:

Sugar
production

6,876
4,882
3,883
4,475
6,156
4,537
6,236
5,165
4,459
8,538
5,925
4,325
5,383
5,926
6,427
6,151
6,953
7,662
7,800
6,805
7,926
8,039
7,460
7,783

Sugar
exports

6,413
5,132
3,520
4,176
5,316
4,435
5,683
4,612
4,799
6,906
5,511
4,140
4,797
5,491
5,744
5,764
6,238
7,197
7,199
6,170
7,055
7,727
7,011
7,017

Carciofi, 1983:207 and UN, 1986:226
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US$ per pound
Prices paid
by the
USSR

4.09
4.09
6.11
6.11
6.11
6.11
6.11
6.11
6.11
6.11
6.11
6.11
11.82
19.30
26.36
27.43
26.94
36.71
37.17
47.39
35.10
39.00
46.00
44.00

Prices paid
by the
world market

2.75
2.83
8.34
5.77
2.08
1.81
1.92
1.90
3.20
3.68
4.50
7.27
9.45
29.66
20.37
11.51
8.10
7.82
9.65
28.15
16.88
8.38
8.56
5.18

Table 25

Percentage Allocation of Soviet Assistance to
Various Sectors

Industry
Agriculture (irrigation and drainage)
Geological surveys
Transportation and communication
Education and health
Other sectors

Source:

76.1%
5.2
8.3
8.2
1.9
0.3

Cole Blasier, 1979:230

Table 26

Structure and Evolution of the External Debt
(in Millions of Pesos)

1984

%

1985

Variation

%

Total

2,988.8

100

3,258.9

100

270.1

Official debt
Private debt

1,595.9
1,392.9

53
47

1,691.2
1,567.7

52
48

95.3
174.8

460.1
932.8

16
31

502.7
1,065.0

15
33

42.6
132.2

Medium term
Short term

Source:

Banco Nacional de Cuba, 1986:38
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Table 27

Cuba's Indicators of External Indeptness in
Freely Convertible Currency

1980

1981

1982

1983

3,227
1,354
8
27
1,837

3,170
1,294
15
33
1,826

2,669
1,276
18
47
1,327

2,790
1,333
25
97
1,335

3,032
1,527
20
221
1,264

563
1,238
36
1

505
1,282
39
1

417
860
50
1

495
789
50
1

480
699
86
-

Disbursements0

214

229

148

351

522

Service4*
Interest paid
Amortization payment on
long-term debts
Amortization payments on
short-term debts

417
263

619
338

1,029
341

673
248

661
241

96

142

166

160

156

58

139

522

265

264

Total disbursed debt
Bilateral official debt
Multilateral official debt
Suppliers
Financial institutions
Medium-term bilateral loans
and loans from consortia
Short-term deposits
Credits for current imports
Other credits

1984b

PERCENTAGES
Ratios
Total disbursed debt/global
social product
Total debt service/exports of
goods and services
Total debt service/disbursements
Total debt service/global
social product

18.5

14.3

11.6

11.5

11.7

20.1
194.9

35.4
270.3

63.4
693.3

42.7
191.7

46.8
126.6

2.4

2.8

4.5

2.8

2.5

^Includes commitments falling due one year or less after date of issue.
Preliminary figures.
cIncludes long- and short-term loans received, according to the balance of
payments.
Relates to service payments which appear in the balance of payment (see
Table 18).
Source:

UN, 1986:233
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E1rv re I

Composite Basic Needs (Includes: Food, Clothing, Housing,
Education, and Health) Performance Indexes, 1958-1980

170

-

150

■

140 •
130

.

120

■

110

-

100

•

1958

60

Source:

62

64

66

68

70

72

74

76

Brundenius, 1984:104.
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78

80

Figure 2

Estimated Income Distribution in Cuba in 1953,
1962, and 1978 (Lorenz Curves)

90
80
70
1978*
60
1962
50
1953

40

Percent Income Earners

20

Source:

70

Brundenius, 1984:116.
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Index of Sugar and Non-Sugar Production, 1982, 1983 and 1984
(Preceding Year Industrial Production Index — 100)

INDEX OF SUGAR AND NON-SUGAR PRODUCTION, 1982,1983 AND 1984
(PRECEDING YEAR INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION INDEX-100)
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Source:
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UNIDO, 1986:10
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■ tea)

Figure 4

Share of Manufactured Imports in Total Imports, 1970 and 1983
(SITC 5-8 Less 67 and 68)

1970

1983
Manufactures
58.9 per cent

Manufactures
1*1**7 per cent

Other
1*1.1 per cent

Source:

Other
55.3 per cent

UNIDO, 1986:12
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Figure 5
Productive and non-productive
sectors
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Figure 6

Cuban Terms of Trade with the USSR and the West,
1963-1981 (1970-100)
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Notes
The attempt here is a brief one; a comprehensive presentation of
Cuban history is impossible here.

For detailed historical

presentation of the period between 1895-1902 see Foner (1972); for
an account
(1972);

of

the period between

1902-1933

see

Luis

for an extensive detailed presentation for

between 1762-1959 see Hugh Thomas.

Aguilar

the period

Also see the collection of

different important documents covering the period from 1783-1962
in Smith (1963).

Finally, for a critical historical assessment of

the period 1510-1959

(in Spanish language)

The historical background

in

this

chapter

see Segrera
is based

on

(1981).
these

sources and others which will be mentioned.
Though titled "Cuba under Spanish domination", this section will
reveal that while being a Spanish colony, Cuba came under the U.S.
nomination.
Different external factors, together with the suitable land and
climate,

influenced Cuba's transition to large

production:

scale

sugar

(1) the short duration of the British occupation of

Havana (1762-1763) which brought a large number of slaves and a
large amount of equipment (especially the recently developed steam
engine) and opened up the markets of 13 American colonies; (2) the
destruction of the sugar industry in St. Dominique (Haiti) in the
1790s as a consequence of the successful slave revolt; and (3) the
Spanish trade liberation decree of 1818.

Different factors had constrained the success of the struggle: the
lack of organization among the rebel
supplies and ammunition;

forces; the shortage

of

the failure to confront the problem of

slavery and the role of the blacks; the opposition of the wealthy
planters who supported Spain; and the refusal of the U.S. to sell
arms to the rebels (while supplying them to Spain hoping to be
able to buy the Island).

(Foner, 1972(v-l):xviii).

In 1895, the American Magazine of Civics featured a symposium on
the topic "Ought We Annex Cuba?"

A leading Wall Street figure

wrote: "It makes the water come to my mouth when I think of the
State of Cuba as one in our family".

Another spokesman of Wall

Street wrote: "Canada will come in time; Mexico will follow Texas
and

California,

and drop

into her

Stripes, when we are ready.

niche under

the Stars

But we want Cuba now".

and

(In Foner,

1972(v.I):xxxii).
For

the complete

presentation of

all

the

articles

see

Smith

(1963:125).
As an implementation of article VII Cuba leased Guantanomo to the
United States at $2,000 per year.
U.S.

investment had also penetrated other fields, a U.S.-Cuban

family of New York owned four major Havana dailies: El Mundo, La
Frensa,

the

Havana

Post

and

the

evening

Telegram

(Benjamin,

1977:19).
The following points are my translation of the original text in
Spanish.
One example of the extent of the impact of the U.S. embargo on
Cuba is its oil imports.

Prior to the revolution Cuba produced

only 10 percent of its oil consumption, the other 90 percent came

from the United States, a percentage that was totally cut after
the embargo (Gultelman, in Bonachea and Valdes, 1972: 232).
11.

The imported Soviet harvesters KCT-1 and KT-1 had limitations.
They could only cut erect cane or cane with maximum inclination of
30°; in addition, they required fields with a maximum inclination
of 5°.

It was estimated that they could be used only in 30

percent of the Cuban cane fields in 1966 (Edquist, 1985:41).
12.

The term was used by Castro in his report to the First Party
Congress.

13.

The

information of this part

is derived

from Castro's

report

(1980) unless otherwise specified.
14.

Some small-scale production of libratadora was produced in Cuba
and used in the 1969 sugar harvest (Edquist, 1985:48).

However,

lacking the technical capacity for large-scale production,
gave a West

German

company

the

patent

right

for

Cuba

libratadora

production in exchange for a low price for certain quantity of the
machine.

Since 1972 the West German company has exported the

libratadora to 44 countries including Argentina, United States,
Mexico and Venezuela (Edquist, 1985:129).
15.

These data and the following are derived from Castro's report to
the 3rd congress (1986) unless otherwise mentioned.

16.

All the mentioned industrial projects have been located in
different provinces of Cuba and mostly outside the Capital City,
in an effort to distribute the industrial centers in the country.
This effort increases both the economic integration of the
different parts of the country and the level of regional equality;
in addition, it reduces the chances of certain social and economic
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problems of rural migration to the cities as witnessed in most
developing societies.
17.

One

of

the major

construction
different

efforts

to

counter

the

shortage

of

social

projects has been through the volunteer work of

workers

organizations.

and

associates

of

a

wide

range

More construction projects have been

of

recently

accomplished through the efforts of the minibrigades.
18. During my first trip to Cuba in April 1986, we visited one of the
newly constructed sugar mills located in Camaguay, built in 1981.
About 70 percent of the equipment was Cuban made;

the machines

allowed for more than 60 percent of the harvest to be mechanized
with potential increases up to 80 percent.

The mill utilized 20

percent fewer workers as compared to other,

older mills.

In

addition, the mill's use of oil was limited only to the first year
of production;

thereafter,

all energy came

from bagasse.

In

addition to crude sugar and bagasse, the mill produced molasses,
sugar derivates used for animal feeding and fertilizers.
19. DPR is the ratio of apparent consumption of capital goods produced
by domestic industry.
20. Mercantile production is the sum of all goods and services of the
productive sectors (excluding trade) destined for sale.
21. In 1985 Cuba concluded bilateral trade agreements with many Third
Vorld and socialist countries.

In one of these agreement (with

Ecuador) Cuba would export spare parts for the sugar industry and
animal feeding technology (UNIDO, 1986:24).
22.

The difference

in growth rates reflected in Table 19

is even

higher since the average growth rates of Latin American countries
are for total gross domestic product while for Cuba the average
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growth rate

is the total

gross social

product which

excludes

public services.
23.

While in the rest of this section I will argue against the first
group's claim in some detail, 1 will not pursue a counter argument
of the second claim.

It is sufficient to say, however, that the

claim that the USSR has dictated the terms of Cuba's involvement
in Africa,

beside denying the possibility of political and

ideological non coercive convergence of two countries,
some historical aspects.

neglects

The claim reflects a neglect of the

historical ties that existed between Cuba and Africa long before
the Cuban-Soviet relationship (e.g., Cuba's solidarity support of
the Algerian revolution), and of

the

Soviet and Cuban policies in Africa.

differences

between

the

On more than one occasion,

Cuba supported different revolutionary groups than those supported
by the USSR e.g., in Angola and Ethiopia (for a detailed account
see F. Fitzgerald 1987:451-53.

And for an interesting account of
f

the Cuban involvement in Africa see Garcia Marquiz 1981).
24.

Turits

notes

that according

to

the

CIA's

calculations

received aid would compete even with Israel; however,
look would reveal a major difference.

Cuba's

a closer

Assuming that Cuba does

receive an estimated $2 billion, it is a tied aid per year through
implicit subsidies.

Israel's received aid of $2 billion, however,

is outright hard currency cash transfer from the United States.
Further,

on per

capital

basis

Israel

receives

2.5

times

the

estimated average yearly trade subsidies received by Cuba (Turits,
1987:177).
25.

Reference is to the first Congress of the Cuban Communist Party.
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26.

In a

comparison

exercise

of

the

different

impact

of

foreign

assistance utilization, Turits shows that while Puerto Rico
receives from the United States about six times the per capital
aid than Cuba receives from the USSR, yet
Puerto Rico is hardly an analogous paradigm of
growth with equity, and still depends on a
conclusive dynamic of incessant circular migration
(...).
Since the 1950s, almost a third of the
population has migrated to the United States,
while a quarter of those seeking work in Puerto
Rico remain unemployed and half the people live on
food stamps and public assistance (Turits,
1987:178).
27.

In addition to the general reduction in international liquidity,
the change in these banks' financial policy towards Cuba has been
the result

of worsening Cuban-U.S.

relations

especially

after

Reagan's Presidency.
28.

For an excellent account of these aspects see Brundenius (1981,
1984); and different studies in Griffiths and Griffiths (1979).
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CONCLUSIONS
It is difficult to find any country, regardless of its level of
development or its social and political orientation,

that

consider economic independence as one of its major goals.

does not

Despite this

common goal, however, there exists no commonly accepted definition of
economic independence and, as a consequence, no general agreement on
the conditions and strategies necessary for achieving it.
An examination of five theoretical perspectives on the issue of
economic independence reveals,
definitions

either explicitly or implicitly,

of such independence:

(1) delinking from

two

the world

capitalist system and pursuing an anti-capitalist path i.e. , socialist
development;

(2) transforming the economic structure into one with a

higher productive and technical capacity as well as a higher level of
national integration.

This dissertation adopts the second definition

of economic independence.

This definition as opposed to the first one

has two main implications:
(1)

It implies the theoretical possibility of achieving a higher level
of economic independence in capitalist-oriented economies as well
as in socialist-oriented ones.

In a capitalist-oriented economy,

the ability to pursue successfully the strategies
independent-,

depends

of

economic

largely on the relative strength of the

national industrial bourgeoisie over that of the commercial and
landed oligarchy.
expanding

the

Generally, the former's best interests involve

domestic productive

limiting foreign investment.
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sectors

and

regulating

and

(2)

The definition also implies that the internal dynamics within an
economy

(e.g. , the role played by

the

state

and

its

adopted

strategies, class structure, surplus use) override, in most cases,
the

external

dynamics

(e.g., the

role

played by

hostile countries and financial organizations).
internal

dynamics,

however,

does

not

friendly

or

This emphasis on

mean

that

economic

independence is equated with autarky; on the contrary, it implies
economic interdependence with other countries, only however,

on

more equal terms.
Examination of the five different schools

of thought

in this

dissertation, has revealed a set of different strategy proposals and
policy recommendations.

Further

investigation of these

points out the importance of an industrial strategy,

strategies

one that pays

special attention to the development of the capital-goods sector and to
those

industries

with

the

highest

linkage

effect.

Such

special

attention would contribute greatly to the development of an economy's
technical and productive capacity and increase the level

of national

integration.
Both 1S1 (Import Substituting Industrialization)
Industrialization)

are

important

and BI

industrialization

(Basic

strategies.

Although the theoretical examination pointed out the superiority of the
BI strategy, an empirical examination of the Cuban experience showed
that ISI contributed greatly
independence.

to

increasing

the Cuban economy's

This was especially true when the strategy was pursued

within a process of economic planning and applied in the intermediate
and capital

goods

sector,

not

only

in the

consumer-goods

sector.

Furthermore, the negative impacts associated with 1ST, cited repeatedly
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in the literature,
industries with

can be minimized when 1S1

the highest

linkage

effects

is pursued
among

between them and domestic resources and output.

in those

themselves,

and

When all these factors

are considered, 1SI stand close to BI in enhancing the productive and
technical capacity of an economy.
demands for the NIEO

Also,

regional cooperation and

(new international economic order)

can be

considered important long-run strategies, as they face external factors
beyond the control of the national economy and require the committed
collective effort of other countries.
The

theoretical

investigation also reveals a set of necessary

policies which pursued simultaneously with the above strategies, would
warrant achieving a higher

level

of economic

independence.

These

policies are as follows:
(1) Regulating foreign investment (especially its direct form) will
reduce both

the

outflow

of

surplus

and

foreign

control

over

decision making.
(2) Regulating the transfer of technology will enhance an economy's
technical capacity, if it involves the adaptation and innovation
of technology suited for domestic resources and output.
(3)

Undertaking a deliberate policy

of income

redistribution will

contribute to increasing both the level of productivity and mass
support.
(4)

Transforming most (if not all) foreign ownership of the productive
assets into national ownership (public and private) will increase
the country's

control

over

the

making.
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national

surplus

and

decision

(5)

Undertaking a marked policy of economic planning will enhance the
implementation of the adopted strategies and reduce some of the
ill effects that develop due to conflicting interests.

(6)

Finally,

the

above

policies

call

for

the

participate and intervene in the economy.

state

to

actively

This can be considered

the "sufficient condition" for the successful implementation of
the strategies and policies outlined above.
Though not addressed in this dissertation,

there are other

important social and political policies that would help a nation to
develop

a higher

level

of productivity and economic

independence.

Examples of such policies include the advancement of human power in
terms of skills and education;
technical

research;

and

the

the expansion of scientific

enhancement

of

mass

and

participation

in

decision making, a policy which would strengthen a country's social and
political stability.
All of the above socio-economic policies have been confirmed as
essential in the empirical case of Cuba.
adopted earlier in this dissertation,
economic

independence,

Cuba has

Judged by the definition

and by its own definition of

successfully managed

to achieve

higher level of economic independence since the revolution.
is demonstrated by

Cuba's

technical

national

national

capacity,
surplus.

Such

increased

level

of

refutesthe

This fact

productive capacity,

integration and control

achievement

a

claim

over

its

that

own
Cuba

continues to be dependent on the Soviet Union, as it was on the United
States before the Cuban revolution.
"dependency"

with

quantitative factors

"dependence"

This claim mistakenly equates
and

focuses

(e.g., volumes of trade).
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only

on external

Cuba's higher
(especially

level

of

productivity

industrial-agricultural

and national

integration)

has

integration

been

achieved

mainly through determined efforts at industrialization (both 1SI and
BI),

export diversification,

provision of basic needs.
provision of basic

needs,

technical research and innovation,
Cuba's successful experience
and

its political

and

social

and

in the

democracy

(evident in increasing mass participation in the decision-making
process
social

(Harnecker,
stability.

1979)) have further contributed to its internal
Furthermore,

by participating

in

the

socialist

international division of labor, through an active membership in the
CMEA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) , Cuba has facilitated its
transition process and minimized the negative Impact of the world's
economic fluctuations.
The particular definition of economic

independence utilized in

this dissertation retains its validity when applied to other economies
(socialist, capitalist and mixed) in different levels of development.
Such a definition, when utilized within an historical perspective, can
demonstrate the relative change in the level of economic independence.
Other studies have applied different conceptions of dependency and
independence in assessing the experiences of other developing countries
especially of those categorized as the newly industrialized countries
(NICs) .
the

There is an ongoing debate in the development literature on

issue of

economic

independence

specifically

certain countries (e.g., South Korea and Brazil).

as

it

applies

to

Some writers (e.g.,

Luedde-Neurath (1980), Hamilton (1983), Barone (1983) and Foster-Carter
(1985)) have argued that the economy of South Korea,

for example,

represents a successful model of an independent capitalist development.
Other writers (e.g., Payer (1975), Sunno (1978) and Landsberg (1979)),
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however, emphasize the dependent nature of this development, and argue
that

it

is

foreign

capital

(mainly Japanese)

productive sector of the Korean economy.

that

dominates

the

In their analysis of

technology and the nature of NICs development, Baumgartner and Burns
(1981) argue that "isolated structural changes in specific industrial
sectors have not affected the socio-economic and political metalevel
structures which are all too characteristic of dependency" (Baumgartner
and Burns, 1981:321).
No attempt is made here to settle this debate over the assessment
of the actual experience

of these other economies, which requires in-

depth case studies.

is important to mention,

It

however,

that the

distributional results of the process of independence would differ in
the capitalist-oriented from the socialist-oriented ones.

. In this

sense the answer to the important question: economic independence for
whom will differ, with the
different

social groups

conclusions

regarding

gains from higher productivity reaped by
in each case.

the status

While

of dependency

reaching conflicting
or

independence

of

specific capitalist-oriented economies (e.g., Brazil and South Korea),
most writers on the subject agree that the dependent or independent
development of

these

economies has

been

accompanied by

repressive

social and political measures, which raise doubts about their long-run
internal social stability.

Furthermore, many writers point out the

increasing external obstacles (e.g., changing world demand,

increased

protectionist measures taken by the advanced countries

(Bienfeld

(1982), Helleiner (1979)) which threaten these developing countries'
long-run economic stability.
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In summary, economic independence is perceived not as an absolute
condition, but as a gradual process towards a relatively higher degree
of national integration.

In this sense one cannot speak of countries

that are independent and countries that are not, but rather of degrees
of

dependence

and

independence.

Judged

within

an

historical

perspective, Cuba since the revolution has been able to attain a higher
level of economic independence.
assistance,

Though still dependent on the Soviet

this dependence can be

’tactical' ; it has

been

used

to

considered a short duration or
develop

the

economy's

productive

capacity and to ensure a stronger structure for future independence.
Without

implying

universal

applicability

and

taking

into

consideration the specificity of the different political, economic and
social factors facing each country, it can be said that lessons can be
learned from other countries' experiences.
experience

(especially

the efforts

In this instance, the Cuban

at increasing the technical

and

productive capacity, national integration and provision of basic needs)
does provide useful insights for other small developing countries in
their attempts at achieving a higher level of economic independence.
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